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Abstract: 
Although supported in principle by two-thirds of the public and even more of the 
States, capital punishment in the United States is a minority practice when the 
actual death-sentencing practices of the nation‘s 3000-plus counties and their 
populations are considered. This feature of American capital punishment has been 
present for decades, has become more pronounced recently, and is especially clear 
when death sentences, which are merely infrequent, are distinguished from 
executions, which are exceedingly rare.  
 
The first question this Article asks is what forces account for the death-proneness 
of a minority of American communities? The answer to that question---that a 
combination of parochialism and libertarianism characterizes the communities 
most disposed to impose death sentences---helps to answer the next question 
addressed here: Why so few death sentences end in executions? It turns out that the 
imposition of death sentences, particularly for felony murder (a proxy for the 
out-of-the-blue stranger killings that generate the greatest fear among parochial 
communities), provides parochial and libertarian communities with a quick and 
cheap alternative to effective law enforcement. And that alternative is largely 
realized whether or not death sentences are ultimately carried out. This explanation 
sheds light on two other criminal law conundrums---the survival of the most 
idiosyncratic manifestation of the felony murder doctrine (which mysteriously 
transmogrifies involuntary manslaughter into capitally aggravated murder) and the 
failure of the death penalty to have a demonstrable deterrent effect (which is not 
surprising if the death penalty operates as a weak substitute for, rather than a 
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powerful addition to, otherwise effective law enforcement strategies). The 
explanation also reveals a number of costs the capitally prone minority imposes on 
the majority of citizens and locales that can do without the death penalty, including 
more crime, a cumbersome process for reviewing systematically flawed death 
sentences whose execution is of less interest to the death sentences‘ originators 
than their imposition, and a heightened risk---to the judicial system as well as 
individual defendants---of miscarriages of justice. 
 
These explanations, in turn, beg the most important and difficult question 
considered here. Why do the majority of communities and citizens who can live 
without the death penalty tolerate a minority practice with serious costs that the 
majority mainly bears? With a bow towards Douglas Hay‘s famous explanation for 
the survival over many decades of eighteenth century England‘s no less universally 
vilified death-sentencing system---which likewise condemned many but executed 
few---we offer some reasons for the minority‘s success in wagging the majority. In 
response to recent evidence of a (thus far largely counterproductive) majority 
backlash, we conclude by offering some suggestions about how the majority might 
require the minority of death-prone communities to bear more of the costs of their 
death-proneness without increasing the risk of miscarriage of justice. 
 
I. A Local Institution 
II. A Minority Practice 
A. Death Sentences 
B. Executions 
III. An Explanation of the Death Penalty’s Localism 
A. Parochialism 
1. Parochialism Defined 
2. Death Sentencing Localities as Parochial Communities 
B. Libertarianism 
1. Death Sentencing Localities as Libertarian Communities 
2. The Death Penalty as a Libertarian Tool for Self-Protection 
3. The Death Penalty as a Libertarian and Parochial Tool for 
Self-Protection 
C. A Parochial and Libertarian Explanation of the Resilience of the 
Felony-Murder Doctrine 
1. Felony Murder’s Puzzling Resilience 
2. Felony Murder’s Symbiotic Relation to the Death Penalty 
3. Capital Felony Murder as a Tool for Parochial Self-Protection 
4. Capital Felony Murder as a Tool for Parochial and Libertarian 
Self-Protection 
D. The Death Penalty and the Illusion of Self-Protection 
IV. An Explanation of the Death Penalty’s Frequent Imposition and 
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Infrequent Execution 
A. The Paradox at the Heart of the System 
B. A New View, from Without 
C. The True Course of a Capital Case 
1. The Origin of a Death Sentence: The Scarlet Letter Stage 
2. The Death Row Stage 
3. The Re-trial Stage 
a. The More Parochial Response to Reversal 
b. The More Libertarian Response to Reversal 
D. A New Explanation of Why Reversals Have No Chastening Effect 
V. The Costs of a Broken System: Imposed by Few, Borne By Many 
A. Direct Costs Compared to Life Without Parole  
1. Additional Costs Per Trial 
2. Additional Costs Per Appeal 
3. Additional Cost Per Execution 
4. Overall Additional Cost 
B. Indirect Costs 
C. Other Externalized Costs 
VI. An Exploration of Why the Majority Accepts the Costs the Minority 
Imposes 
A. The Opaque Nature of the Costs  
B. No Deterrence Dividend 
C. The Death Penalty as a Back-Pocket Option 
D. The Majority’s Fear of the Minority’s Reaction to Abolition 
E. The Resonance of the Minority’s Parochial and Libertarian Values 
F. Hay’s America? 
VII. The New Millennium: Decline and Fall? 
A. The Last Decade’s Death-Sentencing Decline 
B. An Uneven Decline  
C. A Smaller Tail Wagging a Larger Dog  
VIII. Policy Options 
A. The Insufficiency of Options Previously Proposed  
B. Regulatory Strategies  
1. Less, not More, Externalization of Costs 
2. The Problems with Performance-Based Approaches 
3. Local Improvements in Defense Representation 
4. Managed Prosecution 
IX. Conclusion 
 
I. A LOCAL INSTITUTION 
 
As Tip O‘Neill famously quipped about ―all politics‖ in the United States, 
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almost all there is to know about its death penalty is local, not national.
1
  Only 
local differences can explain, for example, the simultaneous vilification of the 
United States as the only Western nation to punish personal and civilian crimes 
with death
2
 and celebration of the State of Michigan as the vanguard of abolition 
in the Western world.
3
  
 
Until relatively recently, the decision to impose death and carry out 
executions was a local affair across most of the Western world.
4
 For example, 
Douglas Hay‘s classic article Property, Authority and the Criminal Law vividly 
depicts eighteenth century England‘s ―capitol assize[s]‖ as a distinctly local 
spectacle.
5
  He explains that period‘s prodigious number of death verdicts as a 
diabolically ingenious tool the small gentry class in each community used to 
customize the maintenance of social order to local conditions and protect local 
prerogatives against centralization of law enforcement in the hands of the Crown.
6
 
 
By the twentieth century, however, most Western nations had witnessed a 
transformative ―delocalization‖ of capital punishment, placing capital institutions 
in the hands of national authorities who, for example, carried out executions at a 
great distance from the site of the offense.
7
  Typically, the effect of 
nationalization was to rationalize the process, reduce regional capital-sentencing 
disparities and the frequency of executions overall and eventually pave the way for 
national elites to abolish the penalty despite the public‘s desire to retain it.8  
 
Although, capital punishment in the United States has fitfully followed some 
of these trends—especially since the Supreme Court began examining the 
penalty‘s constitutionality in the late 1960s9—American federalism has mostly 
                                                                                                                       
 
1   See CHRISTOPHER COLLIER, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL: FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND PROVINCIAL 
2   See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA‘S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF 
ABOLITION 11 (2010) (noting that ―all other Western nations have decisively abandoned‖ capital 
punishment). 
3   See Id.  
4   Id. at 108.  
5   Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION‘S FATAL TREE: CRIME 
AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17–18 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975). 
6   Id. at 18 (describing England‘s localized ―system of criminal law based on terror‖ that was 
used in place of a national police force that ―the gentry would not tolerate‖). 
7
   GARLAND, supra note 2, at 108, 116. 
8   Id. at 109. 
9   See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 
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blocked any nationalizing tendency.
10
  In the United States, state, not federal 
legislation, is the source of nearly all the nation‘s capital crimes,11 and nearly all 
of its death sentences are imposed and executed in the name of a state.
12
 All but a 
handful of the nation‘s condemned prisoners await their fate on death row in state 
prisons;
13
 state governors have the power to commute their sentences or to pardon 
them;
14
 and state courts are and have always been responsible for the vast majority 
of court rulings affirming and reversing capital verdicts.
15
  Currently, 68% of all 
States (34 of 50) retain the death penalty,
16
 which neatly matches up with polling 
figures showing that public support for the death penalty has hovered between 65 
and 70 percent over the last decade or so.
17
  Michigan‘s pioneering constitutional 
expungement of the death penalty in 1846, as well as more recent legislation in 
New Jersey, New Mexico and Illinois amply demonstrate that abolition is also a 
state affair in this country.
18
 
                                                                                                                       
(1968). 
10  GARLAND, supra note 2, at 188. 
11  Eileen M. Connor, The Undermining Influence of the Federal Death Penalty on Capital 
Policymaking and Criminal Justice Administration in the States, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
149, 151 (2010) (―[The] number of federal capital prosecutions remains low, and the vast majority of 
homicide prosecutions are undertaken by state criminal justice systems.‖)  
12  Death Sentences in the United States From 1977 By State and Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008 (last visited May 13, 
2011) [hereinafter Death Sentences by State and Year] (listing the 112 individuals executed in the 
United States in 2009, of whom 108 were executed by one of the several states); Execution List 2011, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2011, (last visited May 
13, 2011) (listing the fifteen executions thus far in 2011, all of which were carried out by one of the 
several states). 
13  Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated June 30, 2011) (listing 3,249 
death row inmates in the United States as of October 1, 2010, of whom only 68 were under federal 
sentence of death). 
14  See, e.g., Richard A. Devine, The Death Penalty Debate: A Prosecutor‘s View, 95 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 637, 639 (2005) (criticizing Illinois Governor George Ryan‘s order commuting 
the sentence of, or pardoning, every death row inmate in the state in the waning days of his 
administration as a policy matter but acknowledging the governor‘s power to issue the order). 
15  Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Pattern of Reversals of Death 
Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 214, 222 (2004) (noting that, 
despite frequent complaints about federal court interference with the death penalty via habeas corpus 
review, state courts have been responsible for 90% of reversals of death verdicts). 
16  See, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., Facts About the Death Penalty, supra note 13, at 1.  
17  Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited 
April 6, 2011). 
18  See GARLAND, supra note 2, at 36–38; Statement from Governor Pat Quinn on Senate Bill 
3539, March 9th, 2011, available at 
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=2&RecNum=9265 
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None of this has gone unnoticed.  Much superb recent commentary on the 
death penalty has treated States and regional groupings of States as the key unit of 
analysis.
19
  Summarizing and contributing to that commentary, Professor David 
Garland identifies a four-fold typology of American States and the death 
penalty—(1) abolishing States; (2) States such as Colorado, Connecticut and 
Wyoming that have death penalty statutes but only rarely invoke them; (3) States 
such as California, Pennsylvania and Tennessee that frequently impose death 
sentences but rarely execute them; and (4) States such as Ohio, Oklahoma and 
Texas that impose and execute death sentences fairly frequently.
20
 The historical, 
political, demographic and other explanations these observers have offered for 
differences in the use of the death penalty have also tended to be 
state-centric—focused, for example, on States that did and did not practice slavery, 
join the Confederacy or tolerate lynching.
21
  
                                                                                                                       
[hereinafter Governor Quinn‘s Abolition Statement]. 
19  See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 2; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF 
AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 72–78 (2003); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two 
Nations: Implementation of the Death Penalty in ―Executing‖ Versus ―Symbolic‖ States in the 
United States, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1870 (2006) (noting that the United States is not monolithic in 
its death penalty practices and dividing the nation into ―abolitionist‖ states, ―symbolic‖ states and 
―executing‖ states).  A sampling of the rich literature on the American death penalty includes DAVID 
C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
(1990); STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002); FRANK R. 
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE 
(2008); BEYOND REPAIR: AMERICA‘S DEATH PENALTY (Stephen P. Garvey ed. 2003); CHARLES L. 
BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981); THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES (Elizabeth Beck & Hugo Adam Bedau eds. 
1997); SAMUEL R. GROSS, & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM (2005);  MACHINERY OF DEATH: THE REALITY OF AMERICA‘S DEATH 
PENALTY REGIME (David R. Dow & Mark Doweds. 2002); CHARLES OGLETREE JR. & AUSTIN SARAT, 
FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (2006); 
SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY (2005); Judge 
Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California‘s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697 (2007); 
Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982); James S. Liebman, Slow 
Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1 (2007); Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283 
(2008); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades 
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995); Robert 
Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305.  
20  GARLAND, supra note 2, at 200. 
21  See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 2; ZIMRING, supra note 19, at 72–78; William S. Lofquist, 
Putting Them There, Keeping Them There, and Killing Them: An Analysis of State-Level Variations 
in Death Penalty Intensity, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1505 (2002); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 1916; 
Andrew Ditchfield, Note, Challenging the Intrastate Disparities in the Application of Capital 
Punishment Statutes, 95 GEO. L.J. 801 (2007).  Although there is a robust scholarship on intrastate 
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As revealing as it is, this state-focused commentary misses important facets of 
the death penalty‘s localism.  For example, these analyses typically pit States like 
Texas—the so-called ―Death Penalty Capital of the Western World,‖ with nearly 
500 executions since 1982
22—against more politically liberal States like Maryland, 
which rarely carry out executions and are on no one‘s list of the nation‘s 
bloodiest.
23
  Yet, just under two-thirds of the counties in Texas did not carry out a 
single execution in the past thirty five years.
24
  Texas‘s El Paso County—the 
                                                                                                                       
geographic disparities in the imposition of the death penalty, it focuses on the legal implications, if 
any, of the fact that defendants committing essentially the same capital-eligible crime in different 
counties of the same state often are predictably sentenced to the death penalty in some counties and to 
a lesser sentence in others.  See sources cited infra note 19.  Recently, Adam Gershowitz has taken 
the analysis further, identifying the death penalty‘s localism as a policy, as well as a legal, problem 
that not only contributes to ―geographic arbitrariness,‖ but also to uneven procedures, poor legal 
representation and high error rates.  Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case 
for Eliminating Counties‘ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 311, 318–28 (2010) 
[hereinafter Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment]; see also Adam M. Gershowtiz, Pay Now, 
Execute Later: Why Counties Should Be Required to Post a Bond to Seek the Death Penalty, 41 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 861, 871 (2007); infra notes 404–412 and accompanying text.  But see Stephen F. 
Smith, Response: Localism and Capital Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. 105, 107, 109–15 (2011) 
(responding to Gershowitz and concluding that county-by-county death sentencing disparities ―are 
not troubling at all, but rather the inevitable effect of any system of nationally varying law 
enforcement‖).  In considering why counties have different approaches to the death penalty, 
Professor Gershowtiz mainly blames differential spending.  Gershowtiz, Statewide Capital 
Punishment, supra at 318–23; See cf. id. at 318 (―[I]t is hard to explain the wide variations in 
counties‘ use of the death penalty.‖).  As Professor Stephen Smith points out, however, 
Gershowtiz‘s explanation boils down to a matter of differences in ―‗local preferences,‘‖ including 
preferences for approaches to and levels of support for public safety.  Smith, supra at 110–11.  As 
we develop below, understanding the reasons for local differences—what Professor Smith refers to 
generically as ―the values, priorities, and felt needs of local communities‖ to which local criminal 
justice strategies respond, see id. at 110—is crucial to resolving the question whether the penalty‘s 
localism is a good or bad thing. 
22  State by State Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited May 11, 2011). 
23  David Michael Smith, The Death Penalty Capital of the Western World, 13 PEACE REV. 
495, 495 (2001) (―‘When it comes to the death penalty, Texas has the dubious distinction of being the 
bloodiest state in the U.S., outstripping all others in sheer numbers of executions‘‖ (quoting an 
official of Amnesty International)); see also Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 
45 (2007) (―Texas [in 2000] was the undisputed capital of capital punishment among the states.‖); 
Adam Liptak, At 60% of Total, Texas is Bucking Execution Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007, at A1.  
24  Professor Baumgartner identified the originating county of all executions in the United 
States between 1977 and 2007.  His data show that only 90 (35%) of Texas‘s 254 counties carried 
out at least one execution between the Supreme Court‘s reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976 
and 2010.  Frank R. Baumgartner, Spreadsheet of Executions by County, 
http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/Innocence/NC/execs-by-county-since-1976.xlsx (last updated Oct. 
2010) [hereinafter Baumgartner, Spreadsheet].  
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seventh-fifth most populous county in the nation
25 —carried out only four 
executions during those three and one-half decades.
26
  By contrast, Baltimore 
County, Maryland---the nation‘s seventy-first most populous county—registered 
the twenty-third most death sentences of any county of any size in the United 
States between 1973 and 1995.
27
  
 
More generally, many of the most important capital decisions are exclusively 
the domain of local actors—including whether to investigate, charge, convict and 
condemn a suspect.  Applying the same statute, moreover, and faced with similar 
circumstances, local actors often make these decisions quite differently from 
counterparts in neighboring locales.
28
  There even is evidence that state appellate 
courts and federal habeas corpus courts exercise different levels of scrutiny of 
death verdicts depending upon which locality generates them.
29
  More than 
anything else, therefore, it is the practices, policies, habits and political milieu of 
                                                                                                                       
 
25  Population figures are from the 2000 Census.  , Resident Population Estimates for the 100 
Largest U.S. Counties Based on July 1, 2009 Population Estimates: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popest/counties/CO-EST2009-07.html (last visited 
June 14, 2011) 
26  Baumgartner, supra note 24.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 26.  Compare 
Texas‘s Potter and Brazos counties, each with about one-fifth the population of El Paso County, 
which executed eleven and twelve individuals, respectively, during the same period. 
27  See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So Much Error in 
Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It, Table 11A, at B-2, (2002), 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/index2.html [hereinafter BROKEN SYSTEM II].  Over 
the 1973–1995 period, suburban Baltimore County accounted for over 55% of Maryland‘s death 
sentences, despite having less than 15% of the state‘s population (1990 census) and being only its 
third most populous county.  See id.  Baltimore County‘s proportion of Maryland‘s death row 
population actually increased in subsequent years.  Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by 
Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 MARGINS: 
MARYLAND‘S L.J. ON RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 2 (2004) (noting that, as of 2004, fully 
two-thirds of those on death row in Maryland were convicted by Baltimore County). 
28  See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 19, at 117–33; GARLAND, supra note 2, at 117; Leigh 
B. Bienen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the Aftermath of the Ryan Commutations: Reforms, 
Economic Realities, and a New Saliency for Issues of Cost, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1301, 
1324–41 (2010); G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal Death 
Penalty, 85 WASH. L. REV. 425, 433 (2010); Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment, supra note 
21, at 308–10, 314–28; Paternoster et al., supra note 27, at 2 ; Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, 
Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988–1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39, 62 (2002); Smith, 
supra note 21, at 106–14. 
29  See Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 247 (presenting statistical analysis indicating that state 
courts are more likely to overturn death verdicts from urban than from rural and small-town counties, 
while federal habeas corpus decisions exhibit the opposite trend); infra notes 192–94 and 
accompanying text. 
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local prosecutors, jurors and judges that dictate whether a given defendant in the 
United States—whatever his crime—will be charged, tried, convicted and 
sentenced capitally and executed. 
 
By focusing on county rather than state data, this Article paints a new and 
surprising portrait of the death penalty in the United States.  Unlike state-by-state 
analyses or national polling numbers—which portray the penalty as a penological 
tool of choice of a comfortable majority of Americans and American 
jurisdictions
30—county-level analysis reveals that the modern American death 
penalty is a distinctly minority practice across the United States and in most or all 
of the 34 so-called death penalty States.  Indeed, analyzed in this way, the data 
pose a modern analogue to the puzzle at the heart of Douglas Hay‘s examination of 
England‘s eighteenth century capital punishment: how a small minority of capital 
punishment partisans gained control over the nation‘s killing machine and 
administered it for decades in a costly, even facially irrational manner, and why 
everyone else went along.31 
 
Part II discusses the raw numbers, which show that American counties 
responsible for the vast majority of death sentences and executions represent a 
minority of Americans.  Moving from simple counts to an uneasy combination of 
statistical analysis and cultural speculation, Part III identifies two threads that 
appear to link communities that frequently use the death penalty—parochialism 
and libertarianism—and shows how their intersection enhances the penalty‘s 
appeal.  Part IV uses the confluence of the same two forces to explain another 
puzzle confounding death penalty practice both in the United States today and in 
eighteenth century England: the disjuncture between a large number of death 
verdicts and a small number of executions.  In both periods, post-conviction 
review—by clemency officials in England, by courts in the United States—is the 
most common explanation, yet in neither period did centralized review have the 
expected, chastening effect on local practice.  Again analogizing to Hay‘s 
solution to a parallel quandary, Part IV explains why this is so in the United States 
today.  
 
The remainder of the Article discusses the implications of the minority‘s use 
of the death penalty for the majority of jurisdictions that do not much use it.  Part 
V catalogues the myriad and escalating costs locally practiced capital punishment 
                                                                                                                       
 
30  See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
31.  See Hay, supra note 5, at 18–19. 
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imposes on residents of the majority of communities that rarely or never use it, and 
asks why the majority continues to tolerate those costs.  Part VI complicates the 
analysis by distinguishing the last dozen years of capital punishment practice from 
the two dozen preceding years, noting important changes that reveal that the 
majority is fighting back.  If so, however, the unintended effect has only been to 
increase the disparity between the costs and benefits of the death penalty for the 
majority.  Part VII suggests how the majority might better align costs and 
benefits.  
 
II. A MINORITY PRACTICE 
 
There are two obvious ways to measure usage of the death penalty: how often 
it is imposed, and how often it is carried out.  Although the former sets an upper 
boundary on the latter, the correlation between the two can be less pronounced 
than one would expect.  Thus, although eighteenth century wags across the 
Channel sneered that England might as well adopt the gallows as its national 
symbol considering how many crimes received death sentences, in fact, even in its 
capital punishment heyday, Georgian England executed only about 20% of those it 
convicted of capital crimes and condemned to die.
32
  An even greater disparity 
exists in the United States today, which—since the Supreme Court permitted 
executions to proceed in 1976 after a ten-year hiatus—has executed only about 
15% of those it has sentenced to die.
33
  In this Part, we examine the frequency of 
both death sentences and executions in the United States in the recent past.  
 
A. Death Sentences 
 
The only comprehensive county-by-county analysis of modern death 
sentencing in the United States is our own Broken System, Part II: Why There is So 
Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It, which examines 
death sentences imposed in the United States between 1973 and 1995.
34
  During 
                                                                                                                       
 
32  England and Wales capitally sentenced about 580 people a year between 1770 and 1830, 
but executed only about 115 a year.  See V.A.C. GATRELL, THE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION AND THE 
ENGLISH PEOPLE 1770–1868, 7, 618 (1994). 
33  Executions per Death Sentence, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-death-sentence (last visited May 12, 2011). 
34
  See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27 (reprised in abbreviated form in Gelman et al, supra 
note 15); see also James S. Liebman, Rates of Reversible Error and the Risk of Wrongful Execution, 
86 JUDICATURE 78 (2002).  
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that period, thirty-four states sentenced at least one person to death, yet fully 60% 
of the counties in those States did not impose a single sentence of death over the 
twenty three year period—out of an estimated 332,000 homicides and 120,000 
murder convictions occurring there during that time.
35
  Even in Texas, nearly 
60% of its counties did not impose a single death sentence in the period.
36
 
 
Not only have many counties de facto abolished the death penalty, but many 
others have employed it only sparingly—once or twice a decade.  Fairfax County, 
Virginia, for example, with a population of nearly one million, imposed only five 
death sentences between 1973 and 1995.
37
  Conversely, a relatively small number 
of counties account for an extraordinary proportion of the nation‘s death verdicts.  
During the same period, Seminole County, Georgia had the same number of death 
sentences as Virginia‘s Fairfax County but had a population more than 100 times 
smaller.
38
  Similarly, Hillsborough County (Tampa), Florida, with about the same 
population as Fairfax, imposed over thirteen times more death sentences 
(sixty-seven) than Fairfax County.
39
  More than half of the death sentences 
imposed nationwide over the twenty-three-year Broken System study period 
originated in only sixty-six, or 2%, of the nation‘s 3,143 counties, parishes and 
boroughs.
40
 16% of the nation‘s counties (510 out of 3,143) accounted for 90% of 
                                                                                                                       
 
35  See Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 214, 252. 
36  See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 246.  
37  BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at B-5.  All county populations are from the 2000 
census.  
38  Id. at B-1. 
39  Id. at B-3, B-5.   
40  See Peter Clarke, County-by-County Death Sentencing Spreadsheet (April 2011) (on file 
with the authors) [hereinafter, Clarke Spreadsheet] (showing that from 1973 to 1995, 66 counties 
imposed 2,569 of the 5,131 total death sentences imposed in the period).  This spreadsheet reports 
the death sentences per capita for all counties in the United States in which at least one death 
sentence was imposed during one of two periods, 1973-1995 (the Broken System II period) and 
2004-09.  The death sentence data for the earlier period is from BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, 
or the NAACP Legal Defense Fund‘s quarterly death row census, Death Row USA.  Death Row 
USA is available in electronic form for the years 2000-2010 at 
http://naacpldf.org/search/node/death%20row%20usa, and may be obtained in printed form for earlier 
years from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in New York City.  Broken System II is the source for 
all 1973-95 county data for counties five or more death verdicts in the 1973-1995 period; Death Row 
USA is the source for all county data for counties with one to four death verdicts during that period.  
Death sentences by county for the later period are from a compilation created by Professor Robert J. 
Smith of the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute, Harvard University Law School for research he is 
conducting on regional disparities in death sentencing.  Smith‘s compilation reports the number of 
death sentences handed down by county, by year, between 2004 and 2009.  In the Clarke 
Spreadsheet, Smith‘s data for each of those years have been summed into a six-year total.  We are 
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its death verdicts in the period.
41
 
 
As the death-sentencing disparities just noted between the equally populous 
Fairfax and Hillsborough Counties reveal, these numbers are not a result of the 
heavy use of the death penalty by a small number of densely populated counties.  
Between 1973 and 1995, the counties where only a fifth of all Americans lived 
imposed two-thirds of its death sentences.
42
  Counties with 10% of the nation‘s 
residents imposed 43% of its death sentences.
43
  Even considering only 
death-sentencing States, counties comprising around 10% of the population were 
responsible for over 38% of the death sentences.
44
  
 
In short, county-level data reveal something that state-level analyses do not: 
notwithstanding broad public and statutory support, the vast bulk of death 
sentences are imposed by on behalf of a small minority of Americans.  A given 
defendant‘s likelihood of receiving a sentence of death depends greatly on the 
county in which he was tried.
45
 
 
B. Executions 
 
The figures are even more striking when we focus on counties where death 
sentences end in actual executions.  Recently, University of North Carolina 
political scientist Frank Baumgartner found that only 454 (14% ) of the nation‘s 
3,147 counties, parishes and boroughs carried out an execution between 1976, 
when the Supreme Court permitted executions to go forward again, and 2007, 
when Baumgartner‘s study ends.46  Six-sevenths of all American counties have 
not carried out an execution in four and one-half decades.
47
  
                                                                                                                       
deeply grateful to Professor Smith for sharing his data with us.  Population figures are from the 
2000 census. 
41  Clarke Spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
42  Id.  
43  Id.  
44  Id. 
45  See, e.g., Bienen, supra note 28.  
46  Baumgartner Spreadsheet, supra note 24.  Because of the moratorium on executions in the 
nation between 1966 and 1976, the same figure holds if one commences the period in question in 
1966.  See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 106, 106-125 (1973) (describing the moratorium).  In this Article, we use 1976, not 
1966, as the start date for our relevant analyses. 
47  Baumgartner Spreadsheet, supra note 24.  Baumgartner records 454 different county and 
county-equivalents from which originated at least once sentence of death.  There are 3,141 counties 
and county-equivalents in the United States (3141-454 = 2687/3141 = 85.5%). 
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From this perspective, the localism and small proportion of American 
communities that use the death penalty are startling.  Fourteen counties—about 
four-tenths of a percent of all U.S. counties, encompassing less than 5% of the 
nation‘s population—carried out over half (53%) of its executions between 1976 
and 2007.
48
  Nearly one-quarter (23%) of all executions came from only six 
counties, with fewer than 2% of the country‘s population.49  
 
Although jurisdictions with only a tenth of Americans account for 43% of its 
death sentences, that same small slice of the population accounts for nearly 70% of 
all executions.
50
  Between 1976 and 2007, half of all executions were carried out 
on behalf of less than 5.5% of Americans.51  Twenty-eight percent of Americans 
account for over 95% of its executions.52  A clear majority (57%) of Americans 
live in counties that have not executed a soul for nearly a half century.53  Over 
70% reside in counties that have executed one person or less during the period.54  
 
Despite the comfortable majorities that profess to telephone pollsters that they 
favor the death penalty, its actual imposition has been a minority practice in the 
United States for decades.55  Moreover, the actual execution of the penalty is an 
even rarer phenomenon.  It is employed on behalf of a small fraction of 
Americans who reside in a minuscule proportion of its communities. 
 
III. AN EXPLANATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY‘S LOCALISM 
 
The irregular pattern of modern American death sentencing cries out for a 
local explanation.  What common thread holds together the minority of locales 
that regularly impose and execute death verdicts and separates them from the 
majority of communities that do not use the penalty?  Given that the rest of the 
                                                                                                                       
 
48  Id.; Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
49  Frank R. Baumgartner, Race, Innocence, and the Death Penalty 19 (April 7, 2010), 
http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/Innocence/NC/Baumgartner-Race-DP-UNC-presentation-April-7-2010.
pdf; Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
50  Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
51.  See Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id.  
54.  Id.  
55.  See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.  
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Western world has formally abolished the civilian death penalty—and the great 
majority of Americans and their localities have largely managed without it for 
decades—what is it that impels a narrow sliver of communities to cling to a 
seemingly anachronistic institution? 
 
At this point, the available hard data fail us.  There is no comprehensive 
study of the demographic, sociological, ideological or penological characteristics 
that distinguish high death-sentencing counties from the rest, much less any that 
support causal explanations.  There are, however, some tantalizing clues in our 
Broken System II study.
56
  In addition to other authors‘ suggestions about the 
death penalty‘s localism, we rely on these inferences in offering hypotheses about 
why these particular counties choose to practice capital punishment at all and at 
such higher rates than other communities.  Our premise is that localities that 
―use‖ the death penalty—that execute it or at least impose it with any degree of 
frequency—are not random idiosyncrasies, but share notable traits, tendencies and 
traditions.  Specifically, we propose that these localities are led to cling to the 
death penalty and favor it over other potential responses to violent crime by a set 
of common instincts that lie at the intersection of what we call ―parochialism‖ and 
―libertarianism.‖  
 
Broken System II is a comprehensive set of regression studies of the features 
of states and counties that—and of possible explanations for why they—experience 
high rates of serious, i.e., prejudicial and reversible, error in the capital verdicts 
they impose.  The study is only suggestive for present purposes because it does 
not seek to explain the comparative use of the death penalty (the topic of this 
Article), but instead comparative rates of judicially identified serious error when it 
is used. 
 
The reason we can use Broken System II at all for our current purposes is 
because—at both the state and county levels—the strongest distinguishing feature 
it associated with high error rates was high capital-sentencing rates.  In other 
words, states and counties that produced the most error-prone death verdicts were 
also the ones that generated the most verdicts per 1000 homicides.  At the state 
level, capital-error rates increase from less than 15%  to more than 75% as 
death-sentencing rates per 1000 homicides move from the lowest to the highest end 
                                                                                                                       
 
56  See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 82–145 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, 
at 253–54).  For the reasons emphasized in the next paragraph, even the Broken System II study 
provides only clues, nothing more. 
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of the spectrum observed across states and years in the study.
57
  The same is true 
at the county level; the more death verdicts per homicide a county imposes, the 
more likely it is that each new death sentence will be infected with reversible 
error.58  This county factor operates independently of, and in addition to, the 
similar dynamic that operates at the state level.
59
  At both the state and the county 
levels, the link between error rates and death-sentencing rates was powerful.  
Holding all other factors constant, death verdicts imposed in jurisdictions with the 
highest rates of death-sentencing per 1000 homicides were nine times more likely 
to be reversed as a result of serious error than capital verdicts imposed in 
jurisdictions with the lowest rates of death-sentencing per 1000 homicides.
60
 
 
Broken System II also identified a variety of other features associated with 
high rates of serious error in death verdicts at the state and county level.
61
  
Because those features are associated with high rates of capital-sentencing error, 
which in turn are associated with high rates of capital-sentencing per se, we 
hypothesize—fully acknowledging that we are nowhere near proving—that those 
features are also characteristic of high death-sentencing jurisdictions. 
 
A further caveat is that some of the associations Broken System II established 
were only at the state, and not at the county level, because data on that feature are 
available only at the state level.62  Although as to features for which we did have 
data at both the state and county level, the county effects tended to be about as 
strong as the state effects.63 We cannot say the same for certain as to features for 
which there is no county-level data.  In those cases, our hypotheses about the 
attributes of high death-sentencing counties are doubly speculative, because they 
are extrapolated based on features of jurisdictions with high rates of reversible 
error in capital cases  and are based on features of the states in which the counties 
are located.  
 
A. Parochialism 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
57  Id. at 342 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 242). 
58.  Id. at 349 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 254). 
59  Id. at 349 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 254). 
60  Id. at 224 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 241). 
61  Id. at 239-41 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 243–44). 
62.  See, e.g., BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 96. 
63.  Id. at 269 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15 at 252–53). 
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1. Parochialism defined 
 
The term ―parochial‖ can have a pejorative connotation of closed-mindedness 
or self-serving behavior.
64
  That is not our intent here.  Rather, by ―parochial‖ 
we mean the attribution of innate importance and validity to the values and 
experiences one shares with the members of—and thus to the security, stability and 
continuity of—one‘s closely proximate community.  We mean something like 
―localism for its own sake‖—in much the way that the phrase ―parochial schools‖ 
is used to distinguish schools attractive to families with a common set of religious 
beliefs from the majority of public and also other private schools.
65
 
 
We also understand the concept to convey a sense of anxiety or threat.  
Given the recent acceleration of national and worldwide cultural integration, we 
understand ―parochialism‖ to include fears that prized local values and experiences 
are embattled, slipping into the minority and at risk from modernity, 
cosmopolitanism, immigration-driven demographic change, and a coterie of 
―progressive‖ and secular influences, including permissiveness and crime.66  We 
assume that the perceived agents of this unwanted change include government 
officials at the state and especially federal levels, including ―unelected,‖ ―elitist‖ 
judges and the outside lawyers who appeal to them.
67
  From this perspective, the 
                                                                                                                       
 
64  See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, The Coast of Utopia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at BR10, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/books/review/Purdy-t.html (―It has never been 
clearer that the country's best self is a global inheritance, its worst a parochial self-certainty.‖) 
65  For an example of a largely favorable comparison between ―parochial‖ and public schools 
(e.g., on grounds of the moral reasoning capacity, self-esteem and educational aspirations of 
students), see Morality in Education: Morality in Parochial vs. Public Schools, UNIV. OF MICH. DEP‘T 
OF PSYCHOLOGY, http://sitemaker.umich.edu/356.dworin/parochial_vs._public_schools (last visited 
May 4, 2011). 
66  See GARLAND, supra note 2, at 158–61, 170–71 (discussing the ―localism‖ of American 
politics generally and Americans‘ distrust of groups of people different from themselves who they 
believe exercise excessive power over the national state). 
67  Consider, for example, a local prosecutor's reaction to a federal habeas judge's reversal of a 
death sentence: 
 
Where's the fairness for the law-abiding citizens?  How many appeals are you entitled 
to?  The constitution demands finality of punishment. 
 
Us good folks here in Tennessee are able to take care of our business in the criminal 
justice system.  We're bright enough to understand the system.  Once the Criminal 
Court has spoken, and the Tennessee Supreme Court has spoken, that's enough. 
 
We don't need this guy telling us we're wrong.  If he had to stand for election every 
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boundaries of the immediate community represent a bulwark against outside 
influences that threaten to dilute or entirely dissolve the community‘s cohesion, 
and parochialism compels a spirited defense of those frontiers. 
 
2. Death-Sentencing Localities as Parochial Communities 
 
There is evidence that the minority of localities that frequently impose the 
death penalty are parochial in the sense described above.  To begin with, studies 
consistently find that localities with higher death-sentencing rates tend to have 
traditional rather than modern political values, a resonance with masculine honor 
codes and revenge, Old Testament and evangelical Christian religious beliefs, and 
Republican Party affiliation.68  In addition, Broken System II found evidence that 
communities with high rates of capital error—which are strongly correlated with 
high death sentencing rates—are ones where influential citizens feel they are under 
particular threat from crime.
69
  Interestingly, neither crime nor homicide rates 
themselves predict high reversal rates and the high death-sentencing rates that go 
with them.
70
  What is predictive, however, is a high rate of homicide 
victimization of white residents relative to the rate of homicides affecting black 
residents.
71
  While in virtually all communities, the homicide rate experienced by 
African-American citizens is greater than that experienced by whites, in heavy 
death-sentencing communities that disparity is smaller.  Other things equal, the 
smaller the disparity is between white and black homicide victimization, the higher 
the death-sentencing rate is.
72
  Heavy use of the death penalty thus seems to occur 
when the worst effects of crime have spilled over from poor and minority 
neighborhoods and are particularly salient to parts of the community that we can 
predict have greater influence over local law enforcement, prosecuting and judicial 
officials.
73
  
                                                                                                                       
eight years or so and let the people speak, we wouldn't be seeing opinions like this.  We 
don't need a federal judge involved in our justice system.  He needs to be held 
accountable for what he's doing. 
 
Tom Chester, Prosecutor Lashes Judge for Reversal of Death Sentence, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, 
May 21, 1994, at A1. 
68.  See, e.g., Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 224. 
69  Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 228. 
70  BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at iii (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 217). 
71  Id. (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 244). 
72  Id. (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 242, 244); see also id. at 166–67 (noting that 
higher error rates are correlated with higher death-sentencing rates); supra note 54 and accompanying 
text (noting that we are extrapolating from factors associated with high error rates to ones associated 
with high death-sentencing rates). 
73  See Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 248.  
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In view of the importance of relative rates of white and black criminal 
victimization, not crime rates themselves, we also hypothesize that it is this 
cross-boundary, cross-class and cross-race spill-over effect of crime—or the 
elevated fear of it—that disposes communities towards the harshly retributive 
response of capital punishment.  In other words, we hypothesize that a 
―parochial‖ tendency to feel embattled from ―outside‖ influences, including crime, 
disposes communities to use the death penalty.  
 
There are at least four ways that the Broken System II data support this 
hypothesis.  First, of course, crime typically is, and is perceived to be, an 
intrusive act of deviance from the accepted social order.  In this sense, the 
criminal is always an outside threat to a given community.  Second, as we just 
noted, the crime experienced in high-death-sentencing communities is statistically 
more likely to be, or to appear to influential members of the community to be, 
spilling over from the precincts where poor and minority citizens live into their 
own communities. 74   Third, Broken System II strongly associated high 
capital-error rates and usage of the death penalty with proximity to a large 
population of either African-American citizens or citizens receiving government 
welfare support.
75
  This is particularly striking because African-American 
communities and jurors themselves are far less likely than white ones to impose 
the death penalty.
76
 Fourth, there is an ―interaction effect‖ between the second and 
third factors above.  In communities where both conditions are present—a large 
African-American community nearby and a high rate of white homicide 
victimization relative to black homicide victimization—the death-sentencing rate is 
higher than one would expect by simply summing the effect of each of those 
factors by itself.77  In other words, the combination of a large African-American 
population nearby and a larger proportion of the risk of homicide being borne by 
whites relative to blacks has a particularly strong association with more frequent 
resort to the death penalty and higher rates of reversible error in death verdicts 
imposed.
78
 
 
Everything we know about the psychology of racial stereotypes and crime 
                                                                                                                       
 
74.  BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 166. 
75  BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 241 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 248). 
76  See Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 227 & n.47 (citing sources). 
77.  BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 240 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 244). 
78  Id. 
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suggests a dynamic that links this combination of high comparative crime 
victimization in white communities and their close proximity to poor and minority 
communities to a disposition to impose harsh punishment: 
 
Ethnicity comes into play for two reasons.  First, ethnicity is associated 
with political power.  Threats to the safety and security of the white 
community tend to be taken more seriously by law enforcement officials 
than threats to minority communities.  Second, partially through the 
unfortunate operation of racial stereotypes, citizens and officials tend to 
use the ethnicity of suspects (particularly if the suspects are 
African-American) and the size of nearby minority populations 
(especially African-American populations) as proxies for the threat of 
violent crime posed by particular individuals and present in particular 
social environments.
79
  
 
As the perceived
80
 threat rises, so does the likelihood of a punitive response.  
 
We thus hypothesize that the relatively greater share of the risk of crime 
falling on whites in high death-sentencing communities, together with the 
misperceived threat from large nearby populations of poor African-Americans, 
gives influential members of these communities a partly accurate, partly inflated, 
sense of threat from crime emanating from outside.  By ―outsider,‖ we certainly 
mean transient individuals who do not reside in the community and are just passing 
through.  The association of capital crimes with gas-station and convenience-store 
hold-ups and home invasion crimes along major interstate arteries is a 
manifestation of this effect.
81
  But ―outsider‖ also includes individuals who cross 
                                                                                                                       
 
79  Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 228. 
80  A crucial feature of this dynamic is the combination of actual threats, measured by 
homicide rates, and inaccurately perceived threats, as measured by proximity to African-American 
populations.  The research literature, discussed in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 248 & n.99 (citing 
sources), demonstrates that white populations associate consistently proximity to African-Americans 
with a much higher threat of crime than actually exists. 
81  See, e.g., Houston v. Dutton, 50 F.3d 381, 383 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming reversal of a 
capital conviction for an out-of-towners‘ gas-station armed robbery and murder), cert. denied, 516 
U.S. 905 (1995); Mitchell v. Hopper, 538 F. Supp. 77, 85–86 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (upholding death 
sentences for men recently released from prison in Florida who crossed the border into southern 
Georgia and killed a fourteen-year-old boy and shot his mother several times after marching them 
into a meat cooler at the road-side grocery store where they worked), aff‘d, 827 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1050 (1987); Coleman v. State, 226 S.E.2d 911, 913 (Ga. 1976) 
(affirming death sentence of one of four capitally sentenced defendants who broke into a rural mobile 
home in southern Georgia in order to burglarize it, then successively killed, and in one case raped, six 
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racial and economic boundaries within communities in order to commit crimes.  
The perceived threat posed from outsiders disposes parochial, more than other, 
communities to invoke the death penalty in response to the threat—especially 
when they can directly and powerfully communicate their fears to elected 
officials.82  The importance of the last-mentioned element is suggested by the 
Broken System II finding that excessive imposition of the death penalty increases 
with the extent to which local judges are subject to political pressure—as measured 
by the type, frequency and partisan nature of elections used to select judges.
83
  
 
The use of the death penalty in response to perceived threats to influential 
members of insular communities from cross-boundary crime helps explain the high 
death-sentencing rate in communities that otherwise do not fit the capital 
punishment stereotype.  An example mentioned earlier is Baltimore County, 
Maryland—the predominantly white, suburban donut that encircles the majority 
African-American Baltimore City.
84
  The consistent pattern across the United 
States of a two to five times greater chance of being sentenced to die for killing a 
white victim than for the same killing of a black victim may be a more generalized 
repercussion of the same dynamic.
85
  
                                                                                                                       
extended family members over the course of the day as each arrived home or came to check on the 
family members who had already been killed), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 909 (1977).  
82.  BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 351 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 249).   
83  See Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 256.  This finding probably applies as well to district 
attorneys, virtually all of whom in the United States, especially in death sentencing counties, are 
locally elected.  See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 533–35 & n.117 (2001) (noting that over 95% of district attorneys are elected, giving them 
incentives to produce prosecutions and convictions the public favors). 
84  See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  Other similar localities with high death 
sentencing rates include Cleveland, Ohio (Cuyahoga County); Gary, Indiana (Lake County); 
Oakland, California (Alameda County) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and St. Louis County, Missouri.  
See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at B-3 to B-6; Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment, 
supra note 21, at 314–18.  See also infra notes 344–54 and accompanying text (discussing Los 
Angeles and Phoenix). 
85  See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987) (discussing ―an extensive 
analysis‖ of racial death sentencing patterns in Georgia, which found that ―even after taking account 
of . . . nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to 
receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks [and that] black defendants were 
1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants,‖ indicating ―that black defendants 
. . . who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty‖); Samuel R. 
Gross and Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing 
and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 55. (―In Georgia, those who killed whites were ten 
times as likely to be sentenced to death as those who killed blacks; in Florida the ratio was about to 
eight to one, and in Illinois about six to one.‖); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Death 
Sentencing in East Baton Rouge Parish, 1990-2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (finding a 2.6 times 
higher chance of being sentenced to death in East Baton Rouge Parish if the victim is white, rather 
  
21 
 
 
B. Libertarianism  
 
1. Death-sentencing localities as libertarian communities 
 
The evidence from Broken System II and elsewhere suggests that the counties 
that frequently use the death penalty exhibit libertarian as well as parochial 
impulses.86  By libertarian beliefs, we mean preferences for more rather than less 
protection of acts of individual autonomy, for less over more frequent exercises of 
state power, and for low taxes over high services.
87
  Libertarianism also is 
associated with a vigilante streak—a willingness to take the law into one‘s own 
hands and out of the untrustworthy hands of government.
88
  In other words, the 
uneasy combination of a desire for seriously retributive responses to 
non-consensual acts interfering with another‘s autonomy, yet little or no spending 
on police, prosecutors, investigators, courts, corrections, rehabilitative services and 
other methods of combating crime may dispose libertarians towards self-help, even 
                                                                                                                       
than black).  See generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 133 (1999) (discussing McCleskey v. Kemp, supra); RANDALL KENNEDY, 
RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW, NEW YORK 328 (1997) (discussing McCleskey v. Kemp, supra).  
Consider also the prominent use of the death penalty by communities in the South to punish a 
black man‘s rape of a white woman, even after the penalty had stopped being imposed there and 
elsewhere for other crimes short of murder.  See Charles Lane, The Death Penalty and Racism: The 
Times Have Changed, AM. INTEREST ONLINE, 2010, 
http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=901 (noting that of the 455 men executed 
for rape in the United States between 1930 and 1967, 90% were African American).  Cf. Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (barring the death penalty for rape of an adult woman); Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (extending Coker‘s holding to bar the death penalty for rape of a 
child).  In its time and place, interracial rape constituted the quintessential cross-boundary, stranger 
crime against members of a privileged community. 
86.  See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.   
87  See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 199 (1964) (arguing that ―the 
greater part of new ventures undertaken by government in the past few decades‖—what Friedman 
calls ―the visible hand for retrogression‖—―have failed to achieve their objectives,‖ but that the 
nation has progressed nonetheless because of ―initiative and drive of individuals co-operating through 
the free market‖); LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 855 (1949) 
(arguing that ―[t]he interventionist policies as practiced for many decades by all governments of the 
capitalistic West have brought about . . . wars and civil wars, ruthless oppression of the masses by 
clusters of self-appointed dictators, economic depressions, mass unemployment, capital consumption, 
and famines,‖ which governments then have claimed ―demonstrate the necessity of intensifying 
interventionism‖); JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 207 (1988) (―[L]ibertarians are 
notoriously unhappy with the state . . . .‖). 
88  See Angela M. Schadt & Matt DeLisi, Is Vigilantism on Your Mind? An Exploratory Study 
of Nuance and Contradiction in Student Death Penalty Opinion, 20 CRIM. JUST. STUD., 255, 259 
(2007) (―[P]ublic concerns for the costs and perceived effectiveness of the official criminal justice 
system have served as the impetus for various forms of vigilante justice . . . .‖). 
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in the realm of criminal justice and law enforcement. 
 
The Broken System II study found that states with high rates of reversible 
error in capital cases also have three other features of interest here: high 
death-sentencing rates, low clearance rates for serious crime and low levels of 
expenditure on criminal courts.
89
  Holding other factors constant at their average 
value, jurisdictions with the highest capital-error rates have seven times higher 
capital-sentencing rates than jurisdictions with the lowest capital error rates; are 
seven times less likely to capture, convict and incarcerate criminals for serious 
crimes committed there; and spend a third as much on their criminal courts.
90
  
                                                                                                                       
 
89  See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 352–54 (reprised in Gelman et. al, supra note 15, 
at 240–43, 244–46).  The study defined clearance rates as the number of prisoners incarcerated in 
the state compared to the number of FBI Index Crimes committed.  See id. at 352.  Comparable 
figures on state and county expenditures on capital defense costs are not available, but there is ample 
evidence that high death sentencing counties do what they can to skimp on these costs.  See, e.g.,  
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the 
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1851 (1993–1994) (surveying indigent defense systems across 
many states and finding that ―gross underfunding . . . pervades indigent defense‖ making it 
impossible ―to attract and keep experienced and qualified attorneys because of lack of compensation 
and overwhelming workloads‖); Matt Thacker, Clark County Prosecutor Supports Limits on 
Death-Penalty Payments, NEWS & TRIB., (Dec. 18, 2010), 
http://newsandtribune.com/local/x1666507751/ 
Clark-County-prosecutor-supports-limits-on-death-penalty-payments (reporting on county 
prosecutor‘s efforts to limit reimbursement of capital defense lawyers for their fees, experts and 
investigators as a way to be able to afford to prosecute more cases capitally); Robert Weisberg, Who 
Defends Capital Defendants?, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 535, 536–38 (1995) (noting that ―whenever 
a political official tries to attack expenditures for public defenders [handling capital cases], she is 
likely to point to the absurdity of paying lawyers who are constantly attacking their employers‖). 
Professor Weisberg provides a typical example, from the Mitchell case cited supra note 69 which he 
a handled in federal habeas corpus proceeding, of the poor quality of local lawyers appointed to 
represent defendants in capital cases:  
[In the] second capital case I worked on . . . the defense lawyer [at trial] was paid $150 
for the entire case, and believe me, he earned every penny of it.  He only interviewed his 
client once, as he was arranging a plea bargain for the guilt phase.  He did not identify 
or reach out to any of the several, excellent mitigation witnesses—teachers, coaches, 
ministers, or whatever—who were only a few hours' drive away.  The reason for the 
omission, he said, was that he thought the case hopeless.  He never attacked the 
confession in the case, even though, as it later became obvious, the defendant was left 
alone in the interrogation room with an off-duty police officer who was a cousin of the 
victim, and who threatened the defendant with a gun.  He did not try to interview the 
officer, because he did not like the man. 
Id. at 537–38. 
90  See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 352–53 (reprised in Gelman et. al, supra note 15, 
at 240–43, 244–46).  
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Broken System II also found that the large numbers of capital verdicts awaiting 
state court appellate review that are in jurisdictions with high death-sentencing 
rates generally tend to depress reversal rates, further revealing an unwillingness in 
those jurisdictions to provide sufficient resources to permit appellate courts to do 
their work and identify the full range of serious error that high death-sentencing 
rates cause.
91
  In short, residents of jurisdictions with high death-sentencing and 
high capital error rates are far less disposed than others to empower state actors, 
create effective government and professional structures, and pay taxes to 
investigate, apprehend, prosecute, provide representation for, provide judges to 
review the convictions and sentences of, and imprison perpetrators of serious 
crimes.
92
  All of these are libertarian tendencies.  
 
Curiously, Douglas Hay noted a similar dynamic in Georgian England.
93
  
Hay marshals evidence showing that the peasantry‘s new-found mobility and 
proneness to riot and crime on the eve of the Industrial Revolution greatly 
frightened the rural gentry.
94
  Although the most efficient solution would have 
been for Parliament to fund and empower the royal government to create a national 
police force to maintain order, for the strongly localist and libertarian gentry, 
escaping the frying pan of local anarchy into the fire of royal dominance had no 
appeal.
95
  Instead, the lords relied on the most powerful local lever they had—the 
criminal justice system and the power it gave them to strategically dole out death 
sentences and pardons as a form of ―terror‖ to cower the lower classes.96 
 
Whatever the merits of Hay‘s controversial explanation of the death penalty in 
eighteenth century England, we conclude that analogous dispositions help explain 
the uneven use of the death penalty in the United States today.  In place of the 
terroristic tool Hay describes, however, we see a device that parochial and 
                                                                                                                       
 
91  See id. at 370–72 (reprised in Gelman et. al, supra note 15, at 242–43).  
92  See id. at iv (reprised in Gelman et. al, supra note 15, at 243).  For a general discussion of 
the historical relationship in the United States, and particularly the South, between underinvestment 
in law enforcement, low clearance rates, high crimes rates and highly punitive sentences imposed on 
criminals who are caught, see William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1984–85, 
1992–93 (2008). 
93  Hay, supra note 5, at 18. 
94  Id. at 20–21. 
95  Id. at 41; David Friedman, Making Sense of English Law Enforcement in the 18th Century, 
2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 475, 476 (1995) (― Eighteenth-century England viewed a system of 
professional police and prosecutors, government-paid and –appointed, as potentially tyrannical and, 
worse still, French‖ ). 
96  Hay, supra note 5, at 25; see supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
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libertarian communities use to ration the costly and state-empowering government 
response to cross-cultural crime.  
 
2. The death penalty as a libertarian tool for self-protection  
 
In a number of respects, capital punishment fits well within a 
libertarian—which is to say staunchly retributive97—theory of justice.  In a world 
where citizens are free of government influence in making individual decisions, 
they also deserve to be fulsomely punished for making antisocial, unacceptable 
choices.
98
  Libertarians are deeply skeptical of determinist explanations for crime.  
In their view, crime is not predestined by nature, nurture or social inequality but is 
a choice individuals freely make that merits severe punishment.
99
  
 
Among possible punishments, moreover, the death penalty may have a 
particular appeal to libertarian communities.  As we have noted, those 
communities tend to be skeptical of government‘s ability to do anything very well, 
and the longer and more complicated the task, the greater the skepticism.  This 
suggests a preference for a single act of state ―execution‖ over a lifetime of state 
efforts to securely incarcerate a murderer.  And researchers have consistently 
identified this preference as a distinguishing feature of jurors most prone to impose 
the death penalty.
100
  As these jurors tell researchers, they prefer death over life 
                                                                                                                       
 
97  See, e.g., RONALD HAMOWY, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIBERTARIANISM 430 (2008) 
(discussing ―the common libertarian insistence that there are principles of justice that must be 
respected in the treatment of individuals even if violations of those principles were socially 
expedient‖); MICHAEL TONRY, WHY PUNISH?  HOW MUCH?: A READER ON PUNISHMENT 311 (2011) 
(describing the ―libertarian conceptions of free will on which retributivism depends‖).  
98  See, e.g., N. Stephan Kinsella, A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights, 30 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 607, 645 (1997) (arguing that libertarian ―justice requires that the aggressor be held 
responsible for the dilemma he has created as well as the aggression he has committed‖). 
99  Id. at 626 n. 46. 
100 Studies showing that death prone jurors tend to have the least amount of faith in the 
willingness and ability of the government to identify and continue incarcerating the most dangerous 
prisoners and to apprehend them a second time if they are paroled include JOHN H. BLUME ET AL., 
Lessons from the Capital Jury Project, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 144, 167 
(Stephan P. Garvey ed., 2002); Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: 
Guilt is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1011, 1053 (2000); William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: 
Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1476, 1499 (1998); William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death By Default: An Empirical 
Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605, 675 (1999); 
Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional 
Comprehension and Penalty Phase Closing Arguments, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 575, 579–80 (1997); 
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sentences for fear that incompetent parole officials will one day free the defendant 
to offend again—a sentiment that might easily extend to the view that paying 
prison and parole officials to exercise that discretion, not to mention paying to feed 
and house killers, is the worst waste of tax dollars.
101
 
 
We hypothesize that, taken together, these dispositions dispose libertarian 
communities towards the death penalty.  Suspicion of government and taxation 
leads to weak and unprofessional law enforcement, which in turn generates low 
clearance rates and a heightened fear of crime.  Still not willing to pay and build 
the institutions needed to respond systematically, libertarian communities turn to 
the death penalty as an extreme, but only episodic and after-the-fact response that 
can (indeed, constitutionally must
102
) be limited to the small number of offenses 
that result in capture and conviction and involve a homicide.  The death penalty 
thus provides libertarian communities with a starkly expressive and retributive 
substitute for routine, ongoing and professional surveillance, apprehension, 
conviction and incarceration across the run of all serious crimes.  Through the 
death penalty, libertarian communities can express their abhorrence for the most 
serious of transgressions against their and their fellows‘ autonomy without having 
to pay the price for effective law enforcement, courts and corrections. 
 
There are numerous risks and ironies here.  By leaving criminals at large, the 
reluctance of libertarian communities to pay for professional law enforcement 
directly threatens the autonomy of law-abiding citizens that libertarians hold so 
dear.  The communities‘ reluctance to pay for incarceration and correctional 
resources likewise leads directly to the wide-open parole practices that in turn 
dispose libertarian jurors to doubt the government‘s will and ability to secure 
dangerous criminals.  Worse, the slapdash law enforcement practices and inferior 
results that characterize the low levels of law-enforcement effort preferred by 
libertarian communities may increase their disposition to impose the death penalty 
in cases where it is not appropriate.  As we said in Broken System II, public 
pressures generated by ―[w]ell-founded doubts about a state‘s ability to catch 
criminals may lead officials to extend the death penalty‖ to cases in which the 
evidence of guilt or desert of the death penalty is weak.
103
  In contrast:  
 
[S]tates with relatively more effective non-capital responses to 
                                                                                                                       
James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or 
Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1177 (1995). 
101 See e.g., Bowers & Steiner, supra note 86, at 675; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 86, at 
1177. 
102 See supra note 72 and infra notes 107, 110 and accompanying text. 
103 BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at iii. 
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crime—i.e. arrest, conviction and imprisonment—may be under less 
pressure than states with weaker law enforcement records to use the 
death penalty.  That in turn may dampen the penalty‘s use in weak cases 
in which the temptation to use unreliable procedures is high.
104
  
 
3. The death penalty as a libertarian and parochial tool for self-protection 
 
Perhaps the biggest irony, however, is the disposition of libertarian 
communities to tolerate—indeed, to esteem—the most powerful civilian exercise 
of state power known to our society.105  One might rather expect libertarians to 
deny government this most powerful of tools and to fear state incompetence and 
overreaching in administering it.  And, indeed, a passel of libertarians, including 
George Will, Richard A. Viguerie, Pat Robertson, Oliver North and Bob Barr, 
have expressed exactly these reservations about the penalty.
106
  As we note above, 
however, there are reasons why the death penalty might appeal to libertarians as 
the best, because most episodic, way for the state to wield the power to punish.  
As we discuss further below, moreover, it is not pure libertarianism of the George 
Will sort, but a mix of it and parochialism that characterizes communities that 
frequently use the death penalty.  This section describes the interaction of the two 
forces. 
 
Consider first how parochial and libertarian tendencies can feed on one 
another.  Parochialism indicates a strong apprehension of serious outsider 
crime;
107
 the ineffective law enforcement that attends the libertarian preference for 
low spending, weak institutions and aversion to surveillance likely aggravates this 
                                                                                                                       
 
104 Id. at 168–69. 
105. Noting the same irony in regard to penalties other than the death penalty is FRANKLIN 
ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 
171–74, 231–32 (2001) (concluding that mistrust of government is associated, counter-intuitively, 
with a greater willingness to use extreme penal sanctions, such as California‘s mandatory minimum 
punishments for three-time offenders, even though the punishments trigger more government control 
and a larger public sector). 
106 For collections of these statements, see, New Voices—Conservative Voices, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-voices-conservative-voices (last visited 
June 16, 2011); New Voices: Prominent Conservative Calls for Death Penalty Moratorium, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-voices-prominent-conservative-calls-death-penalty-moratorium 
(last visited July 11, 2011); BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 4. 
107 See supra notes 57–70 and accompanying text. 
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fear.
108
  Indeed, a feature of libertarian communities in relatively close proximity 
to each other may be the movement of offenders from one community to the other 
as the simplest way to escape the unsophisticated law enforcement efforts that are 
likely to prevail where they last committed a crime. 
 
Indeed, this mixture of conspicuous fear of outsider crime, demand for harsh 
punishment when the community is invaded and autonomy is threatened, and 
doubts about government‘s intestinal fortitude when it comes to punishment can be 
a toxic brew.  Historically, one result in the United States has been lynching.  In 
the face of doubts about officials‘ willingness or ability to exact the retribution 
demanded by parochial and libertarian under siege from outside forces, the public 
stood ready to take matters in their own hands.
109
  The echo of this same impulse 
in the disposition of modern death-prone jurors to doubt the willingness or ability 
of officials to exact deserved punishment is, we suggest, not accidental but a 
manifestation of the same parochial and libertarian proclivity for death as the surer 
and more expressive punishment in a context of fear of outsiders and weak state 
institutions.
110
  
 
There are also reverberations in modern practice in high-death-sentencing 
communities of lynchers‘ low regard for the administrative and professional 
niceties of investigation, prosecution, trial and correction and the tendency to see 
death verdicts and executions as a quick and unvarnished communal expression of 
retribution for a heinous cross-boundary crime.  Extending the parallel still 
further, as lawless and vicious as lynching was, it often carried with it a patina of 
democratic sanction, as a paroxysm of communal, and community-protecting 
violence.
111
  Albeit now with due process, judicial supervision and decorum 
restored, a jury‘s public pronouncement of a death sentence has the same quality of 
a democratic expression of community comeuppance of the offending outsider.  
 
We are not the first to draw these parallels.  Professor Zimring, for example, 
                                                                                                                       
 
108 See supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text. 
109 See GARLAND, supra note 2, at 172 (describing how, during the nineteenth century, 
―Southern whites claimed this private power [over law enforcement represented by lynching] as a 
means to maintain white supremacy‖).  
110 See supra notes 69–70, 85–90. 
111 See GARLAND, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that lynching was fuelled by ―the furious 
demands of ‗popular justice‘ that emerge when local majority sentiment is outraged by crime‖ and 
concluding that ―[t]he self-righteous power of ‗the people‘, emboldened by ideologies of popular 
democracy and myths of self-rule, is an incendiary force in American politics‖). 
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has demonstrated a telling geographical overlap between today‘s high frequency 
death-imposing counties and those that frequently carried out lynchings in the 
past.
112
  Even more to our point, Professor Garland has noted the paradox that 
lynching and the death penalty are simultaneously opposites and the same and has 
pointed to the parochialism and libertarianism of communities that have favored 
both practices as an explanation.  In his words, the modern death penalty is 
consciously designed as an ―antilynching,‖113 yet acts as ―a radical inversion of 
form, a mirror image‖ of the lynchings of yore.114  On the one hand: 
 
[e]xecutions, if they actually occur, take place not in the local town 
square but instead at a great distance from the crime, both in time and in 
space.  Executions methods are avowedly ―non-violent,‖ designed to 
minimize bodily injury and degradation.  Bureaucratic protocols dictate 
a dispassionate administrative routine with crowds, ceremony, and 
cruelty reduced to a minimum.
115
 
 
  Yet, ―[c]ontemporary capital punishment continues to have many 
substantive features in common with those lynchings,‖ that it tries to but 
cannot disavow:    
 
It continues to be driven by local politics and populist politicians.  It 
continues to be imposed by leaders and lay people claiming to represent 
the local community.  It continues to give a special place to victims‘ 
kin.  It continues disproportionately to target poorly represented blacks, 
convicted of atrocious crimes against white victims. . . .  Finally, the 
collective killing of hated criminals (or merely assertion of the right to do 
so) remains one of the ways in which groups of people express their 
autonomy, invoke their traditional values, and assert their local 
identity.
116
 
 
We agree that, as different as the two practices are, lynching and capital 
punishment are responsive to the same parochial and libertarian impulses towards 
cataclysmic expression of a community comeuppance of perceived outside threats.  
                                                                                                                       
 
112 ZIMRING, supra note 19, at 89–118; see also OGLETREE & SARAT, supra note 19, at7–8.  
113 GARLAND, supra note 2, at 34. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 35. 
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We simply add that when parochialism and libertarianism coincide, a 
temptation—or even a felt necessity—arises to invoke the starkly retributive, 
unvarnished and ostensibly deterrent force of the death penalty to compensate for 
the crime-solving shortcomings of localities disposed towards meager spending on 
law enforcement.  The death penalty, that is, substitutes as a locally reassuring 
and externally intimidating demonstration of the community‘s disposition to 
defend itself against criminal invasions where pervasive and effective law 
enforcement is considered unaffordable or unpalatable.
117
   
 
C. A Parochial and Libertarian Explanation of the Resilience of the 
Felony-Murder Doctrine 
 
1. Felony murder‘s puzzling resilience  
 
Further support for our thesis may be found in the puzzling resilience of the 
Capital-Felony-Murder Doctrine in American criminal jurisprudence.
118
  Waves 
of reform, typified by the Model Penal Code, have sought to constrain the 
application of the criminal law, particularly the law of homicide, by using mental 
states specified for each element of the crime to mark lesser and greater gradations 
of culpability and desert of punishment.
119
  In this sea of precise mental states tied 
                                                                                                                       
 
117 Cf. James M. Inverarity, Populism and Lynching in Louisiana, 1889-1896: A Test of 
Erikson‘s Theory of the Relationship Between Boundary Crises and Repressive Justice, 41 AM. 
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 262, 264 (1976) (―[M]any prominent white Southerners . . . viewed lynching as a 
necessary and legitimate adjunct of the legal system . . . .‖). 
118  
[F]elony murder . . . is one of the most widely criticized features of American criminal 
law.  Legal scholars are almost unanimous in condemning [it] as a morally indefensible 
form of strict liability, . . . an anomaly, [and] a primitive relic of medieval law that 
unaccountably survived the Enlightenment and the nineteenth-century codification of 
criminal law . . . [and most believe there is] no way to rationalize its rules . . . and no 
reforms worth urging . . . short of its utter abolition.  [The] author of the leading 
criminal law textbook, called the felony murder doctrine ―rationally indefensible,‖ and 
the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code Commentaries observed that 
―[p]rincipled argument in favor of the felony-murder doctrine is hard to find.‖  
Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 966–67 (2008) 
(citations omitted).  But see id. at 966, 1032–46 & n.4 (defending the felony murder rule as 
expressive of the community‘s reaction to harm caused in the course of felonies and citing other 
intermittent defenses of the rule).  Felony murder has long been abolished in other Anglo-American 
jurisdictions.  See DAVID  LANHAM, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAWS OF AUSTRALIA 180 (2006) (discussing 
the felony murder doctrine‘s abolition through the United Kingdom‘s Homicide Act of 1957). 
119 Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code‘s Culpability Provisions on State 
Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 
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to each element of a crime, the felony murder doctrine is an anomalous island, 
given its omission of any culpability requirement as to the element of death.  The 
doctrine is controversial because of the alchemy it uses to manufacture a higher 
culpability level and punishment than otherwise would be allowed.
120
  Its main 
use is to transform an accidental killing in the course of a felony—which normally 
would merit at most a manslaughter charge based on the inference that the felon 
must have recognized the risk of death—into the equivalent of purposeful 
murder.
121
  If the predicate felony is one of the ―big four‖—robbery, rape, 
kidnapping or burglary—the same alchemy transforms the manslaughter into 
first-degree murder, which otherwise would require premeditation and 
deliberation.  
 
2. Felony murder‘s symbiotic relation to the death penalty 
 
The Felony Murder Doctrine is associated with the broad—and 
overbroad—use of the death penalty 122  and with high rates of error and 
                                                                                                                       
SW. U.L. REV. 229, 229–30 (1997) (noting that ―[o]ne of the greatest changes made by the Model 
Penal Code was its redefinition and reformulation of culpable mental states . . . .  The Code 
obliterated ill-defined, confusing common law language and concepts and replaced them with four 
specifically defined hierarchical levels of culpability…‖)  
120 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 515 (3d ed. 2001); SAMUEL 
H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL 106–08 (1998); Charles Liebert Crum, Causal Relations and the 
Felony-Murder Rule, 1952 WASH. U. L.Q. 191, 203–10; George P. Fletcher, Reflections on 
Felony-Murder, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 413, 415–16 (1981); Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: 
Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 
706–08; Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 679, 695–97 (1994); H.L. Packer, Criminal Code Revision, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 
3–4 (1973); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at 
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 451–52, 490–91 (1985); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 
U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1498–99 & n.2 (1974); see also Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony 
Murder, 91 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 403, 404–05 & nn.1–4 (2011) (―The felony murder doctrine . . . is 
part of the law of almost every American jurisdiction[, but] . . . is also one of the most widely 
criticized features of American criminal jurisdiction‖) (citing authority). 
121 See, e.g., State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 336 (Tenn. 1992) (―The result of the 
felony murder doctrine in Tennessee is thus to impose a rule of strict liability allowing the underlying 
felonious intent to supply the required mens rea for the homicidal actus reus and to impose vicarious 
liability for the acts of another.‖), cert. dismissed, Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 U.S. 124 (1993); 
Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74 (1990) (―When a criminal kills a victim during the course of a robbery, for 
example, the criminal is guilty of murder by operation of the felony-murder rule without any inquiry 
into the killer‘s mental state respecting the killing.‖). 
122 See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (placing constitutional limits on 
imposition of the death penalty on minor participants in felonies in which a homicide occurs); 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (setting somewhat stricter limits on the death penalty 
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arbitrariness in its administration.
123
  This is not surprising, given the doctrine‘s 
use, in another inexplicable feat of legal magic, to remove constitutional obstacles 
to a death sentence that otherwise would clearly bar it.  
 
In Gregg v. Georgia, after a decade and a half of uncertainty about the 
constitutionality of the death penalty,
124
 the Supreme Court concluded that ―when 
a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the 
punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime.  It is an extreme sanction, 
suitable to the most extreme of crimes.‖125 To assure, however, that the ―extreme 
sanction‖ did not become ―disproportionate‖ through its application to defendants 
                                                                                                                       
for minor participants in felonies in which a homicide occurs, later modified by Tison, supra); 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that Ohio unconstitutionally 
limited the aggravating circumstances capital jurors could consider, including by barring the 
defendant from arguing in favor of a sentence less than death based on her limited participation in a 
felony in which a man was killed); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (plurality 
opinion) (concluding that the mandatory death penalty for all participants in a felony murder, 
including the wheel person who was outside during the crime, violated the Eighth Amendment); see 
also Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 
BOSTON COL. L. REV. 1103, 1128 n.64 (1990) (collecting studies finding that felony murders 
constitute anywhere from 48% to 83%  of capitally eligible or capitally punished crimes); ILLINOIS 
GOVERNOR‘S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR‘S COMMISSION ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR (2002) [hereinafter, ILLINOIS DEATH PENALTY 
COMMISSION REPORT].  
123 For example, the Illinois Governor‘s Commission on the Death Penalty recommended 
eliminating the felony-murder aggravating factor from the Illinois capital punishment statute.  
―Commission members [concluded] that this eligibility factor swept too broadly and included too 
many different types of murders within its scope . . . .‖  ILLINOIS DEATH PENALTY COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 107, at 72 (2002).  Because ―so many first degree murders are potentially death 
eligible under this factor, it lends itself to disparate application throughout the state . . . [and is the] 
eligibility factor . . . most likely subject to . . . discretionary decision-making‖ by prosecutors and 
jurors.  Id.; See id. at 3 (finding that even ―[a]fter eliminating those cases in which the ‗multiple 
murder‘ factor and the ‗course of a felony‘ factor appear together, the ‗course of a felony‘ eligibility 
factor accounts for just over 40% of the cases in which the death penalty has been imposed‖); see 
also David C. Baldus et al. Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death 
Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133, 138 n.14 (1986) (collecting 
studies); David McCord, Should Commission of a Contemporaneous Arson, Burglary, Kidnapping, 
Rape, or Robbery Be Sufficient to Make a Murderer Eligible for a Death Sentence?—An Empirical 
and Normative Analysis, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) (finding that over 60% of defendants 
committed murder in the course of one of five predicate felonies, triggering death eligibility and 
criticizing the felony murder aggravating factor as overbroad as currently applied across the United 
States); Chelsea Creo Sharon, Note, The ―Most Deserving‖ of Death: The Narrowing Requirement 
and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. CIV. 
RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 223, 234 (2011) (criticizing the felony murder aggravating factors in capital 
sentencing statutes nationwide due to its ―extraordinary breadth‖). 
124 See MELTSNER, supra note 45, at 149–287. 
125 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
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guilty of something less than ―the most extreme of crimes,‖126 the Court required 
States to ―narrow‖ the circumstances in which the death penalty could be imposed 
to killings more aggravated than the jurisdiction‘s base definition of capital 
homicide (classically, premeditated and deliberate first-degree murder).
127
  To 
satisfy this narrowing requirement, a jury must find at least one statutorily 
enumerated aggravating factor that distinguishes the killing from the jurisdiction‘s 
definition of capital homicide.
128
  An aggravating factor that applies to ―every 
first-degree murder‖ does not suffice because it does ―not narrow the class of   
defendants eligible for the death penalty.‖129  
 
Although the Court has never expressly deviated from these principles, 
inexplicably, it has never applied them to felony murder cases.  To begin with, 
felony murder deviates from the category of homicide to which Gregg ostensibly 
limited the death penalty and from the type of culpability otherwise required for 
first-degree murder—where ―life has been taken deliberately by the offender.‖130  
The whole point of felony murder is to permit murder-liability though the killing 
was accidental and not deliberate.
131
  Yet, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to 
affirm non-deliberate felony murder as a sufficient basis for the death penalty.
132
 
                                                                                                                       
 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 196–97; see Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474–75 (1993) (noting that the Eighth 
Amendment requires States to ―genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty‖ 
(quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 430 (1980) 
(overturning death sentence because Georgia failed to interpret the relevant statutory aggravating 
circumstance to assure that ―[e]ach of the cases [in which death was imposed] is at the core and not 
the periphery‖ of the category of death-eligible murders‖ (citations omitted)); Pulley v. Harris, 465 
U.S. 37, 50 (1984) (describing the ―constitutionally necessary narrowing function‖); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 194, 197–98. 
128 See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474–75; Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 775 
(1990); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606, 609 (2002) (describing the Court‘s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence regulating the death penalty as having ―interpreted the Constitution to 
require the addition of an element or elements to the definition of a criminal offense in order to 
narrow its scope‖ and holding that the Constitution requires that element to be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
129 Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 475 (emphasis added). 
130 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (emphasis added). 
131 See, e.g., People v. Brackett, 510 N.E.2d 877, 882 (Ill. 1987) (affirming conviction for 
felony murder where, as a result of a rape, the victim refused to eat and accidentally choked to death 
on a feeding tube inserted by her doctors); People v. Hickman, 297 N.E.2d 582, 586 (Ill. 1973) 
(affirming conviction for felony murder where one police officer accidentally shot another during a 
manhunt for the unarmed burglars). 
132 See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 644 (1991); see also State v. Middlebrooks, 840 
S.W.2d 317, 337 (Tenn. 1992) (―[T]he vast majority of states that have the death penalty permit it to 
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In addition, one of the most common aggravating factors enumerated in state 
capital sentencing statutes is that the killing occurred in the course of one of the 
―big four‖ felonies of robbery, rape, kidnapping or burglary.133  And a number of 
states allow death sentences when the accompanying felony is the only statutory 
aggravating factor present in the case.
134
  In other words, after using felony 
murder to raise an unintentional killing in the course of a felony that otherwise 
would qualify as no more than manslaughter to murder, and then—if the felony is 
one of the ―big four‖—using the same magical reasoning to raise the offense to 
capital-eligible, first-degree murder, many high death-sentencing states allow the 
prosecution to use the same felony as the ostensible additional factor that 
aggravates the offense to a category ―narrow[er]‖ than first-degree murder.135  
Through this sleight of hand, every killing in the course of a ―big four‖ felony 
automatically qualifies for the death penalty.  
 
A few state courts have ruled as a matter of local law that a felony cannot 
provide both the sole basis for first-degree murder and the sole aggravating factor 
in support of a death sentence.
136
  But when the Tennessee Supreme Court 
premised a similar ruling on the Federal Constitution‘s capital narrowing 
requirement, the Supreme Court promptly granted certiorari, as if to reverse.
137
  
                                                                                                                       
be imposed in cases of felony murder under some circumstances.‖ (citations omitted)), cert. 
dismissed, Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 U.S. 124 (1993). 
133 See Rosen, supra note 107, at 1120, 1125–29 & nn.41, 62, 63, 65 (noting that ―[a] large 
majority of states that enacted new death penalty laws after Furman [v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972)] retained both . . . one form or another of the felony murder rule[] as [a] bas[i]s for a 
conviction of capital murder,‖ and many of them also recognize a killing in the course of robbery, 
rape, burglary and kidnapping as an aggravating factor supporting the imposition of death (collecting 
statutes)). 
134 See Rosen, supra note 107, at 1127, 1134–35 nn.62, 63, 79, 83, 86 (citing decisions). 
135 Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 475 (emphasis added); see Rosen, supra note 107, at 
1121–24, 1135 (noting that ―defendants continue to be sentenced to death solely because they 
committed a murder during the course of a felony, that is, simply because they fit into a class of 
murder defendants that, in some states, is no narrower than‖ before the Supreme Court imposed the 
narrowing requirement in Gregg and subsequent cases). 
136 See State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 346 (―We hold that, when the defendant is 
convicted of first-degree murder solely on the basis of felony murder, the [state‘s felony murder] 
aggravating circumstance . . . does not narrow the class of death-eligible murderers sufficiently under 
the . . . Tennessee Constitution because it duplicates the elements of the offense.‖); Engberg v. 
Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 89–92 (Wyo. 1991) (―We now hold that where an underlying felony is used to 
convict a defendant of felony murder only, elements of the underlying felony many not again be used 
as an aggravating factor in the sentencing phase.‖); State v. Cherry, 257 S.E.2d 551, 566–68 (No. 
Car. 1979) (prohibiting use of a felony murder aggravating circumstance if the defendant had been 
convicted solely of felony murder), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980). 
137 Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 507 U.S. 1028 (1993) (per curiam) (granting certiorari to 
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The Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently made clear that it reached the same 
conclusion under state law, and the Supreme Court dismissed certiorari as 
improvidently granted.
138
  But the Court has repeatedly denied certiorari and 
permitted states to execute death sentences premised on accompanying felonies 
that were the sole basis for a murder conviction and the single statutory 
aggravating circumstance.
139
  Felony murder cases thus are the lone category in 
which the Supreme Court tolerates death sentences absent any ―narrowing‖ of 
death-eligibility beyond the minimal threshold for first-degree murder.
140
  
The extent of the anomaly here is revealed by comparing how existing law 
currently applies to two hypothetical defendants: Bill, who purposefully robs Vic 
at gunpoint; and Bob, who purposefully kills Vic with a gun.  If no one dies in the 
course of Bill‘s robbery, Bill may not constitutionally be executed despite his 
purpose to rob Vic.
141
  But if Vic accidentally knocks into Bill‘s gun, causing it to 
fire and kill Vic, then without more, Bill can be executed for the accidental killing.  
The felony mysteriously elevates the manslaughter to murder, then to first-degree 
murder, then to aggravated capitally punishable murder.  If, however, Bob 
interrupts the robbery in order to purposefully shoot Vic dead, Bob cannot without 
more be executed for intentionally killing Vic.
142
  Although, unlike Bill, Bob 
                                                                                                                       
review State v. Middlebrooks, supra). 
138 Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 U.S. 124, 125 (1993) (per curiam). 
139 See Rosen, supra note 107, at 1126–1127 nn. 62–63, 1134–35 nn. 79, 83, 86 (citing 
decisions). 
140 Some observers understand the Supreme Court‘s decision in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 
231 (1988), to embody a holding that approves the questionable practice we describe the Court as 
merely having tolerated by thus far refusing to forbid it.  See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL 472 (6th ed. 2008) (―[Under Lowenfield], as a matter of federal 
constitutional law, the Supreme Court would permit the [accompanying-felony aggravating 
circumstance] ‗bonus‘ . . . where the underlying murder charge was solely based on a felony murder 
ground . . . .‖).  Lowenfield is to the contrary.  It clearly reprises the requirement that state capital 
statutes ―narrow‖ death eligibility to a category smaller than every first-degree murder, see 
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244; finds that narrowing to be generally satisfied by the list of aggravating 
factors that Louisiana uses to distinguish ―first-degree murder,‖ for which the death penalty is not 
available, from ―capital murder‖ for which death may be imposed, id. at 246; and concludes that 
narrowing occurred in the particular case as a result of the jury‘s finding that the killing not only was 
premeditated and deliberate, thus establishing first-degree murder, but also that it was committed in a 
manner that created a ―great risk of death to more than one person,‖ thus elevating the crime to 
―capital murder,‖ id. at 245.  What seems to have confused the authors of KAPLAN ET AL., supra, is 
that the jury found the aggravating factor at the guilt phase, not the separate sentencing phase, but 
that procedural detail in no way undermines the Court‘s usual requirement (except, inexplicably, in 
felony murder cases), of proof of a circumstance that makes the offense more aggravated than bare 
first-degree murder. 
141 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (strongly suggesting that interpersonal 
crimes short of homicide may not constitutionally be punished with death). 
142 This example gives the lie to the traditional ―transferred intent‖ explanation of felony 
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clearly meant to end Vic‘s life, no aggravating factor is present, and the law will 
not magically manufacture one. 
 
3. Capital Felony Murder as a Tool for Parochial Self-protection 
 
What, then, is the clandestine ―compelling state interest‖ that trumps 
fundamental legal values that otherwise would have buried felony murder long 
ago, and that makes a purpose to commit a felony-less-than-homicide and an 
accidental death more worthy of execution than a purpose to kill and a resulting 
death?  The solution to this legal conundrum, we believe, lies in the 
Felony-Murder Doctrine‘s symbiotic relation to the death penalty and that 
penalty‘s appeal to the minority of parochial and libertarian localities that 
frequently use it. 
 
The key clue to the felony-murder riddle is the ―big four‖ predicate 
felonies—robbery, rape, kidnapping and burglary—particularly the last one, 
burglary.  The predicate felonies often are explained, and the felony-murder rule 
sometimes is said to be justified, because those felonies are so dangerous in and of 
themselves or so likely to be committed with a dangerous weapon.
143
  But neither 
of these things is true of burglary.
144
  Other offenses, such as car-jacking and 
various drug and gun-related crimes, are much more dangerous than burglary yet 
are not standard predicates for the felony bump-up to first-degree murder or the 
accompanying-felony bump-up to aggravated, death-eligible murder.  What does 
set all of the big four felonies apart from others is how effectively they serve as 
proxies for ―stranger‖ or ―invasion‖ crimes.  Both interpersonally in the physical 
manner of their commission and sociologically in the way they manifest 
themselves to members of privileged communities, the ―big four‖ offenses cross 
boundaries, come frighteningly ―out of the blue‖ and are the handiwork of 
                                                                                                                       
murder as substituting the intent to rob for the intent to kill.  See, e.g., KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 
140, at 423 (listing justifications for the felony-murder rule).  If an intent to kill and a resulting dead 
body cannot, by themselves elevate a killing to first-degree murder and automatic capital eligibility, 
how can an intent to rob and a resulting dead body do so?  Nor for this same reason, and another 
given at notes 128–132 and accompanying text below, can deterrence of felonies that are intrinsically 
dangerous or committed in a dangerous manner account for the felony-murder alchemy that turns 
accidental homicide into first-degree and capital-eligible homicide. 
143 See, e.g., Binder, supra note 118, at 1045 (arguing that felony murder is justified as long as 
it is limited to predicate felonies ―inherently involving violence or destruction,‖ which excludes 
burglary and drug offenses but includes such crimes as robbery); Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict 
Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1121–24 (1997) (defending felony 
murder liability predicated on inherently dangerous felonies). 
144 See, e.g., KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 140, at 424 (presenting data showing that deaths occur 
in only fewer than 4 out of every 100,000 burglaries, compared to 10 deaths per 100,000 for auto 
theft, 350 per 100,000 for rape, and just under 600 per 100,000 for robbery). 
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frightening outsiders.
145
  
 
The surreptitiously compelling interest that explains the law‘s otherwise 
inexplicable treatment of accidental deaths in the course of ―big four‖ felonies as 
worse-than-purposeful, capitally aggravated murder is, we suggest, the same 
impulse that leads parochial communities to value the death penalty itself: a 
powerful fear of cross-boundary crime.  Both tools—and in particular their 
frequently conjoined use
146—provide law enforcement officials with a powerful 
device for assuaging fears and communicating how seriously they take and how 
harshly they are prepared to punish outsider crime.
147
 
 
Understanding Felony-Murder Doctrine as a response to cross-cultural, 
invasion crimes explains a number of the doctrine‘s bizarre nuances.  When an 
                                                                                                                       
 
145 We are indebted to WALTER GORDON, CRIME AND CRIMINAL LAW: THE CALIFORNIA 
EXPERIENCE 1960-1975, at 7–8, 10–14, 52–53 (1981) for this sociological insight.  Of course, most 
robberies, rapes, kidnappings and burglaries are committed by and against poor individuals from the 
same poor neighborhood.  But it should not surprise us to find, and the Broken System II results bear 
out, that anomalies in the criminal law are most strongly influenced by the most politically powerful, 
not the most numerous, of victims.  See KENNEDY, supra note 72, at 3–4; Stuntz, supra note 78, at 
1984–85; see supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text.  It is also true that other so-called 
―inherently dangerous‖ crimes, beyond the ―big four,‖ serve as predicates for second- and even 
first-degree felony murder.  See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 140, at 439–42.  But here, too, the 
―cross-boundary‖ concept described in text helps explain, if not justify, the notoriously arbitrary 
judgments states and courts make about what crimes do and do not qualify as ―inherently dangerous‖ 
for purposes of being recognized as predicates for felony murder.  See id. at 441–42 (collecting 
cases identifying the following offenses as not inherently dangerous enough to be a predicate for 
felony murder: fraud by chiropractors inducing patients with curable cancer to forgo surgery in favor 
of futile treatments; possession of a firearm and an illegal sawed-off shotgun by a felon; reckless 
firing of a gun illegally possessed by a convicted felon; and ruling that following offenses do qualify 
as ―inherently dangerous‖ predicates to felony murder: theft by tow-truck of an automobile from a 
deserted used car lot (the intoxicated perpetrators crashed the tow truck into another car on the 
highway) and furnishing heroin). 
146 See supra note 108, 118, 120.  This symbiosis between felony murder and the death 
penalty is further evidenced by the United Kingdom‘s abolition of the felony-murder doctrine and the 
death penalty around the same time—in 1957 in the former case and 1965 in the latter.  See, Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965, NATIONAL ARCHIVES. (1965 Chapter 71), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1965/71. 
147 To a substantial extent, we agree with other observers who recognize a deeply ―expressive‖ 
connotation to the Felony Murder Doctrine.  See, e.g., Binder, supra note 103, at 1032.  What we 
add is a description of what is being expressed—a fear not of especially dangerous or violent crimes 
but of outsider, cross-boundary crimes—a fear, we understand, but unlike the expressivist apologists 
for felony murder, we do not consider sufficient to justify the doctrine‘s departure from 
jurisprudential fundamentals and privileging of some communities over others. 
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innocent person, not a party to the felony, kills a co-felon in the course of the 
crime, the trend is against finding the surviving felon guilty of felony murder.
148
  
Some states exclude killings committed by anyone other than a felon.
149
  Other 
states exclude all killings of co-felons.
150
  Only a handful of states make any 
foreseeable killing of anyone by anyone during a felony a basis for felony murder 
liability.
151
  Commentators struggle to explain these rules.
152
  The doctrine itself 
refuses to acknowledge the standard reasons for exculpating defendants for harm 
for which they were a ―but for‖ cause—that they did not advert to or proximately 
cause the harm.  Yet, through these, the doctrine does grant mercy based on 
fortuities that typically make no difference and violate the usual rule that, formally 
at least, the law treats all victims the same.
153
 
 
Our analysis again solves the riddle.  The trend is to impose excessive 
punishment—measured by rules that apply in all other cases—only when the 
victim is a member of the community and the killer is not.  The compelling 
interest that surreptitiously trumps the normal rules arises only when the identity of 
the killer and victim make the death a cross-boundary offense against a member of 
the local community.  In truth, the Felony-Murder Doctrine does not target 
dangerous felonies in the course of which someone dies; it targets stranger crimes 
in the course of which an outsider kills a member of a privileged community.  
 
Consider, as well, the so-called ―merger rule‖ limiting felony murder.  If the 
underlying felony is an aggravated assault in which the assailant intends to scare 
the victim with a gun, which accidentally fires killing the victim, the crime does 
not qualify as a felony murder in most states and is not first-degree murder or 
capital-eligible.
154
  Ostensibly, this is because the act that killed the victim and the 
                                                                                                                       
 
148 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 793–94 (5th ed. 2010) (―Although it is now 
generally accepted that there is no felony murder when one of the felons is shot and killed by the 
victim, a police officer, or a bystander, it is not easy to explain why this is so.‖). 
149 Famous holdings to this effect include People v. Washington, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (Cal. 
1965), and Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 476 (1958). 
150 See, e.g., State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 30 (N.J. 1977). 
151 See LAFAVE, supra note 133, at 793–96. 
152 See supra note 133. 
153 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.02 (1985) (noting principle that, for 
purposes of balancing of evils recognized by the criminal law, all victim‘s lives are valued the same). 
154 Indeed, if the defendant was not grossly reckless, for example, because she thought the gun 
was unloaded or a toy, the crime does not even constitute bare murder.  For discussion of the merger 
rules, see, e.g., KAPLAN ET AL. supra note 140, at 442–48; LAFAVE, supra note 133, at 803–05. 
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one constituting the predicate felony ―merge‖ into a single act.  But so what?  If 
every burglary resulting in an accidental killing of the homeowner is the moral 
equivalent of deliberate, first-degree, capitally aggravated murder, then why is not 
every aggravated assault resulting in an unintended killing its moral equivalent as 
well?
155
  In both cases, the defendant caused a death, and intending to frighten 
someone with a gun is considerably more dangerous and evil than a cat burglar‘s 
plan to break into a home and steal.  And why, as we have already asked, does the 
law treat an intent to kill constituting second-degree murder less culpable and 
worthy of the death penalty, than an accidental killing in a cat burglary?  Given 
our analysis, the answer is simple: regardless of its potential dangerousness, assault 
rarely is a stranger crime and is not expressive of cross-class or cross-cultural 
invasion.
156
  Burglary is both. 
 
4. Capital Felony Murder as a Tool for Parochial and Libertarian 
Self-Protection 
 
Parochialism helps explain the Felony Murder Doctrine and why insular 
communities demand extra punishment, especially death, for cross-cultural crime.  
Yet, if punishing cross-cultural crime is the goal, why stop at felonies resulting in 
death?  Why not punish all robbers, rapists, kidnappers and burglars with death?  
 
The answer, we think, is that felony murder, like the death penalty itself, is 
also a libertarian rationing device.  Libertarian communities can be expected to 
resist the massive expansion government infrastructure and taxes that such a policy 
would require.  By using the Felony Murder Doctrine to enable it to reserve the 
harshest, most expressive punishment for the occasional cross-cultural crime that 
results in the most tragic result, these communities can make an example of an 
                                                                                                                       
 
155 Or put the other way around, if an assault that accidentally turns deadly merges, why does 
not an armed robbery in which the victim is killed merge, too, given that armed robbery is simply an 
assault with a deadly weapon (which merges) plus larceny (which is not a recognized predicate 
crime)?  See People v. Burton, 491 P.2d. 793, 801 (Cal. 1971) (rejecting this argument on the 
ground that the intended robbery is ―independent‖ of the killing, but an intended assault is not).  The 
illogic of the merger rule has been clear from the beginning.  See State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552, 574 
(1878) (Norton, J., dissenting) (―If B starts out with a fixed felonious purpose to ‗inflict great bodily 
harm‘ on A . . . without intending to kill but to stop with infliction . . . harm and death ensues, the 
felony committed in inflicting the great bodily harm is no more merged in the killing than would a 
rape perpetrated by B upon A, which resulted in the death of A . . . .‖). 
156 The assault, battery and child abuse predicate crimes that are most commonly held to 
―merge‖ with the killing, and thus to provide no basis for felony murder alchemy, are offenses that 
classically and typically afflict (usually poor) acquaintances and family members.  See cases cited in 
KAPLAN ET AL. supra note 140, at 442–48; LAFAVE, supra note 133, at 803–05.  
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occasional stranger-criminal and express how seriously they take stranger crime, 
without actually having taken it too seriously most of the time.  
 
To be sure, from a libertarian perspective, both the Felony Murder Doctrine 
and punishment itself impose costs—felony murder violates the principle that we 
measure evil by the extent to which individuals choose to interfere with the 
autonomy of others; punishment withdraws the criminal‘s autonomy while 
empowering the state in ways that threaten everyone‘s freedom.  Rationing is 
important, therefore, as a way to balance the autonomy harms that crime and 
punishment inflict on innocent and guilty individuals.  Using the victim‘s death to 
mark the rare occasions on which the law most harshly and retributively 
intervenes, and using the criminal‘s death to express how seriously the community 
regards the evil of intruding on a victim‘s autonomy, makes libertarian sense.  
What libertarianism by itself cannot explain, however, is the use, not of any 
victim‘s intended death, but of a particular victim‘s even accidental death in the 
course of a ―big four‖ felony to mark the point where harshly retributive state 
intervention, and the extinguishing of the offender‘s life, become tolerable.  It 
takes the parochial impulse to explain that aspect of the rationing device. 
 
On the other hand, were parochialism the only important influence, one would 
expect insular communities to erect other bulwarks than the death penalty against 
depraved and dangerous outside influences.  They might, that is, respond to their 
fear of outsider crime with well-funded, professional police forces, high-powered 
prosecutorial and judicial law enforcement mechanisms, and a disposition to do 
whatever it takes to put all robbers, rapists, kidnappers and burglars behind bars for 
life.  Yet, as we have seen, the opposite is frequently the case: these jurisdictions 
tend to suffer from some of the poorest quality, underfunded law enforcement 
institutions.  In this case, it takes the conjoining of the libertarian impulse to the 
parochial one to explain the result. 
 
D. The Death Penalty and the Illusion of Self-Protection 
 
Based on the available data, we conclude that the small set of jurisdictions 
that propel the modern American death penalty are driven by the combined 
instincts of parochialism and libertarianism.  These communities exhibit a fear of 
outside influences that threaten the local values and experiences that set them off 
from the national and global mainstream.  Whites in these communities, who we 
take to be a proxy for more privileged residents, tend to have high rates of 
homicide victimization relative to the rates experienced by African-American 
residents, and the white population tends to be located in close proximity to poor 
and African American communities—factors we associate with a partly justified, 
partly inflated apprehension of crime.  These jurisdictions also tend to have more 
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populist electoral mechanisms through which fears of this sort can be powerfully 
communicated to local officials.  Taken together, these factors generate an 
elevated fear of stranger crime on the part of privileged members of capitally prone 
communities that is forcefully communicated to local officials whose jobs depend 
on the adequacy of their response to the fear.  
 
Ironically, however, the communities‘ crime fears are aggravated by their 
parsimonious public spending habits and mistrust of government actors and 
institutions.  These factors lead to low-quality law enforcement, as indicated by 
low rates at which the communities clear serious crimes by arrest, conviction and 
incarceration; an inability to protect privileged residents from the kinds of 
homicide rates that are common in poor and minority neighborhoods; and high 
rates of serious error in the many capital verdicts the communities impose.  
 
This peculiar combination of fear of cross-boundary crime and unwillingness 
to support and systematize law enforcement leads these communities directly to 
the death penalty.  Capital punishment provides them with the seemingly 
incongruent conditions they seek—a public, powerfully expressive and harshly 
retributive—but, on the other hand, carefully rationed, inexpensive and 
episodic—demonstration of the community‘s and officials‘ abhorrence for outsider 
crime.  Through the ultimate punishment, and the preference for it over 
alternative responses to crime that rely more heavily on state institutions, the 
communities have adapted and domesticated a vigilante tradition with deep roots 
in their localities. 
 
Given their parochial and libertarian proclivities, it is easy to see why 
death-prone communities insist on preserving the anachronistic and doctrinally 
dubious Capital Felony Murder Doctrine.  Wielding this penological magic wand, 
the communities can simultaneously make a lot more of and a lot less of the crimes 
that particularly plague them.  Using the proxy of the ―big four‖ felonies, the 
communities can conjure successive strata of otherwise nonexistent culpability out 
of the stranger crimes they abhor.  Using the rare fortuity of a community 
member‘s death in the course of one of those felonies, the localities can shrink the 
body of crimes to which a concerted response is required to a number small 
enough to avoid having to empower the state to respond systematically.  Through 
their retributive and expressive synergy, the Felony Murder Doctrine and the death 
penalty enable parochial and libertarian communities to create the illusion of a 
powerful response to the cross-boundary crimes that most frighten them without 
having to empower or pay the state to provide it. 
 
The death penalty‘s particular attraction to simultaneously parochial and 
libertarian communities helps explain the penalty‘s markedly uneven use among 
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and within states and the puzzling resilience of the capital-felony-murder doctrine.  
As of yet, however, we have shed little light on the other central paradox of the 
modern American death penalty: why so few of the offenders we sentence to die 
are actually executed?  We turn next to that question. 
 
IV. AN EXPLANATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY‘S FREQUENT IMPOSITION 
AND INFREQUENT EXECUTION 
 
A. The Paradox at the Heart of the System 
 
The defining paradox of the American system of capital punishment is the 
stark discrepancy between the number of people sentenced to die and the number 
actually executed.  As we demonstrated in the Broken System studies, an 
American sentenced to die has about a two-to-one chance of having his death 
sentence overturned on appeal or state post-conviction review.
157
  The decision 
for community prosecutors and courts to ―go capital‖ is a gamble the house often 
does not seem to win.  
 
As high as the reversal rate is, it greatly overestimates the likelihood of 
execution.  After the jury imposes a sentence of death, the verdict enters a 
multi-layered system of state and federal judicial review, which has proven 
necessary to uncover the high number of reversible errors in capital cases.
158
  This 
litigation takes, on average, twelve years before the appellate system is able to 
                                                                                                                       
 
157 See Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 216–17 (estimating the total error rate during the 
1973–1995 study period as 68%); see also Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, The Machinery of 
Death, 18 CHANCE 34, 36 (2005) (―[The 68 percent figure in the Broken System] study has received 
overwhelming academic approval and has been repeatedly cited by the federal courts and federal 
judges, including Supreme Court justices.‖); Michael O. Finkelstein et al., A Note on the Censoring 
Problem in Empirical Case-Outcome Studies, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, 375, 382 (finding after 
recalculating the Broken System data that ―the complete case estimate of the reversal rate was 67.8 
percent (which is quite close to the published estimate of 68 percent) and the self-consistent estimate 
[after conducting additional statistical analyses to account for ―censoring‖ or the possibility of change 
over time in regard to verdicts still under review when the study ended] was 62.2 percent‖). 
158 See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 69 (comparing the 40% reversal rate in the third 
and last stage of review, after the preceding stages have already found serious error in and removed, 
respectively, 41% of all capital verdicts entering the review process and 10% to 17% of verdicts that 
survived the first round of review, and concluding that these numbers reveal both a high rate of error 
and the need for multiple levels of inspection to remedy the problem); Liebman, supra note 33, at 82 
(―The 41 percent-10 percent-40 percent pattern of reversal rates at the three successive review stages 
does not exhibit the sharply downward trend of remaining flaws . . . that one expects in a fully 
effective progression of inspections.‖) 
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sign-off on an execution.
159
  As a result, most death-row inmates are many years 
away from being executed, and in the meantime, a number of them will die of 
natural causes, commit suicide or be killed by other inmates.
160
  
 
In Overproduction of Death, published in 2000, we illustrated this process by 
tracking the outcomes of the 263 death sentences imposed nationwide eleven years 
earlier in 1989.  Of the 263 verdicts, 160 (61%) had not completed the review 
process.  Among the 103 verdicts that had reached the end of the appeal process, 
78 (30% of those imposed; 77% of those finally reviewed) had been overturned by 
a state or federal court based on a finding of serious legal error.  Nine of the 
condemned inmates died on death row while awaiting a decision.  Only thirteen 
were executed.
161
  
 
The ordeal of state and federal review that every capital sentence must endure 
in order to be cleansed of error and reach execution is a central feature of 
American capital punishment today.  A hefty majority of death sentences are 
ultimately overturned due to serious flaws in the conviction or sentence.  In the 
process, all of them are suspended for well over a decade while the detection 
process proceeds.  The most poignant illustration of our broken system is that of 
the 5,826 people sentenced to die between 1973 and 1999, only 313, roughly one 
in eleven, were executed during that period.
162
  About four times as many had 
their convictions overturned or were granted clemency.
163
  Of these myriad cases 
sent back for retrial at the second appeal phase (the only phase for which data are 
available), 82% ended in sentences less than death, and 9% ended in not guilty 
verdicts.
164
  
 
B. A New View, from Without 
 
In deciding what to make of a legal regime that operates this way, there are 
two perspectives an observer can take.  The first is to analyze the regime on its 
                                                                                                                       
 
159 See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 36. 
160 See, e.g., Richard C. Dieter, Smart on Crime: Reconsidering the Death Penalty in a Time of 
Economic Crisis, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 14, 21 (2009) 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf. 
161 James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2055–56 
(2000). 
162 See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at A–1. 
163 Id. at 77–78. 
164 See id. at i; Liebman, supra note 33, at 82. 
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own terms.  From the law that governs the regime, one can discern its goals and 
aspirations.  With some empirical research, one then can determine whether the 
regime‘s implementation accomplishes what is intended.  The regime describes 
its own logic, and the observer evaluates it based on how well it succeeds.  This is 
the view from within.
165
 
 
The reality revealed by the Broken System findings, particularly the paradox 
of an affinity for death sentences and aversion to executions, satisfies no one‘s 
stated goals for the death penalty in America.  No constitutional principle, statute, 
judicial decision, politician, pundit or think-tank advocates a capital punishment 
system in which the majority of verdicts are overturned and the average defendant 
languishes on death row for over a decade while an exhaustive and expensive 
review process grinds along to an uncertain outcome.
166
  Yet, these conditions 
more or less define the steady equilibrium that our capital system seems to have 
reached.
167
  In light of the glaring discontinuity between policy and outcome, the 
view from within fails to explain the stasis that characterizes our seemingly broken 
system. 
 
A second perspective observes the regime from without.  By taking a 
birds-eye view of the pattern and practices through which the regime operates in 
actual fact, as a whole, over an extended period of time, and without accepting 
everything the system says about itself, this approach attempts to uncover a hidden 
logic that cannot be discerned from within.
168
  
 
In Albion‘s Fatal Tree, Douglas Hay famously took this second perspective, 
puzzling over a capital system in which the ranks of those sentenced to death 
swelled year upon year, but actually sent only one in five condemned prisoners to 
the gallows.
169
  Stays and clemency were endemic to the system, triggering a 
                                                                                                                       
 
165 A good example of this approach is Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19. 
166 See Liebman, supra note 19, at 4 n.3 (citing sources decrying the evident incoherence of 
American death penalty doctrine and results); Governor Quinn‘s Abolition Statement, supra note 18 
(giving Governor Quinn‘s reasons for signing legislation abolishing the death penalty in Illinois).  
167 But cf. infra notes 332–359 and accompanying text (discussing changes in the nation‘s 
death penalty equilibrium since 2000).  
168 See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 19. 
169 See supra notes 5–6, 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing Hay); see also GATRELL, 
supra note 32, at 7 (discussing outcomes of capital sentences between 1770 and 1830 and finding that 
only about 20% were carried out). 
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glaring discrepancy between the penalty‘s imposition and its execution.170  From 
all sides of the political spectrum, among courts and informed observers alike, the 
capital system was an object of near universal derision for its seeming irrationality 
and inability to accomplish its straightforward objectives.
171
  Yet, despite this, the 
system proved exceptionally stable over time, resisting numerous calls for reform.  
Although Hay wrote about the death penalty in eighteenth century England, his 
vivid description of a seemingly broken capital system has eerie echoes in the 
American death penalty of today. 
 
Hay‘s view from without broke from previous scholarship of the regime by 
noteworthy observers such as Blackstone, Radzinowicz and Romilly, who had 
examined the system from within.
172
  Hay rejected the belief—unanimous from 
the eighteenth century onward—that despite its inexplicable stability, the legal 
regime had consistently failed to meet its own stated goals.173  Instead, he posited 
a strong, but previously hidden, logic to the system that revealed it to be a 
powerful tool for achieving its users‘ deepest objectives, namely, the terroristic 
social control of a restive peasantry by the rural English aristocracy.174  
 
Hay describes a capital system over which the members of the local gentry 
held sway, through their power over the definition of capital crimes (via their 
membership in Parliament), prosecutions (which they often initiated and 
funded
175
), trial judges (who came from their ranks), executive clemency (by 
officials acting on the gentry‘s advice), and public hangings (which the gentry‘s 
clergy framed for the public in commanding sermons delivered to the assembled 
masses as they waited for the trapdoor to drop).
176
  Using these powers, the gentry 
                                                                                                                       
 
170 Hay, supra note 5, at 40–49, 57. 
171 Id. at 23–24, 56. 
172 Id. at 22–24. 
173. Hay, supra note 5, at 39. 
174. Hay, supra note 5, at 25–26.   
175 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 73, at 475–76 (―England in the eighteenth century had no 
public officials corresponding to . . . police or district attorneys. . . .  A victim of crime who wanted 
a constable . . . to apprehend the perpetrator was expected to pay the expenses of doing so. . . .  
[T]he prosecutor was usually the victim . . .  [who undertook] to file charges . . . present evidence to 
the grand jury, and, if the grand jury found a true bill, provide evidence for the trial.‖). 
176 Hay, supra note 5, at 27; see, e.g., Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 2016 (2010) (presenting findings from empirical research suggesting that 
evidence injustices committed by prosecutors or the judicial system can undermine the justice 
system‘s moral credibility, with crime-control costs as citizen‘s become reluctant to support, assist 
and defer to the system). 
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obtained life or death power over huge swathes of the peasantry by making capital 
virtually every invasive indiscretion through which criminals availed themselves of 
the lords‘ silver or linens;177 strategically doled out prosecutions and mandatory 
death sentences to the miscreants, and acts of slow-acting mercy (which often took 
years of appeals to finalize) on behalf of members of their families who humbly 
supplicated themselves to the lords in return for the favor—increasing the former 
in times of riot and stress, and the latter as a form of mass plea bargaining to entice 
the rabble to go back indoors;
178
 and managed the messages conveyed to the 
public and lessons taught and learned through trial judges‘ statements upon 
imposing death verdicts and the clergy‘s well-attended sermons when executions 
took place.
179
  Through this power to take life (swiftly and demonstratively) and 
give it back (excruciatingly slowly and quietly), Hay concludes, the gentry 
exercised a virulent ―terror‖ over the masses, which, however, was carefully 
cloaked in the calming and obscuring ideology of evenhanded due process and 
clemency and the solemnity and spectacle of a judge‘s pronouncement of death 
and the clergyman‘s and hangman‘s publicly dispatching the offender to the next 
world.
180
  
 
Hay argues that the death penalty particularly appealed to the gentry as a form 
of social control because of its extreme and expressive, but only episodic and 
after-the-fact, response to the demands of law and order.  As such, it shielded 
them from their existential fear: a strong central government bolstered by a 
national police force, prosecuting corps and law enforcement regime.
181
  
 
Clearly, Hay‘s Marxian explanation of England on the verge of the industrial 
revolution does not translate well to the modern United States.  Indeed, many 
question the validity of Hay‘s interpretation as applied to the era he depicts.182  
We find much to admire, however, in the model he provides of an analysis from 
                                                                                                                       
 
177 Hay, supra note 5, at 18, 21. 
178 Id. at 40–49. 
179 Id. at 17–18, 26–30. 
180 Id. at 32–39. 
181 Id. at 40–41. 
182 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Albion's Fatal Flaws, 98 PAST AND PRESENT 96, 120 (1983); 
Robert B. Shoemaker, The ‗Crime Wave‘ Revisited: Crime, Law Enforcement and Punishment in 
Britain, 1650–1900, (book review) 34 HISTORICAL J. 763, 763 (1991) (―Aibion‘s fatal tree attracted 
considerable criticism, and a large body of published work now exists which calls into question . . . . 
Douglas Hay‘s argument that criminal law was manipulated by the ruling class as a means of social 
control.‖). 
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outside the system that aims to identify the hidden logic of a stable, yet seemingly 
illogical, system of capital punishment. 
 
Until now, our own writing has considered the death penalty largely from 
within, arriving at a conclusion about the modern American death penalty that is 
close to the starting point for Hay‘s explorations.  The Broken System studies 
described a modern American death penalty system so fraught with reversible error 
that only 5% of the 5,826 death verdicts imposed were carried out during the 
twenty-three years studied from 1973 to 1995.
183
  Coupled with evidence that 
defendants are overwhelmingly sentenced to a penalty less than death on retrial 
after reversal, the findings reveal a capital punishment system with little to be said 
in its defense from within.  Although Broken System begged, it did not answer, 
the question of why a system like this would be allowed to persist. 
 
In Overproduction of Death, we discovered a set of skewed incentives that 
help explain why there is little supply-side constraint on the number of flawed 
death sentences that localities produce.  Local prosecutors stand to gain by 
imposing as many death verdicts as possible, regardless of the verdicts‘ failure rate 
on appeal, because they quickly realize the political gains, and the costs of review 
and reversal are slow to materialize and shouldered by others.
184
  Across the aisle, 
the modest resources of the anti-death-penalty bar require them to focus only on 
those clients that face the most imminent threat of execution.  With their cases 
clustered at this narrower, post-conviction end of the capital appeals funnel, these 
lawyers understandably value reversals for their immediate clients over a doubtful 
promise of fairer, more reliable trial procedures for hypothetical, future capital 
defendants whom the lawyers do not now represent.
185
  Again, however, although 
Overproduction of Death explained how these incentives keep the systems‘ repeat 
players from exposing and resisting the capital system‘s stable diseconomies, the 
article did not consider why the legislatures that created the system, the courts that 
regulate it or the taxpayers who underwrite it allow it to survive. 
 
More recently, Slow Dancing with Death explored the Supreme Court‘s 
tortuous and ambivalent regulation of the nation‘s capital punishment 
architecture.
186
  The article describes how the Court‘s responsibility for directly 
                                                                                                                       
 
183 See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 36. 
184 Liebman, supra note 146, at 2097, 2101. 
185 Id. at 2076. 
186 Liebman, supra note 19. 
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superintending a system of blatant, court-administered state violence that often and 
evidently lacks the trappings of law has compelled it to intervene in matters of 
substantive criminal law and punishment that (with textual encouragement from 
the Constitution) it has traditionally left to the States.
187
  Yet, the Court has ended 
up being paralyzed by the responsibility—unwilling, on the one hand, to accept the 
moral exposure entailed by the substantive review it originally promised,
188
 yet 
fearful, on the other hand, of the public reaction if it tried to abolish a form of state 
violence it has been unable to domesticate.
189
  In the latter regard, the parochial 
and libertarian proclivities of the communities that support the penalty, and their 
history of taking matters violently in their own hands when they doubt the state‘s 
willingness or capacity to protect them, suggests that the Court has good reason to 
fear.
190
  
 
Slow Dancing with Death finds the Court in about the same situation vis-à-vis 
the American system of capital punishment as the nation at large—helplessly 
watching the system churn out case after flawed case, seemingly without purpose 
or direction.  The article helps explain why the Supreme Court has not succeeded 
in altering a situation it believes is untenable, but still leaves unanswered the 
question of why the system arose in the first place and why it remains so stable, 
despite the vilification it receives from death penalty proponents, detractors and the 
agnostic alike.  Following Hay, and informed by our above discovery of the 
minority status of the death penalty and the characteristics of the relatively few 
communities that value it, we are now prepared to take a fresh look from without. 
 
C. The True Course of a Capital Case 
 
One way to obtain this view is to write the story of the death penalty, not the 
way a lawyer would, but as a documentarian might.  Informed by the facts 
revealed in the Broken System study, we undertake something like that approach in 
this section.  
 
                                                                                                                       
 
187 Id. at 16 (noting, inter alia, that the Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments appear to bless the death penalty as a substantive matter). 
188 Id. at 125 (arguing that the Court ―lost heart‖ and renounced many of the supervisory 
responsibilities its earlier decisions regulating the death penalty promised). 
189 Id. at 122 (arguing that the Court is at once tormented by sanctioning the continuation of 
raw, state-imposed violence and fearful of the ―struggle with the political branches that banning the 
violence would ignite‖). 
190 See supra notes 59–102 and accompanying text. 
  
48 
 
1. The Origin of a Death Sentence: The Scarlet Letter Stage  
 
A home invasion murder in a small town—the victim is well known, the 
details disturbing.  The community is stricken; a family cries out for justice.  A 
stranger to the community, the accused, has committed a senseless and despicable 
act.  He must be punished.  
 
Amid public grief and cries for vengeance, the prosecutor goes for death.  
That is what the community wants.  It believes itself to be under siege from 
outside and demands immediate steps to allay its fear and express its anger.  In 
another era, in a county of self-reliant citizens like this one, the accused might not 
have made it this far.  But today, the community trusts the prosecutor to carry the 
case forward to the desired capital conclusion.  The prosecutor‘s ability to repay 
the public trust and remain in office depends on her success. 
 
A jury is empanelled and delivers its verdict: guilty.  But the community, the 
victim‘s family and the state are not ready to exhale.  A final matter remains for 
the representative dozen: to choose between life and death.   
 
At this stage of his long and uncertain journey to execution, or not, the 
accused has few friends.  The community is angry.  Skilled lawyers willing to 
represent the hated and hateful likes of this defendant are not available to him.  
They concentrate their fire on those who have moved further along the conveyor 
belt and are more imminently in danger of being executed.  The accused must 
make do with the less clearly competent and committed legal assistance the 
victimized community is willing and able to provide.
191
 
 
Facing facts, it is clear that none of the participants see the function of this 
stage as conducting a perfect trial or constructing an air-tight case that will 
withstand appeal.  Indeed, truly facing the facts, it is clear that the goal of this 
stage is not even a verdict with a fifty-fifty prospect of being upheld.  Historical 
error rates are simply too high to permit that assumption, particularly in 
communities that use the death penalty the most.
192
  Instead, the evident function 
of this stage of the proceeding is to visit upon the stranger-perpetrator an awful 
                                                                                                                       
 
191 See sources cited supra note 75. 
192 See, e.g., BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 295–99, B-4, B-5 (listing counties with at 
least five death sentences and 100%  reversal rates: Baltimore Count, MD; Orange, CA; De Kalb, 
GA; Tulsa, OK; San Bernardino, CA; Lake, IN; Richmond, GA; Camden, NJ; Pasco, FL; Jefferson, 
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judgment, that proclaims the community‘s anger and abhorrence at his violation of 
their sanctity and its resolve to deal immediately and harshly with those whose 
insidiously invasive acts put the entire community in fear.   
 
It is not lost on the community that there are other ways to improve public 
safety.  A more vigorous and professional law enforcement apparatus, for 
instance, might catch more who offend and deter more who think about doing it.  
Yet, true to its libertarian self-sufficiency and mistrust of government, the 
community is unwilling to empower and invest in that amount of government.
193
  
Instead, it prefers to wager its scarce law enforcement resources on the death 
penalty—infrequently in the scheme of all stranger crime but frequently when the 
cross-boundary offense fortuitously or intentionally kills.  The penalty is not part 
of a comprehensive strategy or penology.  It is the community‘s unvarnished 
expression of communal retributive anger that, although infrequent, is visible and 
dramatic and signals reassuringly to itself and wrathfully to outsiders how 
seriously it takes the invasive offense.   
 
The jury‘s verdict is death.  The sentence is pronounced.  God‘s mercy on 
the invader‘s soul is invoked.  He is branded with the scarlet letter of being 
worthy of death.  
 
Whether he is actually executed will be for others to decide, years down the 
road.  But for now, communal catharsis occurs.  The community has largely 
achieved what it needs and desires.  As Professor Weisberg has pointed out, 
―[s]imply having many death sentences can satisfy many proponents of the death 
penalty who demand capital punishment, because in a vague way they want the 
law to make a statement of social authority and control.‖194  
Of course, other things equal, police, prosecutors and the assembled public 
want the sentence to be executed.  If out-of-town judges overturn it years later, 
those in the community who are still paying attention may curse the outsiders‘ 
insensitivity and elitism.
195
  But facing facts again, an unmistakable feature of the 
scarlet letter stage, at least for most of the players, is that they do not deeply care if 
the condemned man lives or dies.  How else can we explain the fact that the 
highest-frequency death sentencing counties have long coped with significantly 
                                                                                                                       
 
193 The high rates of serious error found when the community‘s death verdicts are reviewed on 
appeal further attests to its unwillingness to invest in high-quality law enforcement and courts 
systems.  See Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 243. 
194 See Weisberg, supra note 19, at 387. 
195 See supra note 58; infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text. 
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higher capital-error and reversal rates than the already staggering national 
two-thirds average?  Indeed, until the Supreme Court put its foot down, 
prosecutors frequently encouraged juries to abandon their hesitation to choose 
death on the grounds that mistakes would be reversed on appeal.
196
  Though these 
communities wish for eventual executions, the real dividend they receive evidently 
comes from the death verdict itself, irrespective of its quality or aftermath. 
 
Given a choice between narrowing the focus and securing higher-quality 
death verdicts that stand up on appeal and, instead, sticking with the quick and 
unvarnished verdicts the community has been imposing, it chooses the latter.  
When faced with a trade-off between more sentences and more executions, the 
community opts for the ceremony and spectacle, the expressive comeuppance and 
revenge, attending each additional death verdict.  
 
For the condemned man, however, things are different.  And the same is true 
for the family of the victim.  If the defendant is properly advised by trial counsel 
(a fifty-fifty proposition, at best) and if members of the victim‘s family are 
properly informed by the police, prosecutor or judge (in our experience, this almost 
never happens
197
), these parties with a keen interest in the final outcome will know 
that the capital trial and verdict are so much sound and fury.  For them, the 
process is only beginning; the real outcome is in doubt and will not be clear for 
years. 
 
2. The Death Row Stage 
 
When the condemned man arrives on death row, he takes his place at the back 
of the line of thousands of other death row inmates awaiting their turn for each of 
three successive inspections of their conviction and sentence.  First comes the 
state direct appeal, usually lasting about three years.198   During the Broken 
System study period (1973–95), the elected state high court judges who preside at 
this stage found 41% of the verdicts they examined so prejudicially flawed that 
                                                                                                                       
 
196 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329, 333, 334 & nn.4, 5 (1985) (imposing 
constitutional ban on arguments, frequently made, that the jury should be less than fully concerned 
about the life-or-death responsibility it bears, given that the outcome will be scrutinized on appeal). 
197 See Liebman, supra note 146, at 2134 & nn.247, 248 (discussing the toll the review process 
takes on the victim‘s family who typically are left uninformed by the other players).  
198. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 
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reversal and a do-over was required.199  In other words, as a result of the first 
stage of review, over two out of every five defendants is back at square one, 
awaiting trial.
200
  
 
The prisoners whose verdicts survive direct appeal (59% in the Broken System 
period) trudge on to the next, state post-conviction stage of review, which 
examines the case for a separate set of errors.  Few of the decisions at this stage 
are published, making it difficult to discern how many death verdicts that cleared 
the first hurdle are overturned at this stage and how many simply languish awaiting 
decision.  The limited information established that no fewer than 10% of the 
surviving verdicts were found lacking at this stage because of an error sufficiently 
egregious that it probably affected the outcome of the trial—again requiring re-trial 
if the defendant was to be executed.
201
  The figure could be as high as 78% if 
every surviving case for which an outcome is unknown ended in a reversal.  
Broken System II‘s very conservative estimate of the actual number is 18%.202  
This is itself a remarkable number when it is considered that the inspector at this 
stage is the same locally elected trial judge who imposed the verdict in the first 
place and is reviewing her own handiwork, to which her judicial superiors already 
gave their stamp of approval at the first stage of review.203 
 
Publicly accessible decisions again become available at the third, habeas 
corpus level of inspection, where federal judges review the half or so of the 
original verdicts still standing for constitutional error.
204
  Even though federal 
courts can only examine claims of error already rejected at one or both of the 
previous state court stages,
205
 during the Broken System period, they found 
                                                                                                                       
 
199. BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 8.   
200 See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 8 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 
216–17). 
201 Id. (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 216–17). 
202 Id. at 8 & n.88, 17–18 & n.103.  . 
203. See Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 215. 
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BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 18 n.103.   
205 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1996) (requiring exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite to 
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prejudicial violations in two out of five capital verdicts that survived both prior 
stages of review.206  Reversals at this final stage occurred on average about 
thirteen years after the prisoner was sentenced to die; final decisions approving 
death verdicts typically occurred about a year earlier on average.
207
 
 
Using the 10% underestimate of reversals at stage two and ignoring a handful 
of reversals at an intermittent fourth level of review, the odds during the Broken 
System period were better than two to one (68%) that a man sentenced to death in 
modern America would have his case overturned and sent back to its originating 
county. 
208
  
 
In other words, the massive error detection process consumes over a dozen 
years on average and considerable public treasure before a conclusion is reached.   
 
Decisions in capital cases are highly visible and closely scrutinized by the 
public,
209
 and judges do not lightly reverse capital verdicts and order costly 
do-overs.  Nine out of ten of the nearly 2,400 reversals during the Broken System 
                                                                                                                       
 
206. BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 8. 
207 See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 91; see Nancy J. King et al., Executive Summary: 
Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by 
State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUSTICE MONOGRAPH AUGUST 2007 at 10,  http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf 
(noting that capital federal habeas corpus cases resulting in reversal of death verdicts in the 2000–02 
period took longer to complete than cases resulting in an affirmance of the death verdict). The figures 
in text are of course averages.  Individual cases take much longer.  See, e.g., Alarcón, supra note 
20 , at 711 & n.75 (showing that of the thirteen men executed in California between 1992 and 2006, 
ten had been on death row for fourteen years or more, and of those ten, five had been there for twenty 
of more years); See Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 346–47 (discussing a Tennessee death row inmate 
sentenced to die in 1984, whose case was under review in the Supreme Court twenty-four years later, 
at a point about midway through the third tier of review); infra notes 195–204 and accompanying text 
(describing Carl Isaacs, who Georgia executed in 2003, thirty years after he first arrived on death 
row). 
208 BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 8, 58 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 
216–17).  The full reversal-rate equation, reflecting the findings at all three phases of review is .41 + 
.10(.59) + .40(.53) = .68.  See id.  Using a sophisticated methodology to project future changes in 
reversal rates and apply them to the cases that were still under review when the Broken System study 
was completed, Finkelstein and colleagues re-estimated the 68% figure as 62%.  See supra note 
142.  Using the still conservative, but likely more accurate, 18% reversal rate at the second stage, 
the 68% figure climbs to 71%.  See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 18 n.103 (presenting a full 
reversal-rate equation, reflecting a more realistic estimate of reversals at the second stage of review 
as: .41 + .18(.59) + .40(.48) = .71); supra note 183 and accompanying text.   
209 See Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 231 n.64. 
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period were ordered by state judges elected to office by voters who profess to 
support the death penalty, remove judges who they believe do not,
210
 and so 
chasten the governors they elect that state chief executives have all but stopped 
awarding capital clemency even in egregious cases.
211
  Most of the remaining 
10% of reversals were ordered by federal judges appointed by ―law and order‖ 
Presidents Nixon, Reagan and Bush (the elder)—judges whose reversal rate in 
non-capital habeas corpus cases is a few percent or less.
212
  The sensitivity of 
elected state judges to the political risks from reversals is suggested by another 
Broken System II finding.  State judges are less likely, on average, to overturn 
error-laden death verdicts originating in rural and small-town communities—where 
reversals are likely to be more visible and controversial—than from cities, leaving 
it to their life-tenured federal counterparts to weed out the rural and small-town 
bad apples.
213
  
 
The willingness of state and federal judges to overturn flawed capital verdicts 
reveals something important about them, however.  On the whole,
214
 and despite 
their conservative and pro death penalty proclivities and susceptibility to political 
pressures, these judges are different from denizens of the communities that impose 
most death sentences.  They are less parochial and libertarian.  By definition, 
they have absorbed at least some cosmopolitanism and respect for layers of 
government.  They have sojourned at college and law school and work in state 
capitals and urban hubs—at a distance from the personally and communally 
invasive reality of the crimes they review.  They listen attentively to the 
out-of-state, big-firm, big-city lawyers who prosecute the appeals of many death 
row inmates and have the best record of success of all capital lawyers.
215
  Their 
                                                                                                                       
 
210 See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 37–38; see Liebman, supra note 143, at 82.  The 
rare state judges who have reversed all or nearly all death sentences they reviewed have been 
unceremoniously voted out of office and often have been replaced by judges even more loath to 
overturn any death sentence—more than counterbalancing the effect of the former.  See BROKEN 
SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 39, 65 & nn.161, 209. 
211 See Liebman, supra note 43, at 2117 & n.211 (citing sources).  
212 BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 38–39; see also King et al., supra note 186, at 10 
(reporting on district court (i.e., non-final) outcomes of a sample of federal habeas corpus petitions 
filed in a sample of federal courts between 2000 and 2002, in which the reversal rate for capital cases 
was 35 times higher than that in non-capital cases). 
213 BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 336 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 247). 
214 For an exception, see infra note 204and accompanying text. 
215 BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 318 (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 
250–52) (noting that capital prisoners are more likely to have their convictions reversed in federal 
habeas proceedings when they are represented by out-of-state, big-firm lawyers than when they are 
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work lives are governed by, and their decisions turn on, standard legal operating 
procedures.  In some basic way, they have made universalizing professional 
commitments—sworn oaths—to uphold the law, making national law supreme 
over local edicts, and practice a craft that requires them to hear out both sides and 
base a decision on only the law and the facts.  
 
Whether advised by counsel from the start or by the acuity of hindsight, the 
condemned man comes to see that if he can stick it out for a decade or more, he 
has a better than even chance of surviving his death verdict.  Likewise, the family 
of the victim comes to see that the passions that drove the trial to its 
conclusion—the sense of outsider violation, the communal and expressive 
retribution and the episodic singularity of their loved one‘s case—have little grip 
on appeal.  Something very different, and probably unexpected and ill-explained, 
takes place.  The divergence between these reactions and those of the community 
itself become clear when the matter arrives back in the county for retrial. 
 
3. The Retrial Stage 
 
Upon reversal of the death verdict, the capital prisoner typically remains on 
death row while the prosecutor decides whether to try him again.  His ―case‖ 
comes home to the county where it originated.  Years have elapsed since the 
crime and original verdict.  The modest time and resources the community is 
willing to expend, even on cases like this, have been depleted and the passage of 
time and scattering of witnesses make a second go-round costly.  How does the 
community react?  In fact, there are two responses, one dominated by the 
parochial impulse, the other by libertarian disposition. 
 
i. The More Parochial Response to Reversal 
 
The first response is a rather rare situation.  It arises when the reaction to the 
reversal fuses with a still palpable sense of outsider violation from the original 
crime or a more recent one.  An example is the notorious Alday case in Seminole 
County, Georgia.  Then Governor Jimmy Carter dubbed the 1973 rural home 
invasion murders over many hours of the entire extended Alday family ―the most 
heinous crime in Georgia.‖216  Despite unequivocal evidence of the codefendants‘ 
guilt, the federal court of appeals overturned the convictions, a decade and a half 
later, due to ―inflammatory and prejudicial pre-trial publicity [that] so pervaded the 
                                                                                                                       
represented by other counsel). 
216 Jerry Schwartz, 1973 Georgia Murders Back in Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1988, at A13, 
available at 1988 WLNR 1285127. 
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community as to render virtually impossible a fair trial before an impartial jury.‖217  
Rousing the same sentiments again, the reversal prompted 100,000 Georgians to 
send Congress a truckload of petitions calling for the federal judges‘ 
impeachment.
218
  Unsurprisingly, the county prosecutor opted to go capital again 
for two of the four defendants.
219
  A jury again sentenced the ringleader, Carl 
Isaacs, to death, but imposed a life sentence on his accomplice Wayne Carl 
Coleman.
220
  Even under these circumstances, the District Attorney decided not to 
pursue a death sentence against a third accomplice, George E. Dungee, because he 
was mentally retarded.
221
  The fourth accomplice, Isaacs‘ younger brother Billy, 
who was fifteen at the time of the crime, testified against his brother in exchange 
for a reduced sentence and has since been paroled.
222
  Carl Isaacs was executed in 
2003, by which point he had become the longest serving death row inmate in the 
United States.
223
  
 
As to Isaacs (although, interestingly, not as to the other three killers), the 
dynamic is clear.  When the magnitude of the communal violation and fears it 
engendered remain fresh in mind—or are rekindled by a new crime—the 
outlander‘s cross-boundary offense merges with the faraway judges‘ secular and 
universalizing assault on community safety and values, magnifying the parochial 
sense of threat from outside.  Although the localist instinct dominates, libertarian 
disgust at the judges‘ impeachable inability to protect the community also comes 
into play, triggering a desire to take matters once again in the community‘s hands.  
 
Professor Garland describes this dynamic when explaining why abolitionists 
gain so little traction in even strongly religious communities that value the death 
penalty:  
 
Support for capital punishment came to be seen as an integral part of the 
                                                                                                                       
 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 See Bill Montgomery, What Ever Happened to . . . George Elder Dungee: Man Convicted 
of Role in Alday Family Murders, ATLANTA J.-CONST., March 19, 2007, at B1 available at 2007 
WLNR 5136443. 
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222 See Jay Apperson, After 20 Years, Freedom Nears, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 21, 1993, at I13, 
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―traditionalist‖ worldview, just as opposition to it became standard for 
liberal ―progressives.‖  Depriving people of the right to impose capital 
punishment—like depriving them of their guns or their right to school 
prayer, or their right to ban abortion—came to be viewed as a kind of 
elite contempt for common people, for their faith, and for their way of 
life.
224
 
 
Illustrating the response, Garland quotes Alabama judge Tom Parker‘s response to 
a Supreme Court decision banning the execution of juveniles:  
 
[T]he liberals on the U.S. Supreme Court already look down on the 
pro-family policies, Southern heritage, evangelical Christianity and other 
blessings of our great state.  We Alabamians will never be able to 
sufficiently appease such establishment liberals, so we should stop trying 
and instead stand up for what we believe without apology.
225
 
 
When the distant judges‘ and the stranger criminal‘s assaults on the 
community‘s way of life fuse, the result is to confirm the community‘s need for the 
death penalty and re-create the conditions for its episodic use as an expression of 
the seriousness with which the community takes the incursions on its sanctity. 
 
ii. The More Libertarian Response to Reversal 
 
Libertarian impulses dominate the second, more usual response to reversals, 
which is to let the death penalty go, and sometimes let the defendant go.  Broken 
System II‘s study of the aftermath of reversals at the second review stage shows 
that 82% of the do-overs end in sentences less than death, including 9% ending in a 
decision to release the defendant for insufficient evidence that he committed the 
crime.
226
  In some cases, the jury reaches this conclusion after the prosecutor 
brings new charges.  In other cases, the prosecutor chooses not to re-prosecute at 
all.  More times than not, however, the prosecutor and defendant agree to the 
result out of court, in a plea bargain for a life sentence—typically, with both sides 
doing everything they can to make the outcome as low-key as possible, with no 
news coverage.
227
  
                                                                                                                       
 
224 See GARLAND, supra note 2, at 251. 
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226 BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at i (reprised in Gelman et al., supra note 15, at 221). 
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In other words, most members of the community hear little or nothing about 
the reversal and subsequent—usually non capital—result.  From their perspective, 
the matter reached a satisfying conclusion years before, when a jury of their 
fellows issued a very public, very expressive and merciless rebuke of the invader 
and warning to others via their verdict of death.  The one exception is the victim‘s 
family, who are quietly asked to acquiesce in the bargain.  This they often are 
willing to do, after years of anguish at each unexpected and unexplained twist and 
turn in the appeals process, the hard won recognition of what a new appeals 
process would look like, and a promise that the man they (unlike the rest of the 
community) continue every day to fear will remain in prison until he dies.
228
 
 
We now have a first important insight from our view from without—from our 
resolve to face the facts and be honest about what we see: the main value the 
capital-prone community gets from the death penalty is its imposition, not its 
execution.  Most of what the community wants comes with the spasm of 
retributive anger it expresses contemporaneously with its experience of the 
homicidal invasion by publicly condemning the killer to die.  It is then that it 
exorcizes its fear and economically signifies its anti-crime mettle.  In all but rare 
situations, when the case returns after reversal, it has none of the attributes of the 
expressive proxy for systematic law enforcement that the libertarian death penalty 
is there to provide.  By now, the case is little more than an expense the 
community need not bear. 
 
D. A New Explanation of Why Reversals Have No Chastening Effect 
 
A second insight follows close behind, once we acknowledge that neither 
response the death-prone community gives to reversals is the one the logic of 
appellate inspection assumes.  According to that logic, the community will be 
chastened by the error its officials made and educated by the decision explaining 
the reversal.  Voters will consider dismissing the offending district attorney or 
judge, in hopes of more certain and timely executions in the future.  To head off 
that result, those officials will look to sanction their employee or the appointed 
defense lawyer who let the county down.  Everyone will resolve to do better in 
the future.  Or so the reversing judges hope.  But, as we saw, those judges and 
the denizens of the local community are different,
229
 and so is their view of 
reversals. 
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Consider, for example, San Bernardino County, California.  Between 1973 
and 1995, the county imposed thirty death sentences, more than one a year, at one 
of the highest rates in California.
230
  All thirty death verdicts were overturned on 
appeal.
231
  In contrast, neighboring and much more populous Riverside County 
imposed about the same number of capital verdicts during the period 
(twenty-seven), albeit at a much lower rate per homicide, but only 31% were 
reversed.
232
  If execution was the sincere goal of San Bernardino County, one 
might expect it to align its trial practices more fully with the legally ordained rules 
for securing a valid capital conviction.  But the facts do not bear out the 
assumption that the county will learn from its mistakes.  As of May 2011, only 
one of San Bernardino‘s many dozens of death sentences since the late 1970s had 
matured into an execution.
233
  Yet, despite this abysmal record, the county 
continues to churn out death sentences at one of the highest rates in the 
nation—fourteen between 2000 and 2007 alone, costing an estimated $15.4 
million—or the equivalent of thirty-two additional homicide investigators each 
year.
234
 
 
In The Overproduction of Death, we offered an explanation for the lack of an 
effective feedback loop between appellate reversals and county level trials.  We 
noted, for example, that the local officials who secured the flawed verdict are not 
required to defend it on appeal.  That task falls to bureaucrats in the state attorney 
general‘s office—lower status officials who are in no position to take the district 
attorney to task for generating losing verdicts the state must defend.
235
  The 
                                                                                                                       
 
230 See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at B-7.  The County grew quickly during the 
period, averaging about a million residents.  County of San Bernardino, Demographics, available at 
http://www.sbcounty.gov/main/demographics.asp. 
231 See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at B-7.  
232 See id. 
233 See Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (revealing that since 1973, California has executed 
thirteen people, only one of whom was convicted by San Bernardino County); Kevin Fagan et al., 
Condemned Murderer Executed at San Quentin for 1980 Slaying,SFGATE.COM (Jan. 29, 2002), 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2002-01-29/news/17525855_1_death-row-elizabeth-lyman-stephen-wayne-
anderson. 
234 See, Death by Geography, A County by County Analysis of the Road to Execution in 
California, ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA,  
http://www.aclunc.org/issues/criminal_justice/death_penalty/death_by_geography_a_county_by_cou
nty_analysis_of_the_road_to_execution.shtml (last visited May 13, 2011). 
235 Liebman, supra note 146, at 2121. 
  
59 
 
case-specific and claim-specific nature of review also militates against effective 
feedback, because no single judge or panel of judges observes the county‘s overall 
pattern of corner-cutting and shoddy miscues;
236
 the focus is on procedure (often 
read as ―technicalities‖), not the substantive desert of punishment;237 the remedy 
ordered is a do-over directed at no one in particular and calling for neither the 
aberrant office to be revamped or the offending official to be punished;
238
 and in 
any event, given the many years that elapse between a verdict and reversal, the 
responsible official is often long gone by the time the reversal occurs.
239
  Finally, 
even if the error does somehow get connected to the responsible official, the onus 
is unlikely to outweigh the political and career capital the official accrued at the 
time of the original conviction.
240
 
 
From our bird‘s eye view here, however, it is clear that the problem is larger 
than flaws in the feedback mechanism for informing local citizens of the errors and 
the actors responsible for them, so they can demand steps to assure the scrupulous 
proceedings and executable verdict everyone wants.  As this suggests, feedback 
assumes a common goal—to learn how to do better next time the task tried and 
overturned the first time.  As we have seen, however, what communities that most 
use capital punishment want from death verdicts, and what the appeals process 
reviews the verdicts for, are two different—even irreconcilable—things.  
 
The appeals process seeks to let executions go forward as long as they are 
based on professionally acceptable law enforcement and judicial procedures, and 
there is no ―reasonable probability‖ of unreliability in the determinations of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt and of sufficient aggravation net of mitigation to 
warrant death.
241
  The law enforcement science, standard procedures and 
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professional norms these protocols entail for evaluating verdicts lie at oblique 
angles, or are positively anathema, to the parochial and libertarian values that 
prevail in communities that most use the death penalty.  What those communities 
wanted—and what they more or less already got—from the verdict is different.  
Their goal is a simple, unyielding expression, with no institutional or professional 
frills, of what they think of cross-boundary invaders; a straightforward message 
about how harshly they mean to punish such killers now and in the future, leave 
aside the fine points of how to catch and try them.  
 
When the community confronts the reversing court‘s directive to spend a little 
more, tighten up on standards and process, engineer a more professionally 
reasonable and probabilistically reliable product, the result is not the corrective 
dialogue the appellate apparatus assumes,
242
 but dissonance.  At worst, the order 
and its aftermath are the mirror image of feedback—not a neutral outside 
evaluator‘s advice from which to learn about how to improve, but a confirmation 
of the pernicious outside threat against which the community imposed the flawed 
penalty in the first place—a red cape before angry eyes.  More often, however, 
the order simply falls on the uncomprehending ears of people who cannot make 
any sense of it and have already moved on. 
 
The indifferent reaction to reversals years later is not the only evidence of 
how unimportant actual executions are.  Also indicative is where and how 
executions are conducted—not, as Hay described, in the central square on market 
day, with a fiery object lesson projected from a makeshift pulpit about to scaffold a 
public hanging.  Instead our executions are in an isolated penitentiary separated 
for the public by brick walls, barbed wire and an inviolable TV blackout, in the 
darkest of night, with a few last words murmured by a man on a gurney about to be 
injected with drugs designed to put beloved pets to sleep.
243
  The death-prone 
community, that is, having long since taken matters in its own hands and projected 
the stern and unforgiving message it desired, has little concern for the sanitized 
way the carceral state carries out what Professor Garland calls the ―anti-lynching‖ 
                                                                                                                       
verdict‖); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984) (providing that the assistance 
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of modern execution.
244
 
 
V. THE COSTS OF A BROKEN SYSTEM: IMPOSED BY FEW, BORNE BY 
MANY 
 
Capital punishment is a minority practice in the United States today; a relative 
handful of counties drive a huge proportion of death sentences.  These 
communities get a lot from the death penalty, but in unexpected ways that are far 
more bound up with the verdict than the execution.  For them, the visceral 
message about invasive crime that the verdict—and in the rare cases where it 
occurs, the execution—convey outward and especially inward substitute for 
systematic state efforts to protect the community from crime.  Because the death 
penalty substitutes for systematic crime prevention and penology, one might 
expect these localities to lose something in terms of the objectives traditionally 
associated with criminal enforcement, such as incapacitation, deterrence and 
retribution.
245
  In fact, there are a number of costs associated with these 
communities‘ use of the death penalty.  This section identifies those costs and 
who bears them. 
 
There is no national figure for the cost of the death penalty,
246
 which of 
course no doubt varies from state to state and county to county.  Nor is there 
consensus on how to measure the cost.  On one point there is agreement, 
however.  Capital punishment in the United States always costs more than 
non-capital proceedings and penalties.
247
 
 
When a prosecutor seeks the death penalty, additional layers of investigative, 
evidentiary, procedural and legal complexity automatically arise.
248
 To begin with, 
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virtually every capital case goes to trial (because the defendant has nothing to 
lose), while the vast majority of non-capital cases, including murder cases, are 
resolved without trial, on a plea to a lesser crime.
249
  Additionally, the body of 
legal doctrine and case law governing capital cases is vastly more complicated than 
the law that applies in non-capital cases.
250
  Most importantly, capital cases entail 
two full-blown trials, one on guilt and the other on sentence, in contrast to other 
criminal proceedings which require only a guilt trial and a summary sentencing 
proceeding.
251
  
 
Each component of the typical criminal trial process—for example, pretrial 
investigation
252
 and motions practice—also takes far longer and is more costly in 
capital trials.  An example is jury selection, which in capital cases not only must 
examine the usual questions of juror competency and impartiality, but also must 
delve into a prospective juror‘s opinions and beliefs on capital punishment.253  
Because of its sensitivity, this ―death qualification‖ process takes longer than other 
selection steps, as each juror is questioned separately while sequestered from other 
prospective jurors.
254
  Death qualification leads to significantly more prospective 
jurors being excused ―for cause‖ than in non-capital cases, requiring many more to 
be summoned and put through the lengthy selection process.  In addition, the 
prosecutor and defense typically have twice as many preemptory challenges in 
capital than in non-capital cases, leading to more excusals and the need for more 
prospective jurors. 255   The pretrial publicity, length and sequestration 
requirements that typically attend capital trials require still more excusals and 
prospective jurors.  Although 100 potential jurors are sufficient to permit a panel 
of twelve to be selected for most non-capital criminal trials, it is not uncommon for 
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courts to summon over ten or even twenty times that many in capital case.
256
  
Instead of the hours or day or so that suffices in other criminal cases, jury selection 
in capital cases can take weeks.
257
 
 
There is an even greater discrepancy in the cost of capital and non-capital 
appeals.  All three levels of appeals discussed above are automatic or nearly 
automatic in every capital case.  Because most non-capital cases are disposed by 
plea bargain, which substantially limits the defendants‘ bases to appeal, the strong 
tendency in those cases is not to appeal at all.
258
 
 
A. Direct Costs Compared to Life Without Parole 
 
The usual way to estimate the cost of a death penalty case is to compare it to 
the cost of a comparable murder case in which the next most serious 
punishment—life without parole—is imposed.  In this section, we make that 
comparison per trial, per appeal, per execution and on an annual statewide basis.  
 
1. Additional Costs per Trial 
 
Indianapolis prosecutors estimate that ―a death penalty trial . . . demands the 
resources of five normal murder cases.‖259  Because of these additional costs, a 
single capital case can cripple a county‘s criminal justice budget.260  For example, 
county costs for defense lawyers alone (a fraction of all costs) in a 2005 murder 
case in Yakima County, Washington exceeded $2 million, even though the 
prosecutor eventually reached a plea bargain with both defendants.
261
  Given this 
                                                                                                                       
 
256 See id. . 
257 See, e.g., New Jersey Death Penalty Study Comm‘n, Report 31 (2007),  
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_ final.pdf [hereinafter New Jersey Death Penalty 
Report] (noting that jury selection takes four to six weeks in a capital case as opposed to one or two 
days in an otherwise comparable noncapital case). 
258 See Liebman, supra note 146, at 2053 n.90. 
259 Tim Sparks, Cost of Death Penalty Trial Can Tip Decision, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Oct. 
25, 2001, at 1. 
260 See Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 319–23 (collecting examples of prosecutors deciding not 
to purse capital sentences in egregious cases in which the cost of doing so may, or admittedly did, 
factor into the decision). 
261 Chris Bristol, Death Penalty: The Cost Is High, YAKIMA HERALD-REPUBLIC, March 19, 
2011.  A plea deal was reached in one co-defendant‘s case a year before the deal in the other case, 
explaining why the defense costs in the former case were $500,000 and in the latter case were three 
times that much.  See id. 
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history, when Yakima County Prosecutor Jim Hagarty recently considered 
capitally indicting an alleged triple murderer, a dust-up broke out between him and 
a county court administrator.  Hagarty said cost would not affect his decision; the 
administrator complained about ―overspend[ing] in a capital case‖ at a time when 
―we have no reserves left.‖262  Statewide, a Washington State Bar Association 
study estimated prosecution, defense and court costs at just the trial phase of a 
capital case to be roughly $520,000 more than if same case were prosecuted 
non-capitally.
263
 
 
Our main concern, however, is not the trial costs counties cover for 
themselves but those that the rest of the state bears as a result of subsidies and 
state-funded services such as courts and public defender offices.
264
  In that regard, 
a Maryland study estimates that each additional death penalty trial costs the state 
$1.9 million—or about $1 million more than a non death penalty murder trial.265  
A report the New Jersey Death Penalty Commission issued before the state 
abolished the death penalty in 2009 estimated that the state‘s public defender 
service, which in that state provides defense representation for local prosecutions, 
cost the state $1.5 million more a year because of the death penalty.  Although the 
report did not break these costs cost down per case, there were only nine inmates 
on the state‘s death row at the time.266  A Kansas study, found that trial costs for 
death cases were sixteen times greater for capital than for non-capital murder 
cases.
267
 
                                                                                                                       
 
262 Id.; see also Bienen, supra note 28, at 1308 (―[A]t a time when state governments are not 
meeting their most basic obligations, how can the state‘s policy of maintaining capital punishment 
alone be immune from considerations of cost and relative value?‖); Smith, supra note 21, at 113 
(describing a similar dust-up recently between an Ohio prosecutor and county board chair on the one 
hand and a trial judge on the other, who all agreed that ―seeking the death penalty would have a 
catastrophic effect on the county‘s budget,‖ but disagreed over whether the prosecutor should be 
permitted to proceed capitally; in the end the trial judge took the ―extraordinary [step of] 
invok[ing]cost concerns as grounds for precluding the prosecutor from seeking the death penalty‖); 
id. at 113–14, nn.24–28 (citing instances of counties raising taxes, even multiple times, taking out 
loans, and cutting police and fire budgets to be able to afford a single capital prosecution).  
263 Washington State Bar Report, supra note 228, at 18. (estimating that pursuing the same 
case capitally as opposed to non capitally costs, on average, an additional $217,000 for prosecutors, 
$246,000 for public defenders, and between $46,640 and $69,960 in trial court operations). 
264 See Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 353–54 (describing arrangements in a number of states 
for reimbursing localities for substantial portions of the costs of capital prosecutions). 
265 J. Roman et al., The Cost of the Death Penalty in Maryland THE URBAN INSTITUTE, 2 
(March, 2008). 
266 New Jersey Death Penalty Report, supra note 235, at 36. 
267 See, Performance Audit Report: Costs Incurred for Death Penalty Cases: A K-GOAL Audit 
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2. Additional Costs per Appeal  
 
That same Kansas study estimated that appeal costs for capital cases are about 
twenty-one times greater than comparable non death cases.
268
  States and the 
federal government bear these additional costs, because states fund the judges and 
typically the lawyers for both sides who are provided at the first two levels of 
appellate review, and the state (vis-à-vis state‘s attorneys) and the federal 
government (vis-à-vis judges and defense lawyers) entirely fund the third level of 
review.
269
  Greatly increasing the non-capital/capital differential is the fact that, in 
non-capital cases, prisoners have no right to state-funded defense counsel at the 
second and third stages of appeals and very few pursue those appeals.270  In 
contrast, capital prisoners have such a right for capital prisoners under state law in 
many states and federal law governing all states, and capital prisoners typically 
pursue all levels of review.
271
  The upshot is that the dramatically higher appellate 
costs instigated by a decision to proceed capitally are mainly triggered by the small 
set of counties that impose most death sentences and are largely subsidized by state 
and federal taxpayers who themselves make do with life without parole, at a 95% 
plus savings.272  
 
Analyzing only the first, direct appeal stage of review and only the cost of 
defense representation, the Washington State Bar Association estimated that each 
death penalty case cost the state $100,000 more on average than a comparable 
non-capital case.
273
  A 2010 Indiana study found that the average cost to the state 
of a capital trial and only the first stage of review is ten times greater than the 
comparable cost of the average life-without-parole case.
274
  These comparisons of 
                                                                                                                       
of the Department of Corrections, KANSAS LEGISLATIVE POST AUDIT COMMITTEE 13, 41 (App. B) 
(2003), http://www.kansas.gov/postaudit//audits_perform/04pa03a.pdf (comparing estimated average 
trial cost of a murder case resulting in a death sentence ($508,000) to estimated cost for a murder trial 
where a death sentence is not sought ($32,000); noting that a substantial portion of these costs, 
especially for defense counsel, are borne by state taxpayers). 
268 Id. at 13 (comparing average estimated cost for capital direct appeals ($401,000) to cost of 
appeal of similar case in which the death penalty was not imposed ($19,000)). 
269 See Liebman, supra note 146, at 2048, 2051, n.85. 
270. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE §§ 7.2, 12.2–12.5 (6th ed. 2011). 
271 See id.  
272. See, e.g., supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
273 See Washington State Bar Report, supra note 228, at 32. 
274 INDIANA GENERAL ASSEMBLY LEGISLATIVE SERVICES AGENCY FOR SB 43, THE COST OF 
SEEKING THE DEATH PENALTY IN INDIANA, at 1 (2010), available at 
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costs per filed appeal vastly underestimate the scale of additional capital costs, 
given that every death sentence is automatically reviewed on appeal, while only a 
small fraction of non-capital sentences are appealed even at the first stage and even 
fewer are challenged at the second two stages.
275
  Because it is a rare capital 
defendant who can pay for his own defense,
276
 this additional cost, again, is borne 
by state taxpayers most of whose own communities impose no such costs on the 
state.  
 
Security considerations affecting the conditions of incarceration during 
lengthy appeals also drive up the cost of incarcerating capital inmates—so much 
so, that even the incarceration costs of the death penalty are greater than the cost 
of imprisoning a murderer until he dies.  For example, the New Jersey 
Department of Corrections estimated that state taxpayers would save about $1 
million per inmate over the life of the prisoner if (as eventually occurred) the death 
penalty was abolished and capital sentences were converted to life without 
parole.
277
  The California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice 
found that the per-prisoner cost of death row incarceration is four times greater 
than if the same man or woman were sentenced to life without parole—costing the 
state $63.3 million more per year to maintain its (as of then) 670-person death row 
than it would cost to incarcerate them under sentences of life without parole.
278
  
Although this figure is annual, not over the life of the prisoner, the fact that 
California now has over 700 inmates incarcerated on death row, and has executed 
only thirteen over the last thirty-plus years, suggests that the life expectancy of 
death-row inmates and of prisoners serving life without parole is not very 
different.
279
   
 
Many of the additional costs are caused by the high rates of serious legal error 
that afflict capital verdicts, particularly from localities with high capital sentencing 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.in.gov/ipdc/general/DP-COST.pdf (estimating state capital costs as $449,887, compared 
to $42,658 for each non capital case). 
275 See supra notes 228, 236, 271 and accompanying text. 
276 See Weisberg, supra note 75, at 535 (―The State virtually always pays for the defense of 
those whom it seeks to execute.‖). §§ 7.2[f], 12.3[b]; Liebman, supra note 146, at 2053–54 n.90.    
277 See Bienen, supra note 28, at 1385–86. 
278 See CALIFORNIA COMM‘N ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, OFFICIAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 69–70 
(June 30, 2008), http://www.ccfaj.org/rr-dp-official.html, June 30, 2008 [hereinafter CALIFORNIA 
DEATH PENALTY COMM‘N]. 
279 See DEATH ROW USA, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 12, 38 (Spring, 2010), 
http://naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSA_Spring_2010.pdf [hereinafter Death Row USA]. 
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rates.
280
  The costs are even greater when the errors lead to the conviction of the 
innocent.  Between 2000 and 2009, alone, Illinois taxpayers (statewide) shelled 
out $65 million in damages to innocent men whom local communities had 
sentenced to die as a result of egregiously flawed investigations and trials.
281
   
 
3. Additional Cost per Execution 
 
From the standpoint of a taxpayer assessing the burden of different 
law-and-order strategies, the sole distinguishing feature of a costly capital case and 
a much less expensive life-without-parole case is the execution.  That, in other 
words, is what the taxpayer ―buys‖ for the additional cost.  Because essentially all 
capital verdicts cost anywhere from five to twenty-one times more than a 
life-without-parole alternative, but (as a result of high reversal rates) fewer than 
15% of death verdicts nationwide eventuate in an execution,
282
 excess costs per 
execution are extremely high.  
 
In Florida, for example, the Miami Herald estimated that, between 1973 and 
1988, a capital case cost the state $3.2 million from indictment to execution, or six 
times more than the overall cost to the state of seeking and carrying out a sentence 
of life without parole.
283
  But noting that few capital cases actually end in 
execution, the Palm Beach Post in 2000 estimated that the excess cost of the death 
penalty to the state per execution that actually does occur was $23 million.
284
  
Florida citizens may be getting a bargain.  A Maryland legislative commission 
found that its taxpayers bore an additional expense of $186 million between 1978 
and 1999 to obtain fifty-six death verdicts, of which five were carried out.  It 
estimated the incremental capital cost to the state per execution as $37 million.
285
  
Executions cost considerably more than that in California.  
 
4. Overall Additional Cost 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
280 See supra notes 50–52,181–187 and accompanying text. 
281 See Bienen, supra note 28, at 1326. 
282 See supra notes 32, 237–257 and accompanying text; infra notes 291 and accompanying 
text. 
283 David Von Drehle, Bottom Line: Life in Prison One-Sixth as Expensive, MIAMI HERALD, 
July 10, 1988, at 12A. 
284 S.V. Date, The High Price of Killing Killers, PALM BEACH POST, January 4, 2000, at 1A. 
285 See JOHN ROMAN ET AL., THE COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND URBAN 
INSTITUTE 1,3 (2008), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411625_md_death_penalty.pdf. 
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In California, it takes over two decades on average for a death verdict to run 
the appellate marathon.  Keeping cases moving at this snail‘s pace costs state 
taxpayer‘s $137 to $184 million extra every year, according to the 2008 report of a 
state commission.
286
  To reduce that average lapse of time to around the national 
average of twelve years, the commission concluded that California would have to 
spend approximately twice this amount.
287
  The commission estimated that 
commuting the sentence of everyone currently on death row to life in prison 
without parole would save the state over $125 million annually.
288
  Although the 
commission did not analyze cost increases over time, they are substantial.  Its 
estimate of an annual additional statewide cost of the death penalty of $125 million 
is about a 40% increase over a similar estimate made fifteen years earlier.
289
  Nor 
did the commission calculate a per-execution cost.  But the state‘s track record 
over the last twenty years of executing a prisoner on average about once every year 
                                                                                                                       
 
286 Compare CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY COMM‘N, supra note 254, at 6, 83–85 with Judge 
Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend or 
End the California Legislature‘s Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty Debacle, 44 LOYOLA L.A. L. 
REV. ___, ___ (2011) (forthcoming), available at 
http://nicic.gov/assets/ExternalLink.aspx?url=http%3a%2f%2fmedia.lls.edu%2fdocuments%2fExecu
ting_the_Will_of_the_Voters.pdf (concluding based on a comprehensive cost analysis that ―$4 billion 
of state and federal taxpayer money has been expended administering the death penalty in California 
since 1978, with a cost in 2009 of approximately $184 million above what taxpayers would spend 
without the death penalty,‖ and noting that this analysis is more complete than the California Death 
Penalty Commission‘s analysis, including because it ―incorporates the costs associated with federal 
habeas litigation,‖ which were omitted from the commission‘s cost estimate of $137 million per 
year). See generally Gil Garcetti, California's Death Penalty Doesn't Serve Justice, L.A. TIMES, 
March 25, 2011, available at 
http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2011/03/gil-garcetti-californias-death-penalty-doesnt-serve-justi
ce.html (noting that author ―was the Los Angeles County district attorney for eight years and chief 
deputy district attorney for four years‖ during which he ―was responsible for my office's decision to 
seek the death penalty in dozens of cases‖ and concluding based on more recent evidence that 
California‘s death penalty is ―an incredibly costly penalty, and the money would be far better spent 
keeping kids in school, keeping teachers and counselors in their schools and giving the juvenile 
justice system the resources it needs‖). 
287 CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY COMM‘N, supra note 254, at 83. 
288 See id. at 84.  The $125 million estimate is derived by subtracting the annual cost to the 
state of the same number of life-without-parole inmates as there are death row inmates—$11.5 
million—from the state‘s $137 million annual death penalty cost to state taxpayers.  The comparable 
savings to North Carolina from substituting life without parole for the death penalty is about $11 
million a year.  See Philip J. Cook, Potential Savings From Abolition of the Death Penalty in North 
Carolina, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 498, 522–25 (2009). 
289 See Stephen Magagnini, Closing Death Row Would Save State $90 Million a Year, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, March 28, 1988, at 1. 
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and a half generates a cost to the state of $187.5 million per execution.
290
  
 
Estimates from other states are also sobering.  Conservatively, between 
Governor George Ryan‘s January 2003 commutation or pardon of all 167 men and 
women on death row
291
 and Governor Pat Quinn‘s March 2011 decision to sign 
abolition legislation,
292
 Illinois spent over $150 million on the seventeen men 
sentenced to die between 2000 and 2010—on average, about $20 million overall 
per year, and $880,000 per condemned inmate per year.
293
  Between 1994 and 
2003, before giving up the endeavor, New York State spent about $170 million 
imposing seven death verdicts, executing none—an average of about $17 million 
overall per year and $2.4 million per condemned inmate per year.
294
 
 
The anecdotal quality of available cost information makes averages and 
comparisons difficult.  There is, however, ample evidence that a local 
community‘s decision to initiate a capital prosecution, and particularly to impose a 
death sentence, foists tens of millions of dollars per execution on the rest of the 
state that would be saved if the sentence instead were life without parole.  
Because a relatively small number of communities in so-called ―capital‖ states 
instigate a disproportionate—and disproportionately error-laden—share of these 
costly verdicts, and because most of the costs are borne by the majority of 
taxpayers whose communities don‘t much use the death penalty, the majority 
might well ask whether the subsidy is worthwhile.  That question becomes more 
pressing when we consider the magnitude of the indirect costs the death-prone 
minority inflicts on the majority. 
 
B. Indirect Costs 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
290 See Death Row USA, supra note 255, at 13–37. 
291 Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 1, available at 
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nois.html. 
292 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
293 Bienen, supra note 28, at 1338. 
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THE DEATH PENALTY IN NEW YORK, at 1 (April 3, 2005), 
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The communities that most use the death penalty do not simply choose to 
impose a surfeit of death sentences, each costly in itself.  In addition, their 
parochial and libertarian dispositions lead them to use the death penalty—often for 
felony-killings
295—as an episodic, if deeply expressive, rationing device, in lieu of 
systematic effective law enforcement.  The result is that, compared to less 
death-prone communities, these localities tend to spend considerably less on law 
enforcement, courts and legal representation for capital defendants
296
 and have 
substantially lower clearance rates for violent crimes.
297
  
 
When a state or county uses the death penalty to broadcast its disposition to 
deal harshly with stranger crimes affecting some neighborhoods, while in fact 
declining to fund and empower government to enforce the criminal law 
comprehensively in all neighborhoods—and when the result is low clearance rates 
for serious crime—inevitably, more dangerous criminals go free.  The lucky 
criminals no doubt continue to prey on the same communities, perhaps 
contributing to their high homicide victimization rates among whites relative to 
blacks.
298
  But the notorious transience of criminals, and the opportunity to leave 
rather than get caught for a past crime or for a later one that turns deadly and gets a 
death sentence, also puts neighboring communities at risk.  There is a triple irony 
here.  First, communities whose parochial tendencies make them particularly 
fearful of outside invaders stoke their own fear by doing a bad job—as a result of 
their libertarianism—of catching, convicting and incarcerating criminals.  Instead, 
they focus only on the tiny proportion of cross-boundary felonies in which a 
privileged victim dies.
299
  Second, and as a result, communities that live in fear of 
criminals invading their communities end up propelling more than their share of 
local criminals into other communities.  Third, to the extent that the criminals‘ 
new victims are in communities that prefer systematic law enforcement to the 
death penalty, those communities end up subsidizing their death-prone neighbors 
yet again, by expending their law enforcement dollars to catch criminals that their 
libertarian neighbors did not bother to catch.  
 
There is no way to know how many violent crimes non death prone 
communities suffer because of low clearance rates in death prone neighboring 
                                                                                                                       
 
295 See supra notes 107–141 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
297 See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 59–63, 66 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 103–141 and accompanying text. 
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communities, or how much their crime control costs increase.  But there is reason 
to think the costs are substantial.
300
  
 
C. Other Externalized Costs 
 
We already have shown how death prone counties‘ quick and unvarnished use 
of the death penalty generates exceptionally high rates of serious error
301
 and risks 
the conviction and execution of innocent individuals.
302
  And we have shown how 
their parochialism and libertarianism blinds them to the corrective feedback from 
the many reversals their verdicts generate.
303
  These conditions are costly to 
taxpayers statewide
304
 and sew disrespect for law and legal institutions.
305
  They 
also take a heavy toll on the victims‘ families.  
 
The parochial and libertarian community is prepared to minimize law 
enforcement and skimp on trial process, while ostentatiously imposing the death 
penalty for the occasional stranger crime that turns deadly.  It is resigned, as well, 
to the length and likely disappointing results of the inevitable appeals—which the 
majority of less death prone communities subsidize in any event—and to take a 
pass on most capital re-trials.
306
  Regrettably, however, no one prepares the 
relatives of the victim for this aftermath.  
 
The loved ones of homicide victims and others disagree on what ―closure‖ 
means, and whether executions provide it.
307
  But whatever else closure means, it 
surely includes knowing the final result, one way or another.  For the community, 
the pronouncement of the verdict is the final, satisfying result.
308
  But not so for 
                                                                                                                       
 
300 Charles M. Blow, High Cost of Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at A21 (discussing 
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million), rape ($448,532), robbery ($335,733), and burglary ($41,288)). 
301 See supra notes 73–90, 181–187 and accompanying text. 
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the victim‘s family, for whom each milepost in the appellate marathon is a fresh 
reopening of wounds, and for whom reversal and retrial mean a replaying of the 
ghastly crime itself.
309
  As dozens of murder victims wrote Illinois Governor Pat 
Quinn before he signed abolition into law in the state in 2011, ―‗to be meaningful, 
justice should be swift and sure.  The death penalty is neither.  [It] drag[s] 
victims‘ loved ones through an agonizing and lengthy process, which often does 
not result in the intended punishment.‘‖310  
 
Quinn addressed victims directly in his signing statement: 
 
To those who say we must maintain a death penalty for the sake of the 
victims‘ families, I say it is impossible not to feel the pain of loss that all 
these families share or to understand the desire for retribution that many 
may hold.  But, as I heard from family members who lost loved ones to 
murder, maintaining a flawed death penalty system . . . will not bring 
closure to their pain. . . .  We must instead devote our resources toward 
the prevention of crime and the needs of victims‘ families, rather than 
spending [the enormous sums of] money [needed] to preserve a flawed 
system.‖311 
 
Notice that Quinn responds in the voice of the majority of communities for whom 
spending public resources on prevention and social services for victims is the 
modal response to the problem of crime.  It is the antithesis of the parochial and 
libertarian voice of the communities that pronounce the lion‘s share of verdicts and 
infuse them with the largest proportion of prejudicial error.  What Quinn could 
not say, is that a good portion of the costs he described—the anguish of victims in 
the face of error and delays, and extra crime prevention costs on taxpayers—are 
foisted on victims and the majority by the parochial and especially libertarian 
choices capital prone communities make. 
 
To be sure, the ultimate blame for all these costs belongs to the killer 
himself—assuming he was the killer and was not wrongly condemned.312  But 
here, too, our view from without requires us honestly to face facts.  Since the 
                                                                                                                       
text. 
309 See Goldberg, supra note 283. 
310 Governor Quinn‘s Abolition Statement, supra note 18 (quoting victims‘ statement); see 
Goldberg, supra note 283 (―Death penalty advocates claim victims' families need [closure]—and 
deserve it—in order to move on.  But some of those family members say dealing with death row 
issues for years only prolongs their pain.‖).   
311 Governor Quinn‘s Abolition Statement, supra note 18. 
312 See supra notes 149, 256–257, 278 and accompanying text. 
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reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976,
313
 capital states have executed death 
sentences for only a vanishingly small fraction of homicides (about one-tenth of 
1%) and of murders resulting in convictions (about three-tenths of 1%).
314
  Even 
among the small fraction of convicted murders for which a death penalty is 
imposed (less than 5% of the total), capital states have only executed about 15% of 
the sentences since 1976.
315
  The few executions that do take place, moreover, are 
typically a dozen years after the crime.
316
 As a matter of honestly faced fact, 
therefore, the death penalty is not the punishment for murder in the United States; 
the penalty instead is life without the possibility of parole, but with a small chance 
of execution a decade later.
317
  
This too has a cost.  A precursor is Fyodor Dostoevsky‘s famous mock 
execution in St. Petersburg‘s Semyonovsky Squarea terrifying event, staged by 
Czar Nicholas I himself, that caused another prisoner to go mad.
318
 Perhaps 
channeling his existential forbearer, Albert Camus based his abolitionism on ―[t]he 
devastating, degrading fear that is imposed on the condemned for months or years 
is a punishment more terrible than death.‖319  Based on the same psychological 
torture, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—the highest court of the 
United Kingdom—unanimously ruled that a fourteen year delay between a trial 
and execution rendered a pending Jamaican execution illegally ―cruel‖ and 
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―inhumane‖.320  Such an inordinate delay, the court noted, would never have 
been permitted under English common law.
321
  Although before retiring, Justice 
Stevens failed to convince a majority of his colleagues on the Supreme Court to 
consider whether even greater capital delays violate the United States 
Constitution‘s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,322 our bird‘s eye view 
compels us to treat that as a foregone conclusion.  From that perspective, we must 
assume that a system that strongly tends to operate in a particular way for many 
years is meant to operate in that fashion.  And no one doubts that a choice, like 
Czar Nicholas I‘s, to exact an extra increment of psychological torture and 
retribution by threatening many, but carrying out only a few, executions violates 
our Constitution.  
 
VI. AN EXPLORATION OF WHY THE MAJORITY ACCEPTS THE COSTS THE 
MINORITY IMPOSES 
 
Our view from without also compels us to ask why we continue employing 
this (from all perspectives) torturous and facially irrational system.  We have 
already explained why the minority of death prone, parochial and libertarian 
communities does so—and does so almost literally with abandon, given how 
thoroughly they discard the costs into others‘ laps.323  The question begged, then, 
                                                                                                                       
 
320. Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica, 4 All E.R. 769, 783 (P.C. 1993) (collecting decision 
by other courts). 
321 Id.  
322 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of 
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men executed in California between 1992 and 2006, ten had been on death row for fourteen years or 
more, and five had been there for twenty of more years); Jeremy Root, Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment: A Reconsideration of the Lackey Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 283 
(2001–2002); Jessica Feldman, Comment, A Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged 
Death Row Imprisonment Becomes Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 187, 219 (1999). 
323 See supra Parts III–IV.   
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is why the majority of jurisdictions and taxpayers that do not employ the death 
penalty, or employ it only rarely and judiciously, are willing to pick up the tab? 
 
A. The Opaque Nature of the Costs 
 
The most obvious reason that non death imposing communities allow their 
high death prone neighbors to reach into their wallets and impinge on their safety 
is that the costs are hidden and thinly spread.  Much may be at stake for the 
majority in the aggregate, but very little of the cost is apparent to any one person at 
any given time.  Modern death sentencing practices and costs thus are a standard 
public choice situation in which concentrated minorities with a clear sense of what 
they want can fleece ―anonymous and diffuse‖ majorities with a less clear sense of 
interests they have at stake.
324
 
 
The way both abolitionists and advocates typically frame the death penalty 
debate also obscures the penalty‘s costs.  This is because the debate so often and 
heatedly focuses on the practice‘s moral aspects—whether it is right, or instead is 
essential, to respond to killing by killing.  On these terms, the death penalty is a 
matter of personal choice, which Americans like to think everyone gets to make for 
herself, then majority rules.  The importance of how the death penalty debate is 
framed is highlighted by polling results and their treatment in the debate.  It is 
commonplace that just under two-thirds of Americans say they favor the death 
penalty (64% vs. 29%).325  In fact, however, Americans are about evenly split on 
whether they prefer death to life without parole (49% vs. 46%).
326
  The former, 
morally salient question and its two-thirds statistic frame the death penalty debate.  
But the latter, pragmatic question and its fifty-fifty statistic actually control 
behavior: The only choice prosecutors and jurors have in real capital murder cases, 
in every state in the nation, is between death and life without parole.
327
 
                                                                                                                       
 
324 Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724 (1985). 
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The naiveté of logic and rationality also probably interfere with the majority‘s 
protection of its self-interest.  Given the usual assumption that irrational systems 
do not persist for decades, most members of the public may be excused for 
believing the death penalty system we have probably deters crime, even in 
communities that do not much use it, and that it costs less than incarcerating a 
prisoner for life.
328
  In other words, we can excuse the majority of non—or 
infrequent—users of the death penalty for assuming their death prone neighbors 
are doing them a deterrent and fiscal favor, rather than fleecing them.  
 
Just how far to push these excuses for the majority‘s credulity is unclear.  
The usual antidote to public-choice bamboozlement is for groups to form with the 
express purpose of pooling and publicizing the individually small but collectively 
large interests of their constituents.  The Death Penalty Information Center, which 
we repeatedly cite in this article, fills exactly that role—rather effectively, we 
might add—focusing at least as much of its attention and information-gathering on 
the actual cost and other pragmatic considerations, as on moral arguments.
329
  We 
suspect that other explanations are also at play. 
 
B. No Deterrence Dividend 
 
First, we consider whether localities that do not use the death penalty do in 
fact receive a ―deterrence dividend‖ from locales that do use it.  That is, one 
community‘s investment in a death sentence might deter crime 
region-wide—protecting surrounding localities and lowering their enforcement 
costs, even if they do not reciprocate with their own death sentences.  
 
In fact, as we note above, high death imposing counties are not net 
suppressers of crime.  On the contrary, they are inordinately bad at catching, 
convicting and incarcerating serious criminals.
330
  This indeed appears to be by 
their parochial and libertarian choice.  They use the death penalty—expressively, 
but only episodically—to demonstrate that they really mean business about 
                                                                                                                       
 
328 See infra notes 305–310 and accompanying text (offering explanation of why the death 
penalty as practiced in the United States today does not deter crime ); supra notes 224–270 and 
accompanying text (documenting the far greater cost of the death penalty compared to life without 
parole). 
329 The Center‘s website is http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/; see supra notes 12–13, 22, 32, 
91, & 303; infra notes 336, 339, 361, & 377. 
330 See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
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cross-boundary crime, when in fact the penalty is a substitute for engaging in the 
real business of systematically fighting crime.
331
 
 
The result is a decline in deterrence.  As criminologist have theorized and 
shown empirically, differences in the probability of capture and sureness and 
swiftness of punishment are likely to have more of an effect on deterrence than 
differences in the amount of punishment once an offender is apprehended, 
convicted and sentenced.
332
  This is especially likely to be so when the choice is 
between punishments that all are extremely harsh, as is true of the exclusive life 
without parole and death penalty options for capital murder.
333
  Given these 
principles, we can expect that death prone localities‘ libertarian aversion to funding 
effective law enforcement, trials and corrections, and their resulting low clearance 
and high reversal rates, more than offset any deterrent advantage the death penalty 
otherwise has over life without parole.  In other words, more costly, competent 
and scientific investigation leading to prison sentences—and more professional 
trials ending in rarely-reversed verdicts—are likely to be a more effective deterrent 
than sloppy investigation and trials, followed by oft-reversed death verdicts and 
only a few executions years later.  
 
This dynamic helps explain a conundrum that has vexed capital punishment 
scholars for decades.  Why doesn‘t heavy use of the death penalty generate a 
measurable decline in predicted crime?
334
  The question has vexed researchers 
                                                                                                                       
 
331 See supra text following note 88; supra notes 95, 175–179, 205–207, 220–223 and 
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because it is the wrong question.  Given modern death sentencing practices in the 
United States, the comparison is not between the death penalty and life without 
parole, everything else equal.  The comparison is between the death penalty as a 
self-conscious substitute for systematic law enforcement, professional adjudication 
and scientific penology and, on the other hand, life without parole under conditions 
closer to those sought by modern penology.  The increment in deterrence from 
imposition of the death penalty is cancelled out by the decrement in deterrence 
from the predominant use of that penalty to starve law enforcement, in the process 
punishing fewer crimes and delaying imposition of sentence. 
An actual deterrence dividend thus cannot explain the majority‘s willingness 
to subsidize the minority‘s heavy use of the death penalty.  Imposing more death 
verdicts correlates with less, not more, law enforcement.  We need other 
explanations for the majority‘s forbearance. 
 
C. The Death Penalty as a Back-Pocket Option 
 
Perhaps a better explanation for the non death prone majority‘s willingness to 
pay, even dearly, for others to use the death penalty is that they want to keep the 
penalty in their own back pocket.  They may sense that there is a murderer out 
there somewhere on whom even they would want to impose the penalty.  They 
preserve it ―just in case,‖ and pay for others to use it. 
 
The recent Stephen Hayes trial in Connecticut is illustrative.  In 2007, Hayes 
and another man broke into the suburban home of Dr. William Petit.  After 
terrorizing the household for hours, beating Petit with a baseball bat and raping his 
                                                                                                                       
deterrent to crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a great deal of debate [but t]he results 
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wife, Hayes and the other man set Petit‘s two daughters, then the home on fire.335  
Only Petit survived.336  In the midst of the case in June 2009, the state legislature 
approved a bill to abolish the death penalty.337  After then-Republican Governor 
Jodi Rell vetoed the measure, the Democratic candidate to replace her in the 2010 
election, Dan Malloy, said he would sign similar legislation.338  In response, Petit 
and others argued for keeping the penalty for the rare crimes like Hayes‘ triple 
homicide.
339
  Almost simultaneously with Malloy‘s election as Governor, the 
Hayes jury deliberated for many hours before sentencing him to die.
340
  Even 
Hayes himself expressed relief, not wanting, he said, to live any longer with the 
crimes he committed.
341
  Then, in May 2011, as the legislature seemed poised to 
enact and the governor to sign abolition legislation, state Senator Edith Prague, a 
capital punishment opponent whose vote would make a majority for repeal, 
withheld her vote at Dr. Petit‘s request.342  ―‗I actually believe in repealing the 
death penalty,‘‖ Prague, said.343  But ―‗[f]or Dr. Petit, for me to do one more 
thing to cause him some kind of angst, I can't do it.‘‖344  The eighty-five-year-old 
Senator asked to delay the vote for a year, evidently so Hayes‘ co-defendant could 
first be tried capitally.345 
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Although Connecticut currently has a dozen men on its death row, it has only 
executed one since the reinstatement of the death penalty in the mid-1970s, and 
that man voluntarily ended his appeals and asked to be executed.
346
  Still, the 
chance to brand men like Hayes and his codefendant as death-worthy—the only 
action that can explain Senator Prague‘s simultaneous request to delay the matter 
and intention to vote to abolish a year later—may explain the majority‘s 
willingness to subsidize counties and states that impose the death penalty with 
greater frequency.  
 
It is hard to assess the strength of this explanation for the majority‘s 
willingness to pay for a costly penalty they do not use.  The preference of half of 
Americans for life without parole over the death penalty,
347
 even when the abstract 
nature of the question invites them to imagine the back-pocket case for which they 
might want to impose death, suggests that it is not decisive.  In any event, this 
explanation casts the death penalty as at best a luxury—something to we might be 
able to afford in flush times, but not necessarily when budgets are tight. 
 
D. The Majority‘s Fear of the Minority‘s Reaction to Abolition 
 
There may be a darker reason for the majority‘s passive acquiescence: fear.  
In this regard, the Supreme Court‘s deeply ambivalent behavior towards the death 
penalty
348
 may be a microcosm of the majority‘s. 
 
In our federal system in which crime and punishment are mainly the domain 
of states and localities, subject only to the Constitution, it falls to the Court to set 
national policy and limits on the death penalty.  As Professor Garland has shown, 
the Court‘s actions in this regard reveal a keen attention to the public mood.349  
Consider, for example, the fierce late-sixties, early-seventies backlash against the 
antiwar and civil rights movements‘ perceived assaults on ―states‘ rights‖ and 
mainstream values.350  Those concerns helped drive the nearly unanimous state 
response to the Court‘s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,351 rejecting the death 
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penalty as then applied.  In turn, the alacrity and vehemence with which the states 
re-upped for the death penalty no doubt contributed to the Court‘s own decision 
four years later in Gregg v. Georgia
352
 to protect its credibility and acknowledge 
the primacy of the states by leaving the new capital statutes in place.
353
  After 
years of incendiary decisions inflaming passions in the South and elsewhere, to 
strike a blow at another revered institution might have threatened a national 
schism.  The Court opted not to find out.
354
  
 
There are several reasons to think that the Court‘s discretion was the better 
part of valor.  As Professor Garland notes, in many areas of the country, support 
for the death penalty soon became a proxy—or our analysis might suggest, a 
substitute—for public officials‘ support for a suitably ―tough-on-crime‖ agenda.355  
We also have noted the association between communities‘ commitment to the 
death penalty and their desire for strict populist electoral constraints of judges and 
district attorney,
356
 as well as a correlation between that commitment and state 
appellate courts‘ timidity in reversing their capital verdicts.357  
 
Another hint of the fear the Supreme Court felt is found in a sentence in 
Justice Stewart‘s plurality opinion in Gregg that has long puzzled the elder one of 
us.  The sentence is in the crucial passage where Stewart, a key member of the 
Furman majority who had long been a focus of abolitionist hopes,
358
 explained 
why the Court had decided to validate capital punishment.  The death penalty, 
Stewart wrote, is ―essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on 
legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs.‖359  Understanding 
Justice Stewart to be worrying that an inflamed family member might take the law 
into his own hands, what Justice Stewart deemed ―essential‖ seemed to me to be a 
make-weight, not worthy of a decision to allow the state systematically to kill its 
own people.  The perspective introduced here, however, clarifies that what 
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Stewart feared was not individual self-help but the vengeance of entire, close-knit, 
self-sufficient communities.  In the wake of Furman, these communities had 
demanded new capital statutes to keep punishment of violently invasive outsiders 
in their own hands.  And the same communities had a history of violent and grisly 
communal vengeance when they sensed that outside government actors with alien 
values were compromising their ability to defend themselves.  
 
If politicians, judges and even Supreme Court Justices live in fear of 
inflaming parochial and libertarian communities‘ passions by taking away their 
death penalty, perhaps the majority of non—or infrequent death penalty users fears 
the same reaction if they stop subsidizing the penalty.  Going further, we might 
conclude that symbolic self-help is a rational underpinning of our capital 
punishment system that our current capital system is well-tailored to serve, and 
that the majority is wise to subsidize appellate review to take some of the vengeful 
edge off of it.  The death imposing community gets to demonstrate where it 
stands on stranger crime; most defendants eventually get their reversals, albeit after 
years of retributive torture; and in the end most cases are quietly re-tried to the 
non-capital conclusion the majority would have imposed in the first place.  This 
analysis harkens back to Professor Robert Weisberg‘s hypothesis that the Supreme 
Court manipulates death penalty doctrine with an eye on the number of executions 
it believes a small portion of the populace demands and the temperance others 
prefer.
360
  Although Weisberg‘s modus vivendi is between hotheads on both sides, 
his analysis easily accommodates our view of a death prone parochial and 
libertarian minority and a more pragmatic majority.  The goal, he wrote, is to 
―have some executions, but not very many.  A small number of executions offers 
a logical, if crude, compromise between the extreme groups who want either no 
executions or as many as possible‖; it allows enough executions to ―keep the art 
form alive, but not so many as to cause excessive social cost.‖361 
 
Still, we wonder.  Facing facts, a system that notoriously lacks ―face 
validity,‖ that massively churns lives (those of the family of the victim and of the 
condemned) and three levels of judicial proceedings, that exacts psychological 
torture, that risks executing the innocent, that imposes heavy monetary and public 
safety costs on the majority to serve little more than the symbolically expressive 
needs of a parochial and libertarian minority, may not deserve the acquiescence 
Professor Weisberg imagines. 
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E. The Resonance of the Minority‘s Parochial and Libertarian Values 
 
It may be, as well, that the ―us against them‖—or ―us grudgingly 
accommodating them‖—tenor of our discussion misses the point.  It is true that 
most Americans have made peace with a modern world that sometimes requires us 
to be each other‘s keeper, flaunts our dependence on others around the world 
whose values we abhor, and threatens us with powerful forces against which we 
need the government to protect us.  But many Americans may still wish it were 
not so.  They thus may resonate with the minority of parochial and libertarian 
communities that refuse to capitulate to the onslaught of these outside, entangling 
forces.  The death penalty, and the values that inform its peculiar use in death 
prone communities, may appeal to a powerful sense of nostalgia for a bygone era, 
akin to the romanticizing of the frontier and Old West.  
 
This brings us back to Professor Garland‘s account of the 1970s reinvention 
of the death penalty after Furman as a populist response to the perceived 
overreaching of the ―soft-on-crime‖ liberal politicians and judges of the 1960s.362  
―In post-1970s America,‖ Professor Garland writes, the death penalty became ―not 
so much a policy or a penal sanction as a commitment, a symbolic badge that 
declared the wearer‘s position on ‗law and order‘ issues—and on so much else 
besides.‖363  Even without throwing in their lot with communities that base their 
entire law enforcement strategy on a version of this death penalty projected 
symbolism, members of the majority might feel that a refusal to subsidize capital 
punishment would constitute a repudiation of traditional values with which they 
strongly resonate. 
 
F. Hay‘s America? 
 
Why, in sum, does the majority quietly allow an idiosyncratic minority of 
death prone communities to impinge so substantially on its aggregate, if not visibly 
any single individual‘s financial and personal welfare?  And why does the 
majority continue to abide the taint capital punishment practices imposed on the 
integrity of a judicial system on which all rely?  Although our explanations may 
not be entirely convincing, they do reveal in our times what Douglas Hay thought 
he discovered about capital punishment in England a few centuries ago: that it has 
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been ingeniously designed to serve the needs of a few while imposing substantial, 
if hidden, cost on the many.364  
 
America‘s current capital practices parallel Hay‘s description of Georgian 
England more fully than first appeared.  Akin to the landed gentry, wary of the 
traditional order‘s destabilization by incipient urbanization and a national 
leviathan, death prone communities feel themselves under siege from disruptive 
outside forces and the entanglements of the modern state.  In England, the gentry 
responded by using its control of the levers of criminal justice to dole out strategic 
increments of terror and mercy in lieu of ongoing surveillance provided by a 
national police force. 365  In the United States, parochial and libertarian 
communities use capital felony murder to ration episodically ferocious responses 
to stranger crime in lieu of systematic law enforcement.  In both times and places, 
actual executions yield to the benefits of the death verdict itself.  And in both, 
revered moral principles—due process and mercy in eighteenth century England, 
close-knit communities and self-reliance in modern America—are used to blind the 
majority to the advantage being taken of them by the minority. 
 
Hay suggested that if the peasants had not been so blinded by ―ideology,‖ 
they would have risen up and overturned the system and its ―terror.‖366  We don‘t 
espouse such a drastic response for the United States today.  Nor do we think the 
majority has been so thoroughly hoodwinked.  In the next Part, we identify 
evidence of a majority fighting back, albeit ineffectively.  In the following Part, 
we suggest ways for the majority to strengthen its response.  
 
VII. THE NEW MILLENNIUM: DECLINE AND FALL? 
 
Although the basic operation of the nation‘s death penalty has remained the 
same for decades, the number of death verdicts and (less so) of executions has 
declined recently.  In this Part we consider whether the decline modifies the 
uneven distribution of death sentences and executions.  
 
In 1996, American jurisdictions sentenced 315 men and women to death 
nationwide.
367
  No year since has witnessed as many, and, with two minor 
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exceptions, the count has declined every year since then.
368
  New death sentences 
reached a post-Gregg low of 112 in both 2009 and 2010, representing a 64% 
plunge since the mid-1990s.
369
  The largest declines occurred in the two years 
between 1999 and 2001, when the number of death sentences fell precipitously to 
159 from 277 (a 43% decline).
370
  More recently, the decline has been 
modest—from 123 in 2006 to 112 in both 2009 and 2010.371 
 
The number of executions each year also has declined but not as much.  
Executions peaked at ninety-eight in 1999, falling since then to about fifty each in 
the last two full years—about where they were in the mid-1990s.372  Owing to 
declines in death sentencing and the huge backlog of the condemned on death rows 
around the country—3,259 inmates as of 2010 373 —the annual number of 
executions has even exceeded annual new death sentences in a small number of 
states, including Ohio and Virginia.
374
  Nationally, however, death sentences 
continue to be more than double the number of executions each year.375  As a 
result of declining death sentences and ongoing appellate reversals leading to 
lesser sentences—but not so much as a result of executions which declined 
somewhat during the period—the nation‘s death row population has modestly 
fallen.  After peaking at 3,593 in 2000, and remaining close to 3,550 from 1999 to 
2002, the death row census fell to a low of 3,207 in 2008 and has been close to that 
                                                                                                                       
 
368 Id.  The year 2002 was up slightly from 2001, and 2010 had the same count as 2009.  
369 Id.  
370 Id.  
371. Id.  
372 EXECUTIONS BY YEAR, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR,  
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year (last visited May 14, 2011) (showing that annual 
executions averaged 81 between 1997 and 2000, peaking at 98 in 1999; averaged 50.5 in 1995–1996; 
and averaged 46 in 2009–10). 
373 See Death Row USA, supra note 40, at 1.  
374 Since 2004, Virginia has executed about twice as many people as it has sentenced to death.  
See DEATH SENTENCES BY STATE AND YEAR, supra note 12; Washington Post, Virginia Executions 
Database, 1982–present, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/data/vaexecutionsdb_02142011.html.  Similarly, 
Ohio executed fourteen individuals between 2006 and 2009 but sentenced only eleven to die in the 
same period.  See SEARCHABLE EXECUTION DATABASE, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (last visited May 15, 2011); DEATH SENTENCES BY STATE 
AND YEAR, supra note 12. 
375. Compare DEATH SENTENCES BY STATE AND YEAR, supra note 12 with EXECUTIONS BY 
YEAR, supra note 336.  
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figure over the last six years.
376
 
 
A. The Last Decade‘s Nationwide Death Sentencing Decline  
 
Observers have offered a variety of reasons for the decline in death sentencing 
over the last fifteen years, including falling crime rates, a fear of executing the 
innocent, broader availability of ―life without parole‖ options and improved capital 
defense representation.
377
  Our analysis suggests a different reason: a rebellion of 
sorts by the majority of communities and citizens in capital states who rarely or 
never use the death penalty but for years have been subsidizing its profligate use 
by the minority of jurisdictions that often impose it.
378
  
 
To examine this hypothesis, we first must determine how the decline in death 
sentencing has been distributed across counties.  One possibility is that the nation 
has reached a new, more sensible capital punishment equilibrium, with fewer, 
                                                                                                                       
 
376 SIZE OF DEATH ROW BY YEAR, 1968–PRESENT, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last visited May 
14, 2011). 
377 Possible explanations for the decline in death sentencing include: (1) a drop in violent 
crimes, starting a few years earlier than the drop in death sentences and declining by a comparable 
amount, see FACTS AT A GLANCE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,  
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/cv2.cfm (last visited May 14, 2011); (2) concerns, fueled by 
the Broken System studies and the exoneration of more than a dozen inmates on death row in Illinois, 
see supra notes 149, 256–257, 278 and accompanying text, about the condemnation and possible 
execution of the innocent, see Adam Liptak, Number of Inmates on Death Row Declines as 
Challenges to Justice System Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/11/us/number-of-inmates-on-death-row-declines-as-challenges-to-j
ustice-system-rise.html (―[L]egal experts across the political spectrum agreed that public discomfort 
with the administration of the system [including DNA exonerations] has played a significant role [in 
the decline].‖); supra note 278 [DeLuna]; (3) the adoption of life without parole as the only 
alternative to a death sentence for capital murder, see supra notes 301–303 and accompanying text, 
together with a Supreme Court decision requiring trial judges to inform capital jurors of that 
alternative if the prosecution contends that execution is required to keep the defendant from 
offending again, see Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); and (4) improvements in the 
quality and sophistication of capital defense lawyers, including as a result of the Supreme Court‘s 
stricter line on ineffective assistance of counsel between 2000 and 2005, see infra note 381 and 
accompanying text. See generally Steve Mills, Death Sentences, Executions Decline, CHICAGO TRIB. 
Dec. 31, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.prisontalk.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-98166.html 
(discussing various theories); Neil A. Lewis, Death Sentences Decline, and Experts Offer Reasons, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at 28, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/15/us/15execute.html (last visited May 14, 2011) (similar). 
378 See supra notes 242–270 and accompanying text. 
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more evenly distributed death verdicts imposed only for ―the worst of the worst‖ 
crimes.
379
  In this scenario, the death sentencing disparity between the minority of 
death prone counties and others would decline, as would rates of reversible error 
associated with high death sentencing rates as well as the majority-to-minority 
subsidy associated with curing the errors.
380
  Another possibility, consistent with 
the generalized decline in violent crimes nationwide since the 1990s, is that death 
sentencing has dropped in roughly equal proportion across all counties.  In this 
event, a minority-majority disparity and majority-to-minority subsidy would 
remain, but be smaller.  A final possibility is that the drop in death sentences has 
been the result of an abandonment of the field altogether by jurisdictions that 
previously used the death penalty only sparingly.  A result of this quiet series of 
county-by-county abolitions would be an increase in the concentration of death 
sentences in a minority of death prone counties and, ironically, an increase in the 
extent to which communities that are trying to wean themselves from the penalty 
end up subsidizing its heavy use by a shrinking minority of death prone localities.  
A smaller tail would be wagging a larger dog. 
 
B. An Uneven Decline 
 
To determine the current distribution of death sentences in the United States, 
we examined the counties responsible for the 768 new inductees to death row 
during the years 2004 through 2009.
381
 Our results support the last of our 
hypotheses, that death sentencing is retreating to its bastions, as less frequent users 
abandon the practice altogether.
382
 Between 1973 and 1995, the most death 
                                                                                                                       
 
379 A proponent of this view is Oregon prosecutor Joshua Marquis, who has been a leader of 
the capital litigation committee of the National District Attorney‘s Association.  See Liptak, supra 
note XXX (―Mr. Marquis said there were other reasons for the decline in death sentences.  
‗Prosecutors in America are far more discriminating in the kinds of cases they submit to juries,‘ he 
said.  ‗There is a recognition that the death penalty should be reserved for the worst of the worst.  
If you look back 20 years, there clearly were jurisdictions where some prosecutors overused the death 
penalty.‘"). 
380 See supra notes 50–53, 181–187, 246–257 and accompanying text. 
381 Data for death sentences by county for the 2004-09 period were provided by Robert J. 
Smith of the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute, Harvard University Law School.  See supra note 
39. 
382 That hypothesis has not been entirely proven, however, because not enough years have 
elapsed to be certain that the communities in question have stopped using the death penalty 
altogether, as opposed to keeping it in their ―back pocket‖ for the very worst cases.  See supra notes 
311–317 and accompanying text.  For evidence from Texas of a sharp and an uneven decline in 
death sentencing in recent years, and for support for our thesis that marginal death-sentencing 
counties are giving up on capital punishment, see David McCord, What‘s Messing with Texas Death 
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prolific 1% of Americans accounted for 9% of death sentences; the top eighth 
(12.5%) were responsible for half of all death sentences.
383
  In our more recent 
study, counties representing 1% of Americans had nearly doubled their share to 
16% of all new death sentences, and counties containing one-eighth (12.5%) of 
Americans now originate two-thirds of all death sentences (67%).384   High 
frequency death sentencing communities are now responsible for an even greater 
share of the national total of condemned inmates than in the Broken System period 
from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s.  
 
Further corroborating the third hypothesis, many major death sentence 
generators continue on much as before or are picking up speed.  As Table 1 
illustrates, between 1973 and 1995, the counties of Los Angeles, Maricopa 
(Phoenix),
385
 and Oklahoma (Oklahoma City) by themselves accounted for 6.5% 
                                                                                                                       
Sentences, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 601, 603–05, 607–09 (2010-2011) (discussing less populous Texas 
counties that are ―opt[ing]-out‖ of the death penalty); see also id. at 609–11 (discussing the ―plunge‖ 
in death sentencing in Harris County (Houston)).  See also Roger C. Barnes, Is the Death Penalty 
About to Die?, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 14, 2011, available at 
http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/Is-the-death-penalty-about-to-die-142263
6.php (noting recent drop in number of death sentences in Texas and concluding that ―Texas is 
having second thoughts about death sentences, and executions‖). 
383 Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
384. Id.  
385 How do cosmopolitan Los Angeles and Maricopa (Phoenix) Counties fit our model of high 
death sentencing communities with parochial tendencies?  The answer in the former case is gangs 
and in the latter is illegal immigration.  To begin with, Los Angeles County has roughly three times 
the population of its more cosmopolitan flagship City.  See STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS, 2009 
ESTIMATES, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html (last visited 
May 15, 2011) (showing that LA County has 9.85 million residents while LA city has 3.85 million)  
Moreover, Los Angeles County has been plagued for decades by ethnic gangs—a classic case of 
threatening ―outsiders.‖  See, e.g., National Public Radio, Race Distinguished Gang Violence in Los 
Angeles, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88098444 (March 11, 
2008) (summarizing a report that found 700 active gangs in Los Angeles with a combined 
membership of more than 40,000, mainly composed of ethnic minorities).  Los Angeles County has 
been by far the largest contributor to California‘s massive death row (the largest in the nation, at over 
700), see Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 39, and California has the highest percentage of gang-related 
homicides in its pool of capital-eligible cases as a result of a statutory aggravating circumstance that 
allows a single police officer‘s testimony that a defendant fits the profile of a gang member 
(regardless of any actual connection to gang activity or gang violence) to establish death-eligibility. 
See, e.g., Alarcón, supra note 19, at 699, n.8 (identifying the gang-member aggravating circumstance, 
among others, as contributing to the excessive ease of imposing a death sentence in California and 
supporting proposals to ―decrease the number of crimes punishable by death and the circumstances 
under which death may be imposed so that we only [capitally] convict . . . [those] ‗we truly have the 
means and the will to execute‘‖ (citation omitted)).  We are indebted to our colleague Jeffrey Fagan 
for these insights on Los Angeles, based on research he is conducting into the relationship between 
alleged gang membership and imposition of the death penalty in Los Angeles and California 
generally.  As for Phoenix, consider a recent article comparing Maricopa (Phoenix) and Pima 
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of the death sentences nationwide.386  More recently, however, their share has 
almost doubled.
387
  Against the backdrop of a steep (64%) drop in the nation‘s 
annual death sentencing rate, these counties‘ previously high rates remained stable 
or, in Phoenix‘s case, increased substantially, accounting for the rise in their share 
of the national total.388 
  
                                                                                                                       
(Tucson) Counties, in the former of which death sentencing is high and increasing and in the latter of 
which, it is relatively low and decreasing substantially.  Arizona Divided: A Tale of Two Counties, 
THE ECONOMIST, March 31, 2011, at 28, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18486323 
(discussing stark differences in the two counties‘ reaction to an influx of Hispanic immigrants; 
Maricopa County, led by Sheriff Joe Arpaio, considers itself to be under siege from illegal 
immigration and has responded harshly; Pima County has taken a more moderate line; also noting  
how Pima County residents distinguish themselves from what they consider to be their more 
parochial peers in neighboring Maricopa County); infra Table 1, text following note 348 and infra 
Table 4, text accompanying note 359.   (documenting Maricopa County‘s increasing and Pima 
County‘s decreasing use of the death penalty).  The boom in death-sentencing throughout all of 
southern California, see infra 349 and accompanying text, may well be in reaction to both gangs and 
illegal immigration. 
The above comparison between Tucson and Phoenix, and our generalizations about a county as 
large and diverse as Los Angeles, prompt two caveats to our overall analysis.  First, the parochial 
and libertarian forces we describe are neither immune to, nor necessarily more powerful than, a 
variety of contingencies relating to such things as the priorities and political ambitions of a given 
county‘s district attorney or the commission there of a particularly wrenching crime.  Those 
contingencies may account for wide discrepancies in death-sentencing practices among counties, and 
within the same county over time, that cannot be explained by differences in the extent to which the 
counties are, or over time have become, more or less parochial or libertarian.  Without denying the 
importance of such contingencies, our argument is simply that parochial and libertarian tendencies 
exert considerable, if not always decisive, influence over death-sentencing practices in the ways we 
have suggested.  Indeed, one such influence may be a county‘s susceptibility to contingencies that 
tend to generate death sentences—e.g., the election of a prosecutor with an unusually strong 
disposition to use the death penalty, including as a springboard for higher office.  Second, the fact 
that Los Angeles County encompasses neighborhoods ranging from some of the most, to some of the 
least, ―progressive‖ or ―permissive‖ in the nation requires caution in generalizing about the effect 
there and in other populous jurisdictions of any single tendency.  Even so, we think it is reasonable 
to suggest that perceived threats from, for example, gangs and illegal immigration can trigger strong 
enough reactions in particular segments of the population of a county to influence policies, even if 
many or most other residents take a more nuanced view of the supposed threat. 
 
386. Clarke Spreadsheet, supra note 39.   
387 The data in Table 1 are from Clarke Spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
388. Clarke Spreadsheet, supra note 39.   
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Table 1 
 
As Table 2 illustrates, three of Los Angeles County‘s fellow southern California 
jurisdictions—Orange, Riverside and San Diego Counties—also are part of a death 
sentencing boom in regions close to the border with Mexico.
389
  
 
Table 2 
 
County Death Sentences Per 
Year, 1973–1995 
Death Sentences Per 
Year, 2004–2009 
Orange, CA 1.6 2.3 
Riverside, CA 1.2 2.5 
San Diego, CA 1.0 1.3 
 
While the status quo ante continues with little interruption in these major 
urban capital contributors and many smaller, rural counties,390 huge swaths of 
communities either slowed down their death sentencing rates dramatically in 
2004–2009 or did not use the death penalty at all.391  New Jersey and New 
                                                                                                                       
 
389 The data in Table 2 are from Clarke Spreadsheet, supra note 39.   
390. Examples of small counties experiencing increases in death sentencing rates between 
1973-95 and 2004-09 include Caddo Parrish, LA (death verdicts increased from 2 in 1973-95 to 6 in 
2004-2009); Cherokee, TX (death verdicts increased from 0 in 1973-95 to 2 in 2004-2009); Houston, 
AL (death verdicts increased from 6 in 1973-95 to 9 in 2004-2009); Madison, NE (death verdicts 
from 1 in 1973-95 to 3 in 2004-2009); and Seminole, FL (imposed 6 death verdicts in both 1973-95 
and in 2004-2009).  See Clark spreadsheet, supra note 39.  
391 Examples of less populous counties experiencing sharp declines in death sentencing 
between 1973–95 and 2004–09 include Bay, FL (death verdicts dropped from 13 in 1973–95 to 3 in 
2005–09); Glynn, GA (death verdicts dropped from 8 in 1973–95 to 2in 2005–09); Lexington, SC 
County Death Sentences Per 
Year, 1973–1995 
Death Sentences Per 
Year, 2004–2009 
Los Angeles, CA 6.8 5.5 
Maricopa, AZ (Phoenix) 5.2 6.2 
Oklahoma, OK 3.1 3.0 
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Mexico abolished the death penalty in 2009, and before doing so, did not register a 
single capital sentence in the 2004–2009 period.392  Quietly, neither did New 
Hampshire and South Dakota, and neither did conservative Montana and Utah.
393
  
Washington, Wyoming and Maryland each registered only one, and Colorado had 
only two.
394
  Perhaps most surprising is Virginia—which after Texas has carried 
out the second most executions in the United States since Gregg.
395
  Since 2005, 
Virginia has imposed only one death sentence a year.
396
 
 
Outside of these states, there were eight counties, collected in Table 3, with 
over 500,000 people that handed down at least six death sentences in the Broken 
System period, but none between 2004 and 2009.
397
  These counties represent a 
sizable portion of the nation‘s citizens who in the earlier period were significant 
death penalty consumers, measured by their localities‘ death sentencing practices, 
yet they stopped imposing capital sentences in the six-year window of our later 
study.
398
  They again are representative of many smaller counties that likewise 
have seen death sentences plunge to zero since 2000.
399
 These communities are 
                                                                                                                       
(small city; death verdicts dropped from 18 in 1973–95 to 5 in 2005–09)); Montgomery, PA 
(suburban; death verdicts dropped from 12 in 1973–95 to 3 in 2005–09)); Randall, TX (death verdicts 
dropped from 8 in 1973–95 to 2 in 2005–09); and Russell, AL (rural/small city; death verdicts 
dropped from 6 in 1973–95 to 3 in 2005–09).  See Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 40. 
392. Clarke Spreadsheet, supra note 39.  
393 See Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 39; infra note 364 and accompanying text (citing 
legislative action on abolition in Montana). 
394 See Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
395 Measured by its high number of executions, Virginia has long been thought of as a death 
penalty heavyweight.  But as Broken System II discovered, Virginia acquired that status not by being 
a heavy death-sentencing state---in fact, it imposed rather few death sentences per capita compared to 
states like Alabama, Oklahoma and Texas.  Virginia managed a high number of executions, because 
its low death-sentencing rate translated into a low reversal rate, giving it the nation‘s highest rate of 
executions per death sentence.  See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at xxx.  In the recent period, 
Virginia has moved from being a moderate death sentencing state to being a marginal death 
sentencing state. 
396 See DEATH SENTENCES BY STATE AND YEAR, supra note XXX . 
397 The data in Table 3 are from Clarke Spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
398 These are large urban areas, generating many homicides each year, so the absence of death 
sentences in the recent six-year period is more reliably indicative of ongoing trends than it is in 
counties with fewer people and homicides.  
399 Examples of less populous counties experiencing declines in death sentencing to zero 
between 1973–95 and 2004–09 include Bowie, TX (death verdicts dropped to 0 in 2004–09 from 8 in 
1973–95); Creek, OK (death verdicts dropped to 0 in 2004–09 from 7 in 1973–95); Cole, MO (death 
verdicts dropped to 0 in 2004–09 from 12 in 1973–95); Columbia, FL (death verdicts dropped to 0 in 
2004–09 from 10 in 1973–95); Meriweather, GA (death verdicts dropped to 0 in 2004–09 from 8 in 
1973–95); and Rockingham, NC (death verdicts dropped to 0 in 2004–09 from 8 in 1973–95).  See 
Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
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widely dispersed throughout the country, defying any state-centric or 
region-centric explanation for the decline in death sentencing.  
 
Table 3 
 
County Death Sentences Per 
Year, 1973–1995 
Death Sentences Per 
Year, 2004–2009 
Muscogee, GA (Columbus) 1.1 0 
Palm Beach, FL 0.8 0 
Marion, IN (Indianapolis) 0.7 0 
Santa Clara, CA (San Jose) 0.7 0 
Gwinnett, GA (suburban 
Atlanta) 
0.5 0 
Davidson, TN (Nashville) 0.4 0 
Franklin, OH (Columbus) 0.4 0 
San Francisco, CA 0.3 0 
 
Finally, part of the drop-off in death sentences occurred in counties—several 
of the largest in the nation—that used to be but no longer are in the high frequency 
category, yet still impose some death sentences.  Together, the seven counties 
listed in Table 4 accounted for about a tenth of the nation‘s death sentences during 
the 1973–1995 Broken System II period.  Between 2004 and 2009, their share fell 
to 3.6%—less than that of either Maricopa or Los Angeles County by itself.  
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Table 4 
County Death Sentences Per 
Year, 1973–1995 
Death Sentences Per 
Year, 2004–2009 
Cook, IL (Chicago)400 6.3 1.2 
Miami-Dade, FL 4.7 0.7 
Hillsborough, FL (Tampa) 3.0 0.5 
Pima, AZ (Tucson)401 2.9 1.0 
Pinellas, FL (St. 
Petersburg) 
2.3 0.5 
Cuyahoga, OH 
(Cleveland) 
2.0 0.5 
Baltimore County, MD 1.5 0.2 
 
The process evidently continues.  In the past year, the legislatures of 
Connecticut,
402
 Kansas,
403
 Kentucky,
404
 Indiana,
405
 Montana,
406
 Maryland,
407
 
Nebraska,
408
 Ohio
409
 Pennsylvania,
410
 and of course, Illinois,
411
 have given 
                                                                                                                       
 
400 Illinois abolished capital punishment in March 2011.  See supra note 18. 
401 See supra note 347 (comparing Pima (Tucson) and Maricopa (Phoenix) Counties. 
402 See supra notes 311–315 and accompanying text. 
403 See RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislative-activity [hereinafter Recent Legislative Activity] 
(last visited July 15, 2011) (discussing House Bill 2323, which would abolish the death penalty and 
replace it with life without parole). 
404 Id. (discussing House Bill 292, to abolish the death penalty). 
405 Id. (discussing Senate Bill 344, to abolish the death penalty). 
406 Id. (discussing Senate Bill 185, to abolish the death penalty, which was defeated in the 
House Judiciary Committee on March 18, 2011).  
407 Id. (discussing House Bill 1075 and Senate Bill 837, to abolish the death penalty).  
408 Id. (discussing Legislative Bill 276, to replace the death penalty with life without parole, 
which passed the Judiciary Committee in March 2011). 
409 Id. (discussing a bill introduced in the Ohio General Assembly in March, 2011 to abolish 
the death penalty and replace it with life without parole).  
410 Id. (discussing Senate Bill 423, to abolish the death penalty introduced on March 24, 2011); 
see also Governor Rendell Urges General Assembly to Review Effectiveness of Pennsylvania's Death 
Penalty, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 14, 2011, 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/governor-rendell-urges-general-assembly-to-review-effec
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significant attention to abolition proposals.
412
 
 
C. A Smaller Tail Wagging a Larger Dog 
 
The distribution of recent death sentencing declines in the United States does 
not reveal a more sensible death penalty equilibrium in which capital sentencing 
proclivities nationwide have converged around the penalty‘s use only for the worst 
crimes, and error rates and the majority-to-minority subsidy have faded.  On the 
contrary, the data demonstrates that the problems we discuss above have 
sharpened.  An increasingly isolated core of counties continues to impose the vast 
majority of death sentences.  And they continue to do so at high—probably 
error-inducing
413—rates, making it likely that only a small proportion of the 
                                                                                                                       
tiveness-of-pennsylvanias-death-penalty-113610439.html. 
411 See supra notes 18 and accompanying text. 
412 Evidence from California and Florida reveal how deceiving statewide data can be.  
Although, as we suggest above, southern California counties (Imperial, Los Angeles, Orange, 
Riverside, San Bernardino and San Diego) are frequent and increasing users of death sentences 
(driving state totals up), see supra notes 347–349 and accompanying text, some northern California 
counties that previously used the death penalty have more recently stopped doing so (Santa Clara and 
San Francisco).  Similarly, some of the biggest drops in the nation were in western and southern 
Florida (Dade, Hillsborough, Palm Beach and Pinellas Counties), while some of the most persistent 
capital-sentencing counties were in the northern and eastern parts of that State (e.g., Brevard, 
Broward, Duval and St. Lucie Counties).  See Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
413 Our data do not prove that high capital sentencing rates continue to generate high rates of 
serious error or high rates of reversal by state or federal courts, and no study comparable to Broken 
System has addressed the question since Broken System II was completed in 2002.  The fact that 
only around fifty executions occur each year from among a death row population above 3200, see 
supra notes 336–337 and accompanying text, reveals that capital review procedures are not speeding 
up, which in turn suggests that state and federal courts continue to find claims of error to be deserving 
of review.  Indeed, the Justice Department‘s annual capital punishment reports indicate that the time 
between death sentences and executions has risen steadily over the past decade.  Compare, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (DECEMBER 2010), BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2215 (last visited July 15, 2011) (calculating the 
average time from death verdict to execution of those executed in 2009 as 14 years and 1 month) 
with, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, at 1 (December 2006), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=415 (calculating the average time from death 
verdict to execution of those executed in 2005 was 12 years and 3 months) with CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,  at 1 (December 2002), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=438 (indicating that the average time from death 
verdict to execution of those executed in 2009 was 11 years and 10 months); see generally King et al, 
supra note 186 (showing of sample of cases showing that capital federal habeas corpus petitions were 
taking twice as long to complete as of 2000-06 than was true before 1996). Likewise, the fact that the 
nation‘s death row population has come down somewhat over the last decade, notwithstanding a 
decline in executions during the same period, see supra notes 336–339 and accompanying text, 
suggests that reversals leading to non capital sentences on retrial continue to occur.  Given 
Congress‘s adoption of legislation in 1996 reducing federal prisoners‘ access to federal habeas corpus 
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verdicts will ever end in executions.  
 
Instead of a harmonizing of death sentencing rates nationwide, or a smooth 
decline across still disparate counties, we are witnessing a retreat of the death 
penalty to a small bastion of counties where its use remains high or is being 
fortified.  In contrast, many jurisdictions that previously used it sparingly are 
losing their stomach for it entirely.  As capital punishment becomes more and 
more of a minority outcome, and the discrepancy between the small capital 
sentencing core of jurisdictions and the majority of less death prone communities 
sharpens, so does the system‘s irrationality from the perspective of the latter.  
They have to subsidize practices by their parochial and libertarian neighbors in 
which they are no longer disposed to indulge themselves—and to continue bearing 
public safety and judicial integrity costs that spill over from their neighbors‘ risky 
actions. 
 
The picture gets even more disturbing when we consider what Carol and 
Jordan Steiker call ―symbolic [capital] states.‖ 414   Over 25% of the death 
sentences handed down today originate in states that are profoundly unwilling or 
unable to carry out most capital sentences unless they have the consent of the 
condemned.415  Faced with the facts set out in Table 5, it is fair to say that a 
death verdict in California, Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, Nevada, Pennsylvania 
and Tennessee is little more than a cruel joke.  It is cruel because the victims‘ 
family members are not told that the punch line they anxiously await almost 
certainly will never occur, and because of the psychological terror the system 
inflicts on condemned men given an involuntary execution does occur now and 
then.
416
  It is a joke—at least to the majority that pays for the system without 
                                                                                                                       
review, it is likely that the reversal rate in federal court has declined recently.  That was the finding 
of a recent study of non-final (i.e. only district court not court of appeals and Supreme Court) 
decisions in a non-representative sample of federal habeas corpus cases filed in 2000-02.  See King 
et al, supra note 186, at 2, 3, 10 (finding reversal rate of 13% for sample of cases filed in 2000-02, 
which is 35 times higher than the reversal rate in non capital habeas corpus cases; predicting that the 
actual capital reversal rate is higher because 25% of the cases in the study were still under review 
when the study ended and because cases in which reversals occur tend to take longer that 
affirmances, but predicting that the rate would not reach the 40% level in the Broken System II study). 
Given Broken System II‘s finding that state courts account for 90% of reversals of capital verdicts, 
and that state and federal reversal patterns tend to be compensatory—with state rates increasing if 
federal reversal rates decline, and vice versa, and with state courts focusing more on urban cases and 
federal courts focusing more on rural ones, see BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 65, 218–19), it 
is unlikely that trends in the current federal reversal rate, whatever it may be, are indicative of trends 
in the state courts or the overall reversal rate.  
414 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 186, at 1870. 
415. Id.  
416 See supra notes 288–293, 316 and accompanying text. 
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hoping to get much from it—because of the resources spent to achieve a minuscule 
and capriciously determined number of involuntary executions.  
 
Table 5 
 
State Death 
Row  
Executions 
Since 1976 
Prisoner 
Volunteered 
for 
Execution 
All 
Executions 
as % of 
Death Row 
Involuntary 
Executions 
as % of 
Death Row 
California 702 13 2 1.9% 1.6% 
Connecticut 12 1 1 8.3% 0% 
Kansas 9 0 0 0% 0% 
Nevada 77 12 11 15.6% 1.2% 
Pennsylvania 222 3 3 1.4% 0% 
Tennessee 89 6 1 6.7% 5.6% 
 
In this sense, the irrationality of the system is getting worse.  California and 
Pennsylvania—prototypical ―symbolic states‖—accounted for 15% of death 
sentences during the 1973–95 period.417  In our more recent 2005–2009 study 
period, the two states imposed a quarter of all US death sentences.
418
  The 
implication is clear, and from the subsidizing majority‘s perspective, troubling.  
As majority communities and taxpayers take steps to curb the costs of their own, 
previously modest, use of the death penalty, the subsidy they continue to pay is 
emboldening the minority of death prone communities to intensify their profligate 
ways.  Where the Steikers found ―no obvious correlation between securing death 
verdicts and carrying out executions,‖419  there now seems to be a negative 
correlation.  The more improbable executions become, the more death sentences 
capital prone communities impose.  The smaller the chance that the system will 
generate the only outcome—executions—that distinguishes it from a system in 
which life without parole is the most severe sentence, the greater the subsidy, 
public safety and judicial integrity burden the majority of death avoiding 
                                                                                                                       
 
417. Clarke Spreadsheet, supra note 39.   
418 Clarke spreadsheet, supra note 39. 
419 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 1872. 
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communities and taxpayers must bear.
420
  
 
Table 6 bears out this concern.  It identifies the top six States in the nation 
based on the number of death sentences imposed between 2004 and 2009.  Then 
it reports those States‘ ranking (out of thirty-two total states) based on the 
historical probability that a death sentence each state imposes will actually result in 
an execution.
421
  Five of the six top death sentencing States in the nation—all but 
Texas—are ranked in the bottom two-fifths of States when it comes to how likely 
it is that their death verdicts will be carried out. 
 
Table 6 
 
State Death Sentences  
2004–2009 
Probability of Execution  
(Rank out of thirty-two)   
California 110 31 
Florida 94 25 
Texas 79 2 
Alabama 63 19 
Arizona 45 20 
Pennsylvania 35 32 
 
Above, we show how for decades the majority of communities and taxpayers 
that rarely use the death penalty have borne a huge share of the costs of the quick 
                                                                                                                       
 
420 Although the Steikers focus on ―symbolic states,‖ our analysis shows that the source of the 
problem is a subset of death prone communities in the state.  California and Florida, for example, are 
made up both of counties that are increasing and those that are decreasing their use—but are not 
decreasing their subsidy—of the death penalty.  See supra Tables 1–4; supra notes 254–255, 
259–260, & 262–266.   
421 The number of death sentences imposed is from DEATH SENTENCES BY STATE AND YEAR, 
supra note 12.  The historical probability of an execution is calculated by dividing each state‘s 
cumulative number of executions from 1977 to 2007 by its cumulative number of death sentences in 
the same period.  The data produced by this calculation and the rankings it generates are from, 
EXECUTIONS PER DEATH SENTENCE, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-death-sentence (last visited July 15, 2011).  Only states 
that currently have the death penalty and carried out at least one execution between 1977 and 2007 
are included. 
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and unvarnished death verdicts that a minority of parochial and libertarian 
communities prefer over systematic law enforcement.  We puzzled over the 
majority‘s willingness to continue subsidizing the minority‘s profligacy.  In this 
Part we discovered evidence that the majority has recently tried to fight back by 
decreasing its own use of the penalty.  But far from chastening the minority, the 
result has been to embolden it.  Whether because of increasingly tight budgets in 
communities that already underfund law enforcement, or to capture space cleared 
in statewide capital punishment budgets by their neighbors‘ withdrawal from the 
field, the minority have expanded their reliance on capital sentences in lieu of 
effective prevention and adjudication, even as the likelihood has declined that their 
error-laden death verdicts will ever be executed.  On the assumption that the 
majority, having already given the shirts off their backs, is increasingly unwilling 
to continue being flayed, the next Part suggests some steps the majority might take.  
 
VIII. POLICY OPTIONS 
 
A. The Insufficiency of Options Previously Proposed 
 
This Article is the fourth in a series chronicling a ―broken‖ system of capital 
punishment and proposing solutions.
422
  In Overproduction of Death and Broken 
System II, we proposed a set of individual policy options designed to reconfigure 
incentives and force the cost of effective death sentencing to be borne at trial.
423
  
 
To some extent, state and federal institutions listened or figured it out for 
themselves.  One proposal was to improve the quality of counsel in capital 
trials.
424
  In three rulings between 2000 and 2005, the Supreme Court required 
more comprehensive mitigation investigations in the run-up to capital trials.
425
  
                                                                                                                       
 
422 See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27 (published in abridged form in Gelman et al., supra 
note 15); Liebman, supra note 146; Liebman, supra note 19. 
423 See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 391–418 (reprised in GELMAN ET AL., supra note 
15, at 254–60) (proposing policy options to narrow the death penalty to the most aggravated cases); 
Liebman, supra note 146, at 2129 (suggesting strategies to get trial level officials to internalize the 
costs of their errors in capital cases). 
424 See Liebman, supra note 146, at 2147 (proposing that states adequately compensate 
defense counsel and support services for indigent capital defendants). 
425 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (holding that ―even when a capital 
defendant‘s family members and the defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is 
available, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel 
knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of 
trial‖); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (requiring counsel to gather substantial 
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Another proposal was to adopt the alternative of life without parole.
426
  All death 
penalty states have now done so.
427
  Together these changes dissuade jurisdictions 
from pursuing marginal capital prosecutions out of fear of heavy defense costs and 
given the availability of a stout alternative to death.
428
  In the process, the reforms 
improve the reliability of the capital sentences that are imposed.  
 
Our analysis reveals, however, that the effect of these steps is limited.  
Although they almost certainly have contributed to declining use of the death 
penalty in the majority of jurisdictions that already were fairly judicious capital 
sentencers, we have produced substantial evidence that the minority of 
jurisdictions that produce the lion‘s share of death sentences are not much affected 
by these reforms.  Recent patterns suggest that those communities are not pulling 
back from the death penalty and may even be increasing the number of flawed 
verdicts they impose.
429
  Our analysis also explains why.  These communities‘ 
parochialism and libertarianism leads them to value death verdicts—particularly 
for felony murder—for two reasons that in neither case are affected by court 
reversals or modern carceral options like life without parole.  First, they value 
death verdicts for the clear message sent, then and there, about how the community 
views and intends to respond to invasive outsider crime.
430
  Second, capital felony 
murder lets them ration the few resources they are willing to spend on law 
enforcement on the stranger crimes they most abhor, while retaining a sense of the 
law in their own hands and while minimizing entanglement with the modern 
administrative state.
431
  More generally, these jurisdictions value the verdict more 
than the execution, so discipline tied to whether or not the verdict will be carried 
out has little effect on them.
432
 
 
In Slow Dancing with Death, we suggested that each state use comparative 
proportionality review of murder sentences to define a statewide ―going rate‖ for 
the amount of aggravation (once discounted by the amount of mitigation present in 
                                                                                                                       
mitigating evidence prior to the sentencing phase); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 392 (1999) 
(ordering relief where defendant‘s attorneys failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating 
evidence at the sentencing phase of trial that might have influenced the jury‘s appraisal of the 
defendant‘s moral culpability). 
426 BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 404. 
427 See supra note 303and accompanying text. 
428 See supra notes 239–245, 301–303 and accompanying text. 
429 See supra notes 347–350 and accompanying text. 
430 See supra text following note 88; supra notes 95, 175–179, 205–207, 220–223 and 
accompanying text.   
431 See supra notes 128–141 and accompanying text. 
432 See supra notes 95, 175–179, 205–207, 220–223 and accompanying text. 
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the case) that is needed for a death sentence, and to expunge outliers.
433
  This 
strategy is partially responsive to the analysis here, because it would use the 
application of the death penalty in the majority of jurisdictions that implement it 
sparingly to discipline more death prone communities and orient the death penalty 
towards only extreme cases.
434
  As Slow Dancing with Death describes, however, 
after first seeming to require comparative proportionality review, the Supreme 
Court pulled back—evidently because of the unwanted substantive responsibility 
this placed on the Court to develop a national ―going rate‖ by comparing state 
―going rates.‖435  The only state willing to implement the strategy in earnest was 
New Jersey, and its failure to carry through with it was part of the justification for 
the state‘s 2009 abolition of capital punishment. 436   We may never know, 
therefore, whether comparative review would have enabled courts to manage the 
dialectic between parochial/libertarian communities and other communities within 
a state—or instead would have skewered them on one or the other of the dialect‘s 
horns.
437
 
 
In any event, mechanisms are required to help the majority rein in the high 
frequency death imposing minority.  Repeal is the most obvious solution, but one 
that, for reasons set out above and below,
438
 many courts and legislatures do not 
                                                                                                                       
 
433 Liebman, supra note 19, at 129 (arguing that the Supreme Court could have used returns 
from juries, courts and legislatures nationwide to identify a national ―going rate‖ for death sentencing 
and, on that basis, adopted a more defensible interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause and applied it to overturn outlying, excessively broad statutes, sentencing patterns and 
individual death verdicts). 
434 Id. at 129–30.  
435 Id. 
436 See NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY COMM‘N, supra note 235, at 49–50; supra note 18 and 
accompanying text. 
437 See Liebman, supra note 19, at xx; see also James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, 
Less is Better: Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, xx 
(2006).  Note a related dialectic that the Supreme Court indeed never managed to resolve, between 
Justice Stewart‘s desire to avoid caprice by narrowing death verdicts to a small set of the worst of the 
worst cases and Justice White‘s desire to increase the number of death verdicts to enhance the 
deterrent and retributive power of the death penalty.  See id. at 1608–48.  Although Justice White 
was far too rationalistic and scientific in his aim for additional deterrence and retribution to be a 
perfect proxy for death prone parochial and libertarian communities, his never resolved battle with 
Justice Stewart has elements of the dialectic between the minority and majority communities that we 
discuss in this Article.  
438 See supra notes 7–18, 59–141, 301, 304, 311–31 and accompanying text; infra notes 
405–06 and accompanying text.   
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yet seem to be ready to adopt.
439
  Accordingly, we limit ourselves here to 
strategies in the shadow of the possibility of abolition, rather than abolition itself. 
 
B. Regulatory Strategies 
 
Death prone communities‘ suspicion of outside forces and distaste for 
government complicate the political economy and the design of steps to regulate 
local capital decisions.  Enforcement is challenging, too, because the usual 
appellate strategy for regulating local court action has little effect on these 
communities, given the greater importance they assign to the verdict, which they 
control, over its execution, which appellate courts control.
440
  Finally, the courts 
and the death indifferent majority seem to be wary of crossing death prone 
communities, out of respect for their traditions and self-reliance and fear of their 
affinity for self-help.
441
 
 
We take as a given, however, that the majority—which is a majority, after 
all—has resolved to fight back.442  Moreover, the majority holds the top card; it 
can repeal the death penalty—as legislatures in red and blue states alike are 
currently considering.
443
  Under these circumstances, the threat of repeal provides 
a classic ―penalty default.‖  It is an outcome about which both ―sides‖ may have 
enough doubts (as to whether it will be accomplished) and fears (that it will be 
accomplished and engender a frightening response) that they will agree to 
cooperate and share secret information to stave off the uncertainty and feared 
effects.
444
  Or course, if the majority is disposed to seek abolition, it should do so 
and outright end the death penalty‘s fiscal, public safety and judicial integrity 
harms.  But if the majority is unsure it can achieve abolition or that it wants to, it 
                                                                                                                       
 
439 See supra notes 360–368 and accompanying text (discussing abolition proposals in several 
states, thus far unsuccessful). 
440 See supra notes 95, 175–179, 205–207, 220–223 and accompanying text. 
441 See supra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
442 See supra notes 332–372 and accompanying text. 
443 See supra notes 360–370 and accompanying text. 
444 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91–93 (1989) (describing how contract law uses onerous 
and unpredictable requirements to encourage contracting parties to ―bargain around‖ the rule, thus 
creating an incentive to redress information asymmetries in order to develop solutions better tailored 
to the particular conditions than any single solution the law could prescribe); Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Information Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN 
THE E.U. AND THE U.S. 301–05 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds. 2007) (citing authority and 
extending Ayers & Gertner‘s analysis to public regulatory regimes). 
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can use the threat that rising costs will drive it to embrace that ―nuclear‖ option to 
induce the minority‘s cooperation. 
 
1. Less, Not More, Externalization of Costs 
 
As we have noted, the majority‘s main goal should be to get death prone 
communities to internalize more of the costs of their capital proclivities.
445
  This 
principle may seem obvious, but it rules out a number of oft-proposed capital 
reform strategies that have the counterproductive effect of increasing the state 
(majority-to-minority) subsidy of local capital sentencing practices.  Examples 
include statewide public defender systems and state prosecutors on loan to 
localities;
446
 state mechanisms for sharing the cost of capital prosecution and 
representing the defendant;
447
 and Professor Gershowitz‘s recent proposal to 
require ―[a]ll aspects of death penalty cases—charging, trial, appeal, and 
everything in between—[to] be handled at the state level by an elite group of 
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges.‖ 448   Professor Smith‘s trenchant 
response to Gershowitz‘s proposal applies to the other suggestions as well: 
 
If states take over the enforcement of the death penalty . . . or underwrite 
the cost of local prosecutions . . ., prosecutors will have less incentive to 
show . . . restraint . . . .  Given the greater resources that are available to 
states, [they] are better positioned than localities to bear the financial 
costs of seeking the death penalty.  Consequently, . . . the most likely 
result [is] more death sentences.
449
 
                                                                                                                       
 
445 See Liebman, supra note 146, at 2142 (―To succeed, reform efforts must realign the 
incentives of all key players . . . to make it costly for police and prosecutors to pursue marginal, and 
to obtain undeserved, capital judgments‖); supra notes 378–395 and accompanying text.  
446 See, e.g., Death Penalty Focus, Inadequate Legal Representation, 
http://www.deathpenalty.org/article.php?id=83 (last visited May 17, 2011) (noting that ―in 2009, the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions conducted an official visit 
to the United States to examine the administration of the death penalty in Alabama and Texas‖ and 
―called for the two states ‗to establish well-funded, state-wide public defender services‘‖).  
447 Proposals of this sort have recently been made, for example, in California and Washington 
State.  See California Death Penalty Comm‘n, supra note 254, at 20 (recommending that counties be 
―fully reimburse[d]‖ by the state for payments for defense services and that the backlog of appeals be 
addressed by state funding of an expanded state public defender); Washington State Bar Report, 
supra note 228, at 33 (arguing that, in order to keep ―financial restraints‖ from interfering with 
charging decisions, ―the state [should] assume the prosecution and defense costs of all aggravated 
murder cases‖). 
448 See Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 310.  
449 Smith, supra note 21, at 120.  
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To be sure, Professor Gershowitz aims to dampen local excesses by putting 
the capital charging decision in the hands of elite state officials.
450
  But for local 
communities, this new effusion of state power and withdrawal of the sacred 
prerogative of local communities to define the ―worst of the worst‖ for themselves 
would certainly be a bridge too far, tantamount to repealing the death penalty.  
For Gershowitz‘s proposal to go forward, therefore, the decision to proceed 
capitally almost certainly would end up in the hands of local prosecutors and grand 
juries, or of state officials whose capital sentencing dispositions mirror those of the 
death prone communities.  In either event, Professor Smith‘s objections are on 
target. 
 
The more difficult question is whether the majority should remove state 
subsidies that already exist.
451
  The problem is that removing existing supports, 
such as statewide public defenders, could aggravate the problem by generating 
more error-prone verdicts as a result of under-funded local representation.
452
  The 
test for whether to remove existing subsidies is, therefore, straightforward: if the 
local action being subsidized helps the locality directly achieve the one thing it 
wants—death verdicts—removing the subsidy is a good idea.  An example is 
state sharing of the cost of the prosecution itself.  Otherwise, however, the goal 
should not be to remove the existing subsidies but to forbear adding new ones. 
 
2. The Problems with Performance-Based Approaches 
 
To get localities to stop incurring, or externalizing, capital sentencing costs, 
states might directly aim (1) to limit death verdicts or (2) cost them out and impose 
a corresponding charge on the sentencing community.  Professor Gershowitz has 
proposed a version of each of these strategies. 
 
Most simply, Gershowitz has proposed to cap the number of capital 
prosecutions a community can bring each year at ―two capital prosecutions for 
every 100 murders‖ and for smaller jurisdictions with fewer murders, a maximum 
of ―one capital prosecution per year‖453   This approach directly attacks the 
                                                                                                                       
 
450 See Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 338–39. 
451 See supra notes 242–276, 402–403 and accompanying text. 
452 See supra notes 75, 174, 308–389, 402–403 and accompanying text. 
453 Adam M. Gershowtiz, Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, 72 MO. L. REV. 73, 78–79 
(2007). 
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problem of overuse of the death penalty.  But its rigidity is enough to turn almost 
anyone into a regulation hating libertarian.  Prosecutors will complain that no 
―right‖ number of death verdicts can apply to all jurisdictions and that 
―heinousness‖ is not evenly distributed across murders and years, so prosecutors 
would be forced to treat like crimes, defendants and victims differently; that a 
county with only ninety-nine murders in a year will be senselessly disadvantaged 
relative to an identical county with 101; that cities with many murders will be 
disadvantaged in relation to towns with fewer than fifty, which nonetheless get 
their one capital prosecution; and that counties should be able to trade ―death 
permits,‖ creating a market in lives.454  Defendants will complain that creative 
charging practices will let prosecutor manipulate the number of ―murders‖ in their 
jurisdiction to increase their cap; that, in order to fill the quota in a ―down‖ year for 
murders, less egregious cases will be selected; and that the remedy in any event 
will not deter ―quick and dirty‖ procedures in cases that are chosen to meet the 
quota.455  
 
A different approach analogizes the modern death penalty to a public service 
that only a minority of people value, justifying a hefty ―user fee‖ each time a 
county initiates a capital case.  Charging the same fee in every case, however, 
will miss the distinct uses counties make of the death penalty and the different 
levels of risk their verdicts create.  Even worse, whatever good cause is the 
beneficiary of the funds from the fees will have an incentive to urge expansion of 
the death penalty to generate more funds—as public schools in many states now 
cheer on gamblers and purchasers of regressive lottery tickets.  The temptation 
then would be to set the fee, not to cover the subsidy, but to generate maximum 
income.  This would be an especially dangerous outcome if the court system 
receives the funds, because it would encourage judges to forbear reversing cases 
for fear of decreasing revenue.  Charging more for post-reversal retrials would 
create the opposite bias.  
Professor Gershowitz tackles these problems in the last of his proposals by 
analogizing capital cases not to boutique public services but to dangerous 
nuisances.456  To get counties to use capital punishment sparingly, Gershowitz 
                                                                                                                       
 
454 Gershowitz rejects a ―cap and trade‖ strategy that would let prosecutors buy and sell 
authorizations to proceed capitally.  Gershowtiz, supra note 409, at 110, n.112.  See generally 
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 
1334–41 (1985) (claiming that tradable permits ―at one stroke, cure many of‖ command and control's 
―basic flaws‖).  
455. Gershowitz, supra note 409, at 110–16.   
456. Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 890.   
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proposes that state legislatures ―requir[e] county prosecutors to post a cash bond 
and transmit the money to the state treasury before filing capital charges.‖457  If 
prosecutors get a death sentence and preserve it on appeal, ―the bond would be 
returned to the county with interest.‖458  But ―if the case is reversed the county 
would forfeit the bond to the state.‖459  This approach addresses the right problem 
(overuse) at the right moment (time of filing capital charges) and avoids 
inflexibility by letting local prosecutors ―determine which capital cases they want 
to pursue while forcing them to take full responsibility for those decisions‖ in the 
event of reversal.
460
   
 
But there is a problem, which also afflicts more traditional approach of 
assessing costs or the other side‘s attorney‘s fees in the event an adverse verdict.  
All these strategies would make state judges hesitant to overturn flawed death 
sentences.  Broken System II shows that elected state judges already are more 
reluctant to overturn otherwise similar death sentences imposed in rural areas, 
evidently due to the stronger adverse reaction there.461  Fear of provoking that 
same reaction after every reversal could lead judges to rubber-stamp death verdicts, 
encouraging more corner-cutting in trials and increasing appeal costs by delaying 
deserved reversals until the case completes both state court levels of review and 
moves to federal court. 
 
Most of our objections to this point focus on the difficulty of measuring death 
penalty costs and assuring they are borne by the communities that generated them.  
From those communities‘ perspective, however, the bigger problem is the failure 
to gauge the benefits they derive from the death penalty—benefits, they would 
argue, that are greater in some communities than others due to different value 
choices.  The user ―fee‖ and ―cap‖ approaches directly impinge on communities‘ 
ability to be the arbiter of the benefits they get from death verdicts because those 
strategies give the same answer for all communities to the questions of ―How 
much is each case worth?‖ and ―How many is enough?‖  Even worse from this 
perspective is Gershowitz‘s alternative proposal to give the capital charging 
decision to state officials,462 because that takes away localities‘ longstanding and 
                                                                                                                       
 
457. Id. at 863.   
458. Id.   
459 Id. at 863–64.  
460 Id. at 865. 
461. See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, at 65, 218–19.   
462. See supra notes 404–06 and accompanying text.   
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highly prized ability to make the cost-benefit judgment in response to each crime.  
The ―bond‖ and ―costs‖ strategies are less pernicious from this perspective, but 
they have a similar odor insofar as they attach a punitive message to communities‘ 
capital sentencing decisions. 
 
3. Local Improvements in Defense Representation 
 
A more promising approach is to require trial procedures that improve the 
quality of death verdicts and deter communities from seeking them except when 
they meet statutory and constitutional standards.  A good example is the 
2000–2005 series of Supreme Court decisions requiring better capital defense 
representation.
463
  In theory, at least, this approach can increase the reliability of 
individual verdicts and decrease appeal costs.  It also may discourage future 
prosecutions in marginal cases out of a concern that when skilled defense lawyers 
obtain not guilty or life verdicts in high profile cases, the message communicated 
is the opposite of the fear-allaying and retributive message that parochial and 
libertarian communities want death verdicts to convey.  By diminishing the value 
of the Capital Felony Murder Doctrine for rationing those communities‘ response 
to outside crime, this reform might even trigger more professional and systematic 
law enforcement techniques to allay community crime fears.  
 
The problem, however, is that the enforcement mechanism for judicially 
imposed requirements of this sort—appellate reversal of the death verdict and 
remand for re-trial—works poorly in the current context.  To be sure, reversals do 
chasten communities that rarely use the death penalty.  But those communities do 
not impose the bulk of the error costs.  Instead, those costs are imposed by death 
prone communities for which the remedial dialectic—that the appellate court will 
not let an execution go forward until the locality cures the systemic defects that 
cause the errors—has no clout.  Those communities value the initial verdict far 
more than the execution, and they do so out of a strong desire not to engage in the 
systematic and professional practices needed to cure the error.
464
 
 
An important lesson, therefore, is that interventions will not be effective 
unless they occur before capital prosecutions are brought, not after verdicts are 
imposed.  This constraint rules out exclusive reliance on rights enforced on 
appeal.  It does not, however, make all procedural solutions ineffective.  Recall 
                                                                                                                       
 
463 See supra notes 380–381 and accompanying text. 
464 See supra text following note 88; supra notes 95, 175–79, 205–07, 220–23 and 
accompanying text. 
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our premise that cooperative steps are possible in the shadow of the penalty default 
created by the repeal option.  Under this impetus, it might be possible to secure 
legislation making the death penalty a local option, which counties invoke by 
agreeing to create a mechanism for qualified, well-paid capital defense 
attorneys.
465
  
 
Legislation to this effect might include standards that county plans for defense 
representation must meet, a review process for deciding whether the plans satisfy 
the standards and post-approval monitoring of opt-in counties‘ track record of 
reversals and other factors.  The law might assign an administrative arm of the 
state courts or the state attorney general to review and monitor plans or give the 
task to a panel with judicial, prosecutorial, defense and taxpayer representatives 
aligned with the majority interest in professional proceedings that moderate error.  
The law should require the reviewing agency to benchmark each county‘s 
proposed plan against those from similarly situated counties to create a race to the 
top.  Later, the agency should publicize counties‘ appellate track records and 
compare counties‘ records to determine whether each continues to meet the opt-in 
criteria.
466
 In this way, the law would use results from appellate and 
post-conviction review to discipline use of the death penalty without relying on 
judges to enforce the discipline through ineffective directives to ―get it right or we 
won‘t execute,‖ and without using fee options or bond forfeitures that create 
incentives for too many death sentences or too few reversals. 
 
The same outcome might be achieved less formally through negotiations with 
capital prone counties that commit, as a way to stave off repeal, to create and fund 
a qualifying mechanism for improved representation and to monitor and publicize 
counties‘ comparative appellate track records.  The goal in either event is to use 
death prone counties‘ desire to avoid repeal and their freedom to choose how to 
meet the representation standards and achieve a viable record on appeal to induce 
cooperation.  Of course, by increasing the cost of death verdicts, these approaches 
would diminish the benefit death prone communities derive from death verdicts.  
                                                                                                                       
 
465 An example of this type of mechanism—albeit one available to states, not localities, and 
that few states have thus far opted into—is the option the federal habeas statute gives states to obtain 
more expedited and favorable habeas proceedings in capital cases if they agree to create systems for 
providing qualifying state post-conviction representation to condemned prisoners.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2261, 2265 (2006); HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 248, § 3.3. 
466 For an analogous regime, see Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: 
Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 670–73 (describing Wisconsin 
legislation under which counties must adopt plans, reviewed by the state attorney general, to assure 
the reliability of eyewitness identifications). 
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What distinguishes this strategy from the cap, fee and bond approaches is that it 
enables each community to make its own judgments about how best to evaluative 
the relative benefits and costs and how to maximize the former and minimize the 
latter across all cases and in each individual case.
467
 
 
4. Managed Prosecution 
 
Along with improved defense representation at capital trials, Broken System II 
proposed making the decision to prosecute capitally a more deliberative 
process.468  The aim was to improve judgments often made hastily under the 
influence of emotions generated by the crime and invite defendants to inform 
prosecutors about competing considerations.
469
  The United States Justice 
Department, for example, requires U.S. Attorneys (some of whom have advisory 
committees of their own) to secure approval for capital prosecutions from a central 
Capital Case Review Committee that also hears from defendants.
470
  A number of 
commentators and death penalty commissions have made similar proposals.
471
  
 
This Article explains why prosecutors in death prone communities resist 
procedures of this sort.  Precisely because they are deliberative and take time, 
these procedures undermine a central feature of the quick and unvarnished death 
penalty that parochial and libertarian communities value.  They diminish the 
communities‘ and prosecutor‘s ability, as a substitute for systematic crime fighting 
strategies, to make immediately and emotively plain to fearful citizens, the 
perpetrator and prospective miscreants how seriously they take the invasion it has 
suffered and how harshly it is disposed to respond. 
 
Still, in the context of the majority‘s use of the possibility of repeal to induce 
cooperation, there may be a place for proposals for more deliberatively managing 
the decision whether to charge capitally.  Facing facts, the majority might want to 
acknowledge the dialectic between the parochial and libertarian dispositions of the 
minority of death prone communities and their own more modern views on 
                                                                                                                       
 
467 See supra notes 406–12 and accompanying text. 
468. See BROKEN SYSTEM II, supra note 27, 409–10.  
469 See id.  
470 See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts about the 
Department of Justice‘s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 404–40 (1999); Benjamin Weiser, 
Pondering Death by Committee: What Is a Capital Crime.  Federal Panel Decides Case by Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at B1. 
471 See Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 338–42, n.163 (collecting proposals and making one). 
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penology and government and their frustration at having to subsidize the 
minority‘s risky practices.  If that dialectic is to be resolved in some fashion, the 
best time to get agreement to have the conversation is in the shadow of the threat 
of repeal, and the best time and a very good way to have the conversation is on a 
contextualized, case by case basis as each possibly capital case presents itself.  
 
Agreement, then, might be reached to predicate counties‘ opt-in to the death 
penalty—or to predicate some other compromise that heads off a cataclysmic vote 
on repeal—on the minority‘s agreement to make death sentencing decisions only 
after discussion with a committee of sober representatives of the majority.  
Questions to be addressed would be those at the heart of the dialectic: why is the 
death penalty appropriate and necessary in the case?  What risks do a death 
prosecution and verdict pose for the community, the victim‘s family, the rest of the 
state and its taxpayers and the defendant?  And (in order to provoke a pretrial 
version of the comparative proportionality review the Supreme Court has declined 
to require after the fact
472
) what does the community‘s and other communities‘ 
appellate track record in similar cases suggest about the wisdom of going forward 
capitally? 
 
The forum and format for such a discussion are matters of choice.  Certainly 
the views of the victim‘s family and defendant should be heard, and 
representatives of the majority that foots the externalized portion of the capital 
punishment bill should help do the probing.  A local committee might serve, 
although it might have too little diversity to assure that the leavening questions are 
sincerely asked and answered.  A statewide standing committee would be better, 
to avoid those risks and gradually reveal—and perhaps impel—a rough, statewide 
―going rate‖ that does indeed resolve the dialectic.473 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
As a matter of the facts on the ground, the death penalty in the United States 
today is a minority institution.  Even in avidly pro death penalty states, only a 
small fraction of local jurisdictions with a minority of the population impose the 
great bulk of death verdicts.  The death penalty offers these parochial and 
libertarian communities a passionately expressive, almost violent, response to the 
outsider, cross-boundary incursions on their security that most terrify them.  At 
                                                                                                                       
 
472 See supra notes 389–391 and accompanying text. 
473 See supra notes 391–393 and accompanying text. 
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the same time, the penalty lets them severely economize on the freedom and fruits 
of their labors that they have to surrender to the modern administrative state. 
 
As spare and unvarnished as this response is locally, it is costly to the 
majority of communities and their residents who do not much use the death 
penalty.  It leaves crime unattended that spills over into neighboring 
communities.  It generates verdicts fraught with costly error.  It misleads the 
family of murder victims into thinking death verdicts will be executed, not just 
expressed.  It tortures the condemned with a punishment positively Czarist in its 
cruelty, of life without possibility of parole, but with a chance of execution a dozen 
years later.  It heaps scorn on court proceedings that churn but never conclude.  
It costs $20 to $125 million extra for the rare, random execution that now and then 
does occur.  Although hidden and diffuse, the costs are so great that one has to 
wonder why the majority puts up with them. 
 
Indeed, even as the majority of death indifferent communities and citizens 
recently have moved towards a quiet repeal of the death penalty in their own 
locales, their death prone neighbors have maintained, even intensified, its use.  A 
diminishing set of communities is responsible for a larger share of death verdicts.  
Ironically, however, death prone communities have grown increasingly indifferent 
to executions.  A quarter of the country‘s 3,200 condemned sit on a death row 
where they are more likely die of illness or old age than by execution.474  The 
seemingly senseless costs imposed on the many by the few increase. 
 
There is evidence, however, that the majority is restive.  Whether abolition is 
in the cards is uncertain, both because of the majority‘s fear of the minority‘s 
violent reaction to repeal and the majority‘s respect for the minority‘s traditions 
and self-reliance.  But a disposition to make their cost externalizing neighbors 
pay their own freight does seem to exist.  
 
We promised at the outset that we would ourselves acknowledge the 
minority‘s traditions and self-reliance.475  And although we have not minced 
words about the crude advantage the minority takes of the majority, we will 
perhaps be criticized in the end for respecting the minority and its values too much.  
Still, short of the majority‘s most logical response—repeal—there are 
                                                                                                                       
 
474. George Skelton, Repeal the Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2011 (―A condemned man 
in California is more likely to die of old age than an execution.  Although 13 have been executed, 78 
have died of natural or other causes.‖). 
475 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
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accommodations to be had to reduce the burden the minority foists on the majority, 
and we propose two of them. 
